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Abstract
The first chapter quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-
sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987)
derived the theoretical efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty,
but little is known about how well real-world bargaining performs relative to the
frontier. The setting is wholesale used-auto auctions, an $80 billion industry where
buyers and sellers participate in alternating-offer bargaining when the auction price
fails to reach a secret reserve price. Using 300,000 auction/bargaining sequences,
this study nonparametrically estimates bounds on the distributions of buyer and
seller valuations and then estimates where bargaining outcomes lie relative to the
efficient frontier. Findings indicate that the observed auction-followed-by-bargaining
mechanism is quite efficient, achieving 88-96% of the surplus and 92-99% of the trade
volume which can be achieved on the efficient frontier.
This second chapter examines a common form of entry restriction: occupational
licensing. The chapter studies how occupational licensing laws affect the distribution
of quality and how the effects of licensing on quality vary across regions of differing
income levels. The study uses variation in state licensing requirements for teachers
and two national datasets on teacher qualifications (input quality) and student test
scores (output quality) from 1983-2008. Results show that more restrictive licensing
may lead first-year teachers of high input quality to opt out of the occupation. For
teachers who remain in the occupation longer, stricter licensing increases input quality
at most quantiles. The distribution of student test scores increases with stricter
licensing, primarily in the upper half of the distribution. For most forms of licensing
studied, input and output quality improvements due to stricter licensing occur in
high-income rather than low-income districts.
The third chapter (co-authored with Denis Chetverikov and Christopher Palmer)
proposes a simple approach for estimating distributional effects of a group-level treat-
ment when there are unobservable components at the group level which may be cor-
related with the treatment. Standard quantile regression techniques are inconsistent
in this setting, while grouped instrumental variables quantile regression is consis-
tent. The study illustrates the estimation approach with several examples, including
3
applications from the first two chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 1
The Efficiency of Dynamic,
Post-Auction Bargaining:
Evidence from Wholesale
Used-Auto Auctions
1.1 Introduction
From haggling in an open-street market to negotiating a corporate takeover deal,
alternating-offer bargaining between a buyer and seller is one of the oldest and most
common forms of transaction. When both parties have incomplete information, it
is known that equilibrium outcomes are difficult to characterize.1 Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) demonstrated that full efficiency is not possible, and theoretical
efficiency bounds are derived in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams
(1987), but it is unknown how well real-world bargaining performs relative to these
bounds. Williams (1987) emphasized that "little is known about whether or not these
1Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) stated, "The theory of bargaining under incomplete information is
currently more a series of examples than a coherent set of results. This is unfortunate because bar-
gaining derives much of its interest from incomplete information." Fudenberg et al. (1985) similarly
commented "We fear that in this case [of two-sided incomplete information], few generalizations will
be possible, and that even for convenient specifications of the functional form of the distribution of
valuations, the problem of characterizing the equilibria will be quite difficult."
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limits can be achieved with 'realistic' bargaining procedures." This paper is the first
attempt to bring data to this question in order to quantify the efficiency of real-world
bargaining with two-sided incomplete information. I develop a framework to estimate
distributions of private valuations on both sides of the market at wholesale used-auto
auctions. I then map these primitives into results from the theoretical mechanism
design literature in order to measure the efficiency of bargaining relative to the first-
best, the information-constrained efficient frontier, and to the indirect mechanisms
studied in Satterthwaite and Williams (1989).
The data analyzed in this paper consist of several hundred thousand sequences
of back-and-forth bargaining offers between buyers and sellers at wholesale used-
auto auctions, a large market where new and used car dealers buy vehicles from
other dealers as well as from rental companies and banks. This industry passes 15
million cars annually through its lanes, selling about 60% of the vehicles, worth a
total of $80 billion. Throughout the industry, auction houses employ the following
mechanism: a secret reserve price set by the seller followed by an ascending price
auction, which, when the secret reserve price is not met, is followed by post-auction,
alternating-offer bargaining mediated by the auction house. This setting is ideal for
studying bargaining under two-sided uncertainty because all players are experienced
professionals and are likely to understand well the game being played. Also, because
the bargaining takes place after an ascending auction and after the seller's choice of
a secret reserve price, the efficiency of bargaining can be studied while imposing only
minimal assumptions on the structure or equilibrium of the bargaining game.
After a brief introduction to the industry in Section 2, I lay out a simple model in
Section 3 which describes the three stages of the game at wholesale auto auctions. The
post-auction bargaining is modeled as a general alternating-offer bargaining game.
The auction stage is modeled as an ascending auction with symmetric, independent,
private values among bidders. The seller's secret reserve price is chosen optimally
before the auction. I prove two preliminary results which motivate an estimation
strategy: first, truth-telling is a dominant bidding strategy for buyers, and second,
the seller's secret reserve price strategy is monotone. These two properties allow for
14
nonparametric partial identification of the distributions of buyer and seller types.
Section 4 describes the data, which comes from several independent auction houses
from 2007 to 2010. The data contains detailed information on each car as well as the
actions taken by sellers and buyers in each stage of the game. The data is broken
down into two main samples: cars sold by used and new-car dealers, and cars sold
by large institutions, such as rental companies, banks, and fleet companies. These
two groups behave differently and tend to sell different types of cars, and hence I
treat them separately in the analysis. I refer to the first group as used-car dealers
and the latter group as fleet/lease sellers. The high bid from the auction exceeds the
seller's secret reserve price only 16% of the time for cars sold by used-car dealers and
only 37% of the time for fleet/lease sellers. Overall, the probability of trade is about
three-fourths, including trade which occurs during and after the auction, motivating
the question of whether or not this is an efficient level of trade.
Sections 5 through 7 constitute the heart of the paper. Section 5 presents the
approach for estimating the three main objects necessary to determine the efficiency of
bargaining: the distribution of buyer valuations, the distribution of seller valuations,
and the costs of bargaining. After controlling for observable covariates and auction
house fees, I estimate the distribution of buyer valuations using a standard order
statistics inversion. I also exploit the size of and information in this dataset by
obtaining multiple estimates of the distribution of bidder valuations using variation
in the imputed number of bidders. I then construct an optimally weighted estimate
of the buyer distribution using these different estimates.
The approach for estimating the distribution of seller types is new. It exploits the
property that the seller's secret reserve price will be strictly monotonic, implying that
it can be inverted. I use moment inequalities defined by bargaining actions to bound
the inverse of the seller's reserve price strategy. Without imposing that the estimates
be monotonic, I find increasing upper and lower bounds on the inverse of the seller's
strategy. The approach is similar in spirit to Haile and Tamer (2003), using bounds
implied by very basic assumptions about players' rationality to learn about model
primitives without solving for the equilibrium of the game. The parameters defining
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the costs of bargaining, which take the form of an additive and multiplicative cost,
are also estimated using bounds.
Section 6 presents the methods for estimating the efficient frontier and other coun-
terfactual mechanisms from mechanism design theory. It is important to note that
throughout the paper, the terms "efficient" or "second-best" refer to ex-ante incentive
efficiency, taking informational asymmetries into account. To refer to full efficiency, I
use the terms "ex-post efficient" or "first-best."2 I also use the terms "surplus" and
"gains from trade" interchangeably. The efficient frontier (or Pareto frontier) delin-
eates the best possible outcomes, in terms of buyer and seller surplus, that could be
achieved by any bilateral bargaining game in the presence of two-sided incomplete in-
formation. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) demonstrated how
this frontier depends on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations. Therefore,
the estimated distributions from Section 5 are crucial for solving for these mecha-
nisms.
In Section 6 I also present the approach for solving for the equilibria of a k double
auction, a simple mechanism where the buyer and seller simultaneously submit sealed
bids and trade occurs if the buyer's bid is higher than the seller's, with the transaction
price being a convex combination of the two bids with weight k E [0, 1]. The solution
approach comes from Satterthwaite and Williams (1989). Finally, I apply the Rev-
elation Principle (Myerson 1979) to characterize a direct mechanism corresponding
to the mechanism used at wholesale auto auctions. I solve for this direct mechanism
using a quantile-matching approach and then use the direct mechanism to estimate
buyer and seller surplus under dynamic, post-auction bargaining.
The main findings are presented in Section 7. First, I examine the efficiency loss
due to incomplete information. Ideally, a buyer and seller should trade whenever the
buyer values a good more than the seller (first-best, ex-post efficient trade). However,
private information on both sides gives rise to a bilateral monopoly, where each party
has some market power. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrated that a
2For a more detailed taxonomy of ex-ante, interim, and ex-post efficiency under incomplete
information, see Holmstr6m and Myerson (1983).
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deadweight loss occurs as each party trades off the dual incentives of increasing the
probability of trade and extracting additional rent from the other party, akin to the
deadweight loss in a standard one-sided monopoly pricing model. As a result, some
trades fail to occur even when the buyer values the good more than the seller.3 This
deadweight loss is given by the gap between the the second-best mechanism derived
in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and first-best trade. I discover that incomplete
information need not be a huge problem in this market: The second-best mechanism
achieves nearly 98% of first-best surplus.
- Second, I examine the efficiency of post-auction bargaining relative to the information-
constrained efficient frontier. Unlike the mechanisms discussed in Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987), alternating-offer bargaining with two-sided
uncertainty has no clear equilibrium predictions due to signaling by both parties.
As a result, it is unknown where alternating-offer bargaining lies within the efficient
frontier. Any gap between the efficient frontier and real-world bargaining represents
a deadweight loss which could theoretically be eliminated by committing to a static
efficient mechanism along the frontier. Therefore, I refer to this as the deadweight
loss due to limited commitment. 4 Findings indicate that the post-auction bargaining
lies quite close to the efficient frontier, achieving 88-96% of the efficient level of sur-
plus. This result is true in both the used-car dealers sample and the fleet/lease sellers
sample. The deadweight loss due to limited commitment is therefore quite small in
this market. However, while the bargaining does lie near the frontier, it does not lie
at the point along the frontier which would maximize the total gains from trade or
the probability of trade. The gains from trade and volume of trade could increase by
about 14% and 8% if the bargaining were to move to a different point on the frontier.
Third, I compare the Pareto frontier and post-auction bargaining to what might be
achieved under a simple k = 1/2 double auction. A stark difference between real-world
bargaining and the theoretical mechanisms discussed in Myerson and Satterthwaite
3 Formally, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrated that when the supports of buyer and
seller types overlap, there does not exist an incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism
which is ex-post efficient and which also satisfies a balanced budget.
4Cramton (1992) and Elyakime et al. (1997) also referred to this as an issue of commitment.
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(1983) and Williams (1987) is that the theoretical mechanisms are direct mechanisms:
the buyer and seller truthfully reveal their valuations to the mechanism designer who
then follows a rule which determines whether they trade and at what price. While
extremely useful as a theoretical tool, these mechanisms are unlikely to be adopted in
practice as they would require the auction house to know the distributions of buyer
and seller valuations. A k double auction, on the other hand, like alternating-offer
bargaining, is simple to for both the auction house and the players to implement
and understand. Section 7 shows various outcomes which could occur in a k = 1/2
double auction setting. Findings suggest that the post-auction bargaining mechanism
achieves approximately the same level of surplus as the 75th percentile equilibrium
of the k = 1/2 double auction (ranked by total surplus achieved).
Finally, I compare the region of the buyer and seller type space where trade occurs
under theoretical mechanisms to where it occurs under the dynamic mechanism used
at auto auctions. Plotting the region of trade is common in the theoretical bargaining
literature to analyze a bargaining mechanism, but it is unknown what this region
would look like in real-world bargaining. Here, as in the case of the efficient frontier,
I put the theoretical bargaining and real-world bargaining on the same footing. I find
that the region of trade is smaller for used-car dealers under the dynamic mechanism
than under the theoretical second-best. For fleet/lease sellers the region of trade is
similar to the theoretical second-best.
In Section 8 I discuss issues of model fit and robustness. I examine the fit of the
estimated buyer valuation distribution using several tests from the empirical auctions
literature. I also demonstrate that the estimates of the bounds on the seller's inverted
secret reserve price are robust to various approaches to performing the procedure. Fi-
nally, I discuss and test several independence assumptions required for the estimation
approach presented in this paper.
1.1.1 Related Literature
In addition to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987), several papers
examining the theoretical efficient frontier include Ausubel and Deneckere (1993),
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Ausubel et al. (2002), and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989). Ausubel and Deneckere
(1993) and Ausubel et al. (2002) demonstrate theoretically that when buyer and seller
distributions have monotone hazard rates and when high weights are placed on the
seller or buyer payoff, some equilibria of a dynamic, alternating-offer bargaining game
can reach the efficient frontier. Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) study the k double
auction game and demonstrate that a continuum of equilibria exist. They also find
that generically only the k = 0 or k =1 double auctions reach the efficient frontier.
Here I provide numerical evidence that equilibria of the k = 1/2 double auction can
also come close to the frontier.
While the theoretical literature on incomplete information bargaining is large, the
set of papers which structurally estimate these models is quite small.5 These papers
include Sieg (2000), Ambrus et al. (2011), and Keniston (2011).6 The latter paper
is the only one to estimate a model of two-sided uncertainty.7 One advantage of the
current paper over previous structural papers is that, because the bargaining occurs
after an auction and after the seller reports a secret reserve price, the model's prim-
itives, namely the distributions of private information, can be estimated using these
pre-bargaining actions without relying on much structure or a particular equilibrium
notion for the bargaining game. This is particularly useful given that, unlike in the
complete information case, there is no canonical model of alternating-offer bargaining
under incomplete information with a continuum of types. 8
5A separate strand of literature, such as Tang and Merlo (2010) and Watanabe (2009), discussed
the identification and estimation of complete information rather than incomplete information games.
6Note that the setting of the current paper benefits from the same features as Ambrus et al.
(2011), in that players are professionals and regular participants, and the econometrician observes
information, namely the secret reserve price, which is only known to one party.
7Merlo et al. (2008) also presented a situation two-sided incomplete information bargaining but
adopted a reduced-form assumption about bargaining behavior rather than estimating these objects
structurally.
8 MOSt of the incomplete-information bargaining literature focuses on one-sided uncertainty, one-
sided offers, or a two-type case. Two papers which model bargaining as an alternating-offer game and
a continuum of types with two-sided incomplete information, where the incomplete information is
about players' valuations, are Perry (1986), which predicted immediate agreement or disagreement,
and Cramton (1992), which modeled the bargaining game as beginning with a war of attrition and
consisting of players signaling their valuations through the length of delay between offers, as in
Admati and Perry (1987). Neither of these models fits the type of bargaining observed at wholesale
auto auctions. See Binmore et al. (1992), Ausubel et al. (2002), Roth (1995), and Kennan and
Wilson (1993) for additional surveys of the theoretical and experimental bargaining literature.
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Several other papers presented theoretical models of auctions followed by bar-
gaining. Bulow and Klemperer (1996), Eklof and Lunander (2003), and Menezes and
Ryan (2005) presented models of an auction followed by static bargaining where one
party presents a single, take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party, which is the optimal
mechanism for the proposing party. Huh and Park (2010) and Elyakime et al. (1997)
studied post-auction bargaining with alternating offers, but in both cases the authors
make the assumption that bargaining takes place under complete information. This
assumption allows for simpler solutions to the model, yielding the Rubinstein (1982)
bargaining equilibrium, but also sacrifices an important element of reality, namely,
incomplete information. Finally, Wang (2000) considered a theoretical model of post-
auction bargaining at procurement auctions, where the bargaining takes place under
one-sided incomplete information, adopting the equilibrium of Admati and Perry
(1987). In addition to their theoretical models, Elyakime et al. (1997) and Eklof and
Lunander (2003) structurally estimated the distributions of private information. The
current paper is the first to present or estimate a model of an auction followed by dy-
namic bargaining with two-sided incomplete information.9 Finally, Genesove (1991)
discussed post-auction bargaining at wholesale auto auctions. He tested several para-
metric assumptions for the distributions of buyer and seller valuations, finding that
these assumptions performed poorly in explaining when bargaining occurred and when
it was successful.
1.2 The Wholesale Auto Auction Industry
The wholesale used-auto auction industry provides liquidity to the supply side of the
US used-car market. Each year approximately 40 million used cars are sold in the
United States, 15 million of which pass through a wholesale auction house. About
9 A somewhat overlapping strand of literature focuses on the use of secret reserve prices, including
Vincent (1995), Horstmann and LaCasse (1997), Li and Tan (2000), Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007),
Ashenfelter (1989), Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003), Ji and Li (2008), Ji (2006), Bajari and Hortasu
(2003), Katkar and Reiley (2007), Grant et al. (2006), Elyakime et al. (1997), Elyakime et al. (1994),
and Eklof and Lunander (2003). One advantage of the data used in this paper is that the seller's
secret reserve price is observable to the econometrician, unlike in many other studies involving secret
reserves.
20
60% of these cars sell, with an average price between $8,000 and $9,000, totaling to
over $80 billion in revenue (NAAA 2009). The industry consists of approximately 320
auction houses scattered through the country. The industry leaders, Manheim and
Adesa, maintain a 50% and 25% market share, respectively, and the remaining auction
houses are referred to as independent. Each auction house serves as a platform in
a two-sided market, competing to attract both sellers and buyers. Buyers attending
wholesale auto auctions are new and used car dealers.1 0 Sellers may also be used or
new car dealers selling off extra inventory, or they may be large institutions, such as
banks, manufacturers, or rental companies selling repossessed, off-lease, or old fleet
vehicles. Throughout the industry, the majority of auction house revenue comes from
fees paid by the buyer and seller when trade occurs.
Sellers bring their cars to the auction house and report a secret reserve price. In
the days preceding the auctioning of the car, potential buyers may view car details
online, including a condition report for cars sold by fleet/lease sellers, or may visit
the auction house to inspect and test drive cars." The auction sale takes place in a
large, warehouse-like room with 8 16 lanes running through it. In each lane there is
a separate auctioneer, and lanes run simultaneously.1 2 A car is driven to the front
of the lane and the auctioneer calls out bids, raising the price until only one bidder
remains. The characteristics of the car as well as the current high bid are listed on a
large monitor near the auctioneer.1 3 The entire bidding process usually takes 30-90
seconds.
If the high bid exceeds the secret reserve price, the car is awarded to the high
10Note that the term "new" means the dealer is authorized to sell new cars from a manufacturer,
but can also sell used cars. On the other hand, "used" car dealers can only sell used cars. Genesove
(1993) discussed the differences of cars sold by new vs. used-car dealers and found weak evidence
of adverse selection among cars sold by used-car dealers. Note also that the general public is not
allowed at these auctions; Hammond and Morrill (2012) presented a model explaining this feature
of auto auctions.
11According to conversations with participants and personal observations at auction houses, few
buyers appear to visit the auction house prior to the day of sale.
12 Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2011) emphasized the fact that many lanes run simultaneously. The
authors used a field experiment to demonstrate that online condition reports provide a quality
disclosure mechanism which aids bidders in choosing which lane to participate in. Cho et al. (2010)
presented an alternative information experiment at Korean auto auctions
13 Lacetera et al. (2011) demonstrated that vehicle mileage, displayed on these monitors, is associ-
ated with large, discontinuous decreases in sale price as mileage readings cross 10,000-mile thresholds.
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bidder. If the high bid is below the secret reserve, the high bidder is given the option
to enter into bargaining with the seller. If the high bidder opts to bargain, the
auction house will contact the seller by phone, at which point the seller can accept
the high bid, end the negotiations, or propose a counteroffer.14 If the seller counters,
the auction house calls the buyer. Bargaining continues until one party accepts or
terminates negotiations. The typical time between calls is 2-3 hours." Auction house
employees contacting each party take care not to reveal the other party's identity in
order to prevent the buyer and seller from agreeing on a trade outside of the auction
house, avoiding auction house fees. 16
If the auction and/or bargaining does not result in trade the first time the vehicle
is up for sale (or first "run"), the vehicle can either be taken back to the seller's
business location or, more often, remain at the auction house until the next available
sales opportunity, usually the following week." The seller can change her reserve
price before the next run of the vehicle. If trade takes place but the buyer feels he
has been given a lemon, he may, under certain conditions, request arbitration, in
which the auction house intervenes to either undo the sale or negotiate a lower sale
price.1 8 This occurs less than three percent of the time in practice.
14 If the seller a present during the auctioning of the car, the seller may choose to accept or reject
the high bid immediately. This is discussed further in Section 1.4.
i5 During the time a car is in the bargaining process, or if that bargaining has ended in no trade,
interested buyers other than the high bidder may also contact the auction house and place offers
on the car. If the bargaining between the original high bidder and seller ends in disagreement,
bargaining commences with the next interested buyer as long as his offer is higher than previous
offers the seller has rejected. This occurs for about three percent of the cars in the full dataset. This
separate form of dynamics is not accounted for in the model below, and hence the observations are
not included in the analysis.
"If the seller is an institution then her identity is revealed, and institutions tend to try to build
a positive reputation of not setting excessively high reserve prices. Conversations with industry
participants reveal that at some auction houses outside of the data sample studied in this paper,
the identity of small sellers is also revealed.
17Genesove (1995) presented a search model to study the seller's decision to reject the high bid
and take the car back to her own car lot.
1 8For a buyer to be able to request arbitration, the car's sale price must be greater than $2,500
and the alleged lemon feature of the car must fall into certain pre-determined categories, such as
structural damage, which was unreported by the seller.
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1.3 Model of Post-Auction Bargaining with Secret
Reserve Price
This section presents a model of the auction-followed-by-bargaining mechanism used
at wholesale auto auctions. I first discuss the timing of the mechanism and set up
some general assumptions. I discuss each stage of the game, starting from the end
with the post-auction bargaining stage. I then present a model of the ascending
auction stage, demonstrating that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy, and
the stage in which the seller chooses a secret reserve price, demonstrating that the
seller's strategy is strictly increasing.
The timing of the game at wholesale auto auctions is as follows:
1. Seller sets a secret reserve price.
2. N bidders bid in an ascending auction.
3. If the high bid exceeds the secret reserve price, the high bidder wins the item.
4. If the high bid does not exceed the secret reserve price, the high bidder is given
the opportunity to walk away, or to enter into bargaining with the seller. 19
5. If the high bidder chooses to enter bargaining, the high bid becomes the first
bargaining offer, and the high bidder and seller enter an alternating-offer bar-
gaining game, mediated by the auction house.
Suppose there are N risk-neutral buyers participating in the ascending auction.
Buyers have valuations, bi, i = 1, ..., N, where each bi is drawn from Fb(-) with
"At wholesale auto auctions, some large institutional sellers are given the option to elect to
eliminate step 4 above, implying that when the high bid does not meet the secret reserve price, the
high bidder is not allowed to immediately walk away from bargaining but must wait until the seller
responds to the high bid. This situation is referred to as a "binding-if auction." It can be shown
that in a binding-if auction, the seller's secret reserve price strategy is only guaranteed to be weakly
increasing, rather than strictly as in the non-binding-if case. It can also be shown that bidders will
not necessarily drop out of bidding at their valuations but may instead drop out at a price slightly
below their valuation to account for the possibility of paying bargaining costs. In the data, there
is no way to know if a sale took place in a binding-if setting. I treat all auctions as non-binding-if
auctions.
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atomless density fb(-) and with support on [b, b]. Let the subscripts order values from
highest to lowest (i.e., b1 represents the max order statistic, b2 represents the second
order statistic, etc.). Suppose a risk-neutral seller has private value s, where s is
drawn from F, (.) with atomless density f, (.) and with support on [s, s]. Throughout
the paper I maintain the following assumptions:
Assumptions.
(Al) Buyers have symmetric, independent, private values (IPV), and the ascending
auction follows a button auction model.
(A2) F,(.) and Fb(.) are independent.
(A3) In bargaining players face a per-period disutility, (cB, CS) > 0, as well as discount
factor due to impatience, 61 E [0,1), and a probability bargaining does not break
down exogenously, 6 E E [0, 1).
A motivation for the IPV assumption is that buyer valuations arise primarily
from their local demand and inventory needs.2 0 Kim and Lee (2008) tested and failed
to reject the symmetric IPV assumption at wholesale auto auctions.21 The button
auction model is a natural choice given that jump bidding is rare as it is the auctioneer
who calls out bids, and bid increments are small.22
Like buyers, sellers who are used-car dealers have valuations arising from their
local demand/inventory. Also, seller valuations can depend on the value at which
the car was assessed as a trade-in. For a bank or leasing company, valuations can
arise from the size of the defaulted loan.23  These sources of valuations serve as
20Conversations with buyers, sellers, and auction house employees support this assumption: buyers
claim to decide upon their willingness to pay before bidding begins, often having a specific retail
customer lined up for a particular car. See Lang (2011).
21Roberts (2010) found contrasting evidence of unobserved auction-level heterogeneity at the
same Korean auctions. The papers differ in approach: Kim and Lee (2008) presented an approach
for testing the IPV assumption when the number of bidders is unknown, whereas Roberts (2010)
estimated a model with and without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. It is unclear why the
results differ.
22Bid increments lie between $25 and $100. In contrast to the auctions studied in this paper,
jump bidding does occur in the online auto auctions analyzed in Grether et al. (2012).2 3These explanations for seller values are due to conversations with industry professionals. Note
also that adverse selection from the seller possessing more knowledge about car quality than the
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motivation for the assumption that buyer and seller types are independent. This does
not preclude a common component among buyer and seller willingness to buy/sell,
but I assume that this component is purely a function of observable characteristics
of the car.
Bargaining costs of the kind mentioned in A3 are common in the literature.2 4
Evidence that bargaining is costly lies in the facts that 1) bargaining does not continue
indefinitely, having at most 10 counteroffers in the data; and 2) three percent of
buyers, after learning the high bid did not meet the secret reserve, choose to walk
away from bargaining before it begins. The parameter 3 represents the probability
that bargaining does not exogenously break down. In the data, exogenous breakdowns
are observed when an auction house employee terminates the negotiations rather than
the buyer or seller choosing to do so, occurring in 1 3% of bargaining interactions.2 5
In addition to the above assumptions, I model the seller as having some ex-ante un-
certainty about the distribution of buyer valuations. This uncertainty is resolved once
the auction takes place and the seller sees (or learns over the phone through an auction
house employee) additional information, such as the level of buyer turnout/interest,
which can be affected by weather, financial news, or other shocks. Such uncertainty is
discussed by auto auction participants and is essential to rationalize why some sellers
would set a reserve price and then accept a high bid below the reserve price, as dis-
cussed in Section 1.4. Let ( be a finite vector parameterizing this uncertainty, where
( is independent of buyer and seller valuations. 2 ' As only the secret reserve price will
depend on this uncertainty, I use the convention that Fb(.) denotes the distribution
of buyer valuations once ( has been realized and is observed to all players, and I only
buyer is likely small because of auction house information revelation requirements and because
sellers are not previous owners/drivers of the vehicles.
24 See, for example, Cramton (1991). Note that the main reason for including discounting in this
bargaining model is because Perry (1986) demonstrated that if bargaining costs take the form of an
additive cost common to all buyers and an additive cost common to all sellers, as in this paper, and
if there is no discounting/probability of breakdown, then the unique equilibrium is for bargaining to
end immediately.
2 5This number is based on the percent of bargaining sequence records in which trade failed and
the sequence of offers was incomplete, ending with an counteroffer.
26Section 1.5.1 explains that a simple form this uncertainty might take would be an overall mean
effect on prices on any given auction sale day, and the seller does not know the realization of this
mean effect until the auction day arrives.
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use the notation Fb(-; () in Appendix A in discussing the seller's secret reserve price,
which is set prior to knowing (.
In what follows, I demonstrate two properties which prove useful for estimation:
1) a buyer's auction strategy is to drop out at his value, as in a standard ascending
auction, and 2) the seller's secret reserve price strategy, R(s), is strictly increasing
in her type s. Note that throughout this section, auction house fees and auction
heterogeneity are ignored. I discuss how these issues are handled in Section 1.5.1.
1.3.1 Bargaining Stage
This section describes a simple model of the dynamic, post-auction bargaining game.
The game begins with an offer by the buyer in period t = 1. At wholesale auto
auctions, this offer is the high bid at the auction, p^. The seller then chooses between
accepting (A), declining (D)-meaning terminating the negotiations-or making a
counteroffer (C). Accepting ends the game, with trade taking place at the accepted
price. Declining also ends the game, with no trade taking place. After a counteroffer
by the seller, play returns to the buyer, who then chooses between accepting, declining,
and counter offering. Thus, at t even it is the seller's turn, and at t odd it is the
buyer's turn. Below, I refer to period "t" as being the seller's turn and period "t + 1"
as being the buyer's turn.
Suppose it is the seller's turn at time t. Let h' = {p,}'-i represent the history
of previously rejected counteroffers by the players as well as the most recent offer on
the table. The player whose turn it is at time t has not yet made an offer and so
this offer does not enter into ht. Let d' E {A, D, C} represent the seller's decision in
period t, and let dt 1 E {A, D, C} represent the buyer's decision in period t + 1.
The seller's payoff at time t is given by the following. When the buyer's most
recent offer is pt_1, a seller of type s chooses to accept (A), decline (D), or counter
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(C), yielding the following payoffs:
A : pB-
D-1
D : s
C: Vs (sh t )
=6, max P6E Pr (d + AIh t+1 ) + s (6EPr B1 = Dh t+1 ) + 1 - 6E
+ 13 E Pr (dt+ 1 = Clht+1) 6EE 1  max {p+ 1 , s, Vts2 (slh'+2)} ht+1 + s(1 - 6E)
- CS
where p is the counteroffer chosen by the seller. The per-period bargaining disutility
(cs > 0) is assumed to be common across sellers, and discounting due to impatience
(61 < 1) and the probability of not terminating exogenously (6E < 1) are assumed to
be common across sellers as well as buyers. The seller's counteroffer payoff takes into
account that the buyer may either accept, decline, or return a counteroffer. In the
latter case, the seller receives her expected payoff from being faced with the decision
in period t + 2 to accept, decline, or counter. Exogenous breakdown may occur in
any period, in which case the seller receives s as a payoff.
Similarly, the buyer's payoff at time t + 1 is given by the following. When the
seller's most recent offer is pt, a buyer of type b chooses to accept (A), decline (D),
or counter (C), yielding the following payoffs:
A: b - ps
D:0
Dc: 0~
C: V+1 (blh t+1 )
= 
61E max(b - p) Pr (d+2 = Alht+2 )
+ 6 16 E Pr d+= Cjht+2 ) E max { b - PS+2, 0, Vt+3 (b~ht +3) } ht+2]-)cB
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where p is the counteroffer chosen by the buyer and CB > 0 represents the buyer's
per-period bargaining disutility, assumed to be common across buyers. The buyer's
outside option is normalized to zero, and hence 6 E enters the buyer's counteroffer
payoff in the same fashion as 61. 27
1.3.2 Ascending Auction Stage
This section discusses bidders' strategies in the ascending auction stage of the mech-
anism. Bidder i's strategy is the price, #i, at which he stops bidding as a function of
his type, bi, which represents his valuation for the car. A seller's strategy is a secret
reserve price, R, which is a function of her type, s, the least she is willing to sell the
car for. Let
O33(by)= #maxk(bk)k:Ai
That is, i will be the high bidder if and only if #i > #j. The expected payoff of bidder
i from following bidding strategy 3(bi) is given by
(b - #5) Pr (#j > R(s))
M(bi, #j)= +rB(3, bi) Pr (3j < R(s), 7rB ( b) >0) if (3> 13j. 1.1)
0 otherwise.
Buyer i would decide to enter bargaining if 7rB(/3 , bi) > 0, where 7r'(0j, bi) represents
the buyer's expected payoff from entering bargaining, equivalent to the counteroffer
payoff in the previous section but with the high bid as the buyer's counteroffer, rather
than the maximizing counteroffer. In this setup, the following property holds:
Proposition (1). If in the bargaining game the seller never accepts offers below the
auction high bid, truth-telling is weakly dominant for bidders in the auction stage.
271n reality, the outside option of a buyer is a complicated object that cannot be estimated in the
scope of this data, as buyers who exit bargaining have the choice to obtain vehicles from a variety
of sources, such as other sales at the same auction house, competing auction houses, online markets,
and trade-ins.
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That is, fi3(b ) = bi.
All proofs are found in Appendix L.A.
This result implies that the winning bid will be the second order statistic from the
distribution of buyer valuations, as in standard ascending or second price auctions.2 8
Intuitively, the assumption that the seller never accepts bargaining offers below the
high bid ensures that buyers will not be tempted to bid beyond their valuations in the
ascending auction stage in hopes of bargaining to a lower price in the post-auction
bargaining stage. This is supported by the data: the bargained price is not lower
than the high bid. Moreover, bidders are not tempted to drop out before the bidding
reaches their valuations because if the high bidder learns that the auction high bid
did not meet the secret reserve, he can always opt out of bargaining. And because
the high bid at the auction is the second-highest valuation of the bidders, the seller
cannot infer anything about the valuation of the winner other than learning the point
at which the buyer distribution is truncated, eliminating any incentive of buyers to
shade bids downward.
1.3.3 Secret Reserve Price Stage
In this section, I discuss the seller's choice of a secret reserve price, chosen before the
beginning of the auction to maximize the seller's expected revenue. Let pA represent
the high bid from the auction.
In choosing her secret reserve price, R, the seller wishes to maximize her ex-ante
payoff.
E [EPA,b [p A*1{pA>R}+s*1{PA<R,7r (PA,b)<0}+ 7 rs (PA,s)*1{pA<R,7rB(PA b)>0}
(1.2)
This term consists of three pieces: 1) the auction high bid, which the seller receives
if it exceeds the reserve; 2) the seller's outside option, her type s, which the seller
28 Huh and Park (2010) found the same result in a theoretical model of second price auctions
with complete information (rather than incomplete information) post-auction bargaining: bidders'
strategies were unaffected by the presence of bargaining.
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receives if the auction high bid is below the reserve and the buyer opts out of bar-
gaining; and 3) the seller's bargaining payoff, 7r' (p^, s) = max {p', s,S V (S, pA) }
which the seller receives when the high bid is below the reserve and bargaining occurs.
The seller's bargaining payoff, the auction high bid, and the buyer types which would
enter bargaining will all depend on the realization of (, which is unknown to the seller
when choosing R. See Appendix A for further details.
I apply a monotone comparative statics result from Edlin and Shannon (1998), a
special case of Topkis's Theorem, to obtain the following:
Proposition (2). The seller's optimal secret reserve price, R*(s), is strictly increas-
ing in s.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that the secret reserve price is never revealed
and hence the seller can use a separating strategy without perfectly signaling her
type. To prove this result, I first show that bargaining payoffs are weakly increasing
in players' types. The strict monotonicity relies on bargaining being costly to buyers
(Assumption A3), such that some buyers will choose to opt out of bargaining when
informed they did not meet the secret reserve. Without costly bargaining, Topkis's
Theorem can be used to show that R(s) will be weakly increasing.
1.4 Dataset
This section provides an overview of the data used in this paper, including summary
statistics and a breakdown of when trade occurs in the wholesale auto auction mech-
anism. The data used in this paper come from 5-10 independent auction houses, each
maintaining a large market share in the region in which it operates. 29 Between Jan-
uary 2007 and March 2010 these auction houses passed over 600,000 vehicles through
their lanes. The data from these auction houses includes detailed information on
each car, including make, model, year, trim, odometer reading, accessories/options,
condition report (prepared by the auction house), quality report (submitted by the
29These auction houses wish to remain anonymous, so the precise number of auction houses is not
disclosed.
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seller), and vehicle identification number (VIN).o When bargaining occurs over the
phone, the full sequence of buyer and seller actions (accept, decline, or counter) and
offers/counteroffers are recorded. The data also records the seller's secret reserve
price, the winning bid at the auction, a timestamp for the arrival of each bidder, and
the identity of the seller and high bidder.
It is important to note that in this paper an observation refers to a run of a vehicle,
that is, a distinct attempt to sell the vehicle through the auction or, if the reserve
price is not met, through post-auction bargaining. The total number of runs recorded
in the data is approximately 1,000,000, so on average a vehicle passes through the
lanes 1.67 times. I treat each run as an independent observation and do not model
dynamics between runs. 3 1
I drop observations with no recorded auction house blue book estimate, cars less
than one year or greater than 16 years old, observations with less than 100 miles or
greater than 300,000 miles on the odometer, observations with incomplete bargaining
sequences, and observations with normalized high bids or normalized reserve prices
(where the normalization is described in Section 1.5.1) greater than the 0.99 quantiles
of these variables..32 I do not use observations where the high bid is missing.33 I also
drop observations for which the secret reserve price is missing, which usually occurs
because the seller plans to be present at the auction sale, and hence would be able to
accept or reject the high bid in person.3 1 Observations are also dropped where the
3 0The VIN contains information on vehicle characteristics. See Lacetera and Sydnor (2012) for
an explanation of VINs and VIN decoding.
31Section 1.8.3 discusses this issue further.
32Together, observations falling into these categories make up 19% of all runs. Note that obser-
vations with no blue book estimate tend to be motor homes, boats, or other recreational vehicles.
33These account for 20% of all runs. These observations could be rationalized by a model of
entry costs in the auction. In practice, auctioneers do not start the bidding at zero; they start the
bidding high and then lower the price until a bidder indicates a willingness to pay, at which point
the ascending auction begins. If bidders are slow to participate, the auctioneer will cease to lower
bids and cancel the sale of the vehicle, leaving no high bid recorded. Given that bidders know they
will only be awarded the car if they meet the secret reserve price or agree in bargaining, a small
entry cost could lead to some auction sales where no bidders participate. Because the focus of this
paper is on the post-auction bargaining, I do not model entry into the auction but instead work
with the empirical distribution of auction outcomes observed in the data and hold this distribution
fixed in counterfactual analysis.
3 4These account for 14% of all runs. In this scenario, the seller is effectively enforcing a se-
cret reserve price even though none was recorded in the data. Therefore, I treat these as missing
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seller's reserve price was reportedly zero." Finally, I drop observations for which fewer
than ten vehicles were observed at a given make-model-year-trim-age combination.3 6
In the end, I am left with 168,745 runs of cars sold by used-car dealers, and 182,843
sold by fleet/lease sellers.
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1.1. The estimated number of bidders
is constructed by dividing the number of bidders present at the auction house by
the number of active auction lanes at the moment the car was sold, as described in
Appendix 1.B. The median number of bidders at fleet/lease sales is 64, while it is
only 51 when cars are sold by used-car dealerships. Table 1.1 also displays the auction
high bid, seller's secret reserve price, and the final transaction price, each calculated
conditional on trade occurring. Prices are higher in the fleet/lease sample than in
the used-car dealer sample. In each sample, the average secret reserve price exceeds
the average high bid at the auction, and the final transaction price lies in between,
close to the high bid. The auction high bid tends to be closer to sellers' reserve prices
in the fleet/lease sample ($200 below as opposed to $900 below). The odometer and
age rows demonstrate that used-car dealers tend to sell cars which are older and have
more mileage.
Table 1.2 displays the proportion of observations in the used-car dealers sample
and fleet/lease sellers sample which end in each major stage of the game, as well are
the proportions which end in trade. The first column indicates that the auction high
bid exceeds the reserve price only 15.77% of the time in the used-car dealer sample
and 36.85% of the time in fleet/lease sample. Between the two samples (not shown
in Table 1.2), the auction high bid fails to meet the reserve price about 73% of the
time at these auctions.
When the reserve is not met, the game ends in immediate agreement or disagree-
ment 61.45% of the time for vehicles sold by used-car dealers and 44.16% of the time
observations and omit them from the analysis.
3 5These account for less than one percent of all runs. It is unclear whether these observations
were correctly recorded in the data, as in some cases a no-sale followed a reserve of zero. However,
the main reason for dropping these observations is computational: the analysis below is simplified
as there is no need to consider a possible atom in the seller's distribution at zero.
3 6These account for 12% of all runs.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics: Number of bidders,
Used-car dealers
prices, and car characteristics.
Fleet/lease sellers
mean s.d. median mean s.d. median
Number of bidders 60 39 51 90 83 - 64
Auction high bid $6,324 $5,337 $4,650 $9,973 $6,626 $8,700
Secret reserve $7,253 $5,605 $5,500 $10,173 $6,561 $9,000
Final price $6,346 $5,347 $4,668 $9,987 $6,623 $8,800
Odometer reading 95,315 47,869 92,311 60,746 43,546 50,186
Age in years 6.45 3.45 6.00 3.49 2.92 3.00
Notes: Number of bidders is imputed by dividing the number of bidders present at the auction
house by the number of active lanes at the moment the car was sold. Statics reported for the
auction high bid, secret reserve, and final price are conditional on trade occurring.
for cars sold by fleet/lease sellers. This immediate bargaining occurs when one of the
following is true: 1) the seller is present at the auction house and can accept or reject
the high bid; 2) the auctioneer rejects the high bid on behalf of the seller, knowing
that alternating-offer bargaining is unlikely to occur; or 3) the high bidder walks away
from bargaining before the seller is contacted, which occurs about two percent of the
time (not shown in Table 1.2) in both samples. As explained in Section 1.3, seller's
setting secret reserve prices and then accepting offers below these reserve prices can
be explained by demand uncertainty (buyer turnout/interest) which is resolved once
the auction takes place.
Table 1.2 indicates that about 20% of the time, in both samples, the buyer and
seller enter alternating-offer bargaining over the phone. In the used-car dealers sam-
ple, this bargaining results in trade 39.47% of the time and for the fleet/lease sellers
sample, trade occurs 55.52% of the time. The overall probability of trade at these
auction houses is slightly under three-fourths for cars sold by used-car dealers and
slightly above three-fourths for fleet/lease sellers.
Figures 1-1 and 1-2 summarize the outcomes when bargaining occurs over the
phone, beginning with the seller's decision to accept (A), decline (D), or counter (C)
when faced with the auction high bid. The figures display the overall percentage of
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Figure 1-1: Summary of phone bargaining outcomes, used-car dealer sample
X# obs % obs
t=2 22% 64% 14% 38,446 100.00%
B
~CI
t=3 10% 27% 63% 24,716 64.29%
t=4 41% 41% 17% 6,761 17.59%
B
OC
t=5 36% 19% 44% 2,803 7.29%
t=6 45% 45% 10% 544 1.41%
t=7 49% 19% 32% 244 0.63%
t=8 48% 35% 17% 46 0.12%
t=9 31% 31% 38% 16 0.04%
t=10 60% 40% 0% 5 0.01%
t=11 100% 0% 0% 2 0.01%
Notes: Percentages at each node in period t describe the probability of the action
accept, decline, or counter (A, D, C) conditional on arriving to period t. The final
columns list the number and percentage of observations with phone bargaining
which reach period t.
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Figure 1-2: Summary of phone bargaining outcomes, fleet/lease sample
S
O C 1 I\X # obs % obs
t=2 44% 51% 5% 34,731 100.00%
t=3 11% 19% 70% 17,821 51.31%
t=4 39% 53% 8% 3,327 9.58%
B
VCI 
t=5 42% 10% 49% 1,756 5.06%
t=6 40% 54% 7% 168 0.48%
t=7 46% 11% 43% 90 0.26%
S
t=8 30% 50% 20% 10 0.03%
B
t=9 40% 0% 60% 5 0.01%
Notes: Percentages at each node in period t describe the probability of the action
accept, decline, or counter (A, D, C) conditional on arriving to period t. The final
columns list the number and percentage of observations with phone bargaining
which reach period t.
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Table 1.2: Probability of trade
Used-car dealers Fleet/lease sellers
(168,745 observations) (182,843 observations)
% of Sample % Trade % of Sample % Trade
High bid 2 Reserve 15.77% 100.00% 36.85% 100.00%
High bid < Reserve cases
A) Immediate agreement/ 61.45% 76.15% 44.16% 68.30%
disagreement
B) Phone bargaining 22.78% 39.47% 18.99% 55.52%
Overall trade volume 71.55% 77.55%
Notes: For each sample, the first column reports the proportion of the sample with the game
ending at the auction, immediately after the auction, or in alternating-offer bargaining over the
phone. The second column reports the percentage of time that trade occurs in each case.
observations which reach each stage of bargaining, as well as the absolute number of
observations. The figures also display the percentage of players who choose to accept,
decline, or counter conditional on reaching period t of bargaining.
Observe in Figure 1-1 that when a used-car dealer is contacted over the phone at
t = 2, 64% of the time she responds with a counteroffer, and 63% of those counteroffers
are rejected by the buyer at t = 3. Buyers are more likely to decline and less likely to
counter or accept than sellers. Only 7.29% of phone bargaining observations reached
the fifth period of bargaining or beyond. However, this still leaves 2,803 records
reaching this period. Two pairs of players endured 11 periods of bargaining, finally
accepting in the end.
Figure 1-2 displays similar patterns for the fleet/lease sample. 51% of the time, the
seller responds to the high bid by proposing a counteroffer, which the buyer declines
70% of time. 5.06% of observations reach period t = 5, and five pairs endured nine
rounds of bargaining, with two of these pairs trading in the end.
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1.5 Estimation of Buyer and Seller Distributions
and Bargaining Costs
In this section, I exploit the model properties derived above in order to estimate the
distribution of buyer and seller valuations as well as the bargaining cost parameters.
I first perform two preliminary steps, controlling for observable heterogeneity and
adjusting for auction house fees. I then estimate the distribution of buyer valuations
using an order statistics approach. To estimate seller valuations, I present a mo-
ment inequalities approach using observed bargaining actions to bound the inverse of
the seller's secret reserve price. Bargaining costs are also estimated using a bounds
approach.
1.5.1 Preliminary Steps: Heterogeneity and Auction House
Fees
This section describes how vehicle heterogeneity and auction house fees are handled.
The model described in Section 1.3 is for the sale of a homogeneous good but can
easily be extended to allow for heterogeneity by controlling for auction-level covariates
in a first-stage regression, as is now common in the empirical auctions literature (see
Haile et al. 2003). To do so, I first state the following lemma, similar to results found
in Haile et al. (2003) but generalized to this specific mechanism. Let l?(Xj) be a
scalar summarizing the observable value of vehicle j, where Xi contains auction-level
covariates.
Lemma (1). Suppose the following:
(a) When the observable value of the car is given by 1(X), the seller and buyer
values are F(X)s and F(X)b, and the additive costs of bargaining are 1(X)cs
and F(X)CB-
(b) When 1(X) = 1, the optimal secret reserve is R, the optimal bargaining offer
in period t is p , and the optimal offer in period t + 1 is p .
37
Then, for any positive 1(X), the optimal secret reserve will be ](X)R and the optimal
offers will be F(X)pt and F(X)pB.
The same result follows immediately for the auction high bid. Using this lemma,
the observed reserve prices, bids, and counteroffers in auction/bargaining sequence
j can be homogenized by dividing by an estimate of ]F(Xj). As in common in the
auction literature, I specify ]F(Xj) = expXO and estimate 0 by the following regression
In Ny = XI6 + In R. (1.3)
where fN, is the secret reserve price observed by the econometrician and R is the
underlying, homogenized secret reserve. 37 The vector Xj contains the auction houses'
blue-book estimate, the odometer reading, the number of pictures displayed online,
and a dummy for used-car dealer vs. fleet/lease seller, as well as dummies for each
make-model-year-trim-age combination (where age refers to the age of the vehicle
in years), odometer bin, condition report grade (ranging from 1-5), auction house
location, and year-month (of the sale).38 I also include dummies for 32 different
vehicle damage categories recorded by the auction house and for each fleet/lease seller
who sells over 500 cars in the sample. The R 2 from this first-stage regression is 0.89,
implying that most of the variation in reserve prices is explained by observables. 39
Lemma 1 is extremely useful from a computational standpoint, but part (a) does
embed two unattractive features. The first is the assumption that additive costs of
bargaining scale with the value of the car. This does not end up being restrictive, as I
find these costs to be very small. The second is that the function of observables F(X)
entering the buyer's overall value is the same as the function entering the seller's
overall value. While analagous assumptions are common in the empirical auctions
3 7As explained below, 0 could also be estimated using the auction high bid instead of the secret
reserve price.
38 Hortagsu et al. (2010) demonstrated that market prices fluctuated weekly during a portion of the
sample period I use. I find that the estimates from (1.3) are unchanged when I use year-week instead
of year-month effects. I also find similar results when I use the interaction of location dummies with
year-month effects.
391 estimate regression (1.3) pooling together the fleet/lease sellers and used-car dealers samples.
All other estimation in the paper treats the two samples separately.
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literature, the assumption implies that the first-stage regression approach cannot be
used to directly control for differences in buyer and seller overall valuations which
are due to the seller's demand uncertainty mentioned in Section 1.3.40 Instead, this
uncertainty can be controlled for by explicitly estimating each piece of the model
in different subsaniples of the data in which ( should differ, as discussed in Section
1.8.3.41
Auction house fees are a function of the transaction price, and are approximately
linear. Let
wB(P) = &B + 3BP
w5 (p) = as + fOsp
denote the fee paid by the buyer and seller, respectively, when the transaction price
is p. Note that these fees can vary by auction house and can change from year to
year, but the fees are observed in the data when transactions occur and thus the fee
structure can be estimated with a simple linear regression, estimating the regression
separately for each auction house and year.
After estimating wB(p), wS(p), and F(X), I adjust observed bids and bargaining
offers as follows. Let pA represent the unadjusted, original high bid. Let P denote
an original, unadjusted bargaining offer. These offers are only used in the estima-
tion of the seller type, and hence are adjusted by the seller fee. The fee-adjusted,
4 For example, if this uncertainty is due to the seller not knowing the value of the year-month or
year-month times location effect entering ]P(X), then Lemma 1 does not allow for one to control for
this uncertainty simply through the first-state regression.
41I find that the correlation is 0.98 between FR(X), the estimate obtained from the regression
in (1.3), and fpA (X), the estimate obtained from a regression using high bids instead of secret
reserve prices. Also, the correlation between secret reserve prices normalized by iR(X) and secret
reserve prices normalized by FPA (X) is 0.71. Similarly, the correlation between high bids normalized
by FR(X) and high bids normalized by FrA (X) is 0.74. These correlations are suggestive that
restricting 1(X) to be the same across buyers and sellers may not be greatly affecting the estimated
distributions of buyer and seller valuations. Note also that the proof of Lemma 1 implies that if
F(X) is not common to buyers and sellers, one could condition estimation of the distributions of
buyer and seller valuations on FR(X) and EPA(X). This is discussed further in Section 1.8.3.
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homogenized high bids and offers are then given by
A _ P A + B PA) WS -B P(X) and 
_ (X)
Note that the adjustment for auction house fees is just an approximation, because
in reality the fixed components of fees, as and aB, do not vary with F(X), but I
treat them as though they do in order to be able to apply the multiplicative structure
implied by Lemma 1. This approximation should have a negligible affect overall given
that in most cases the fixed component of fees is small (about $130) relative to the
transaction price of a car ($8,000 on average).
After performing this adjustment, one additional rescaling is useful in order to put
all prices and private valuations in terms of a market value of the vehicle. I estimate
the overall average of the homogenized final transaction price, p = 1.03, and divide
all prices by p. Throughout the remainder of this paper, prices and private values
refer to the fee-adjusted, homogenized prices/values, scaled by 1/p in order that the
final price will have unit mean. I refer to prices and values as being fractions of the
market value or observable value of the car.
1.5.2 Estimation of Buyers' Distribution
In this section I present the approach for estimating the distribution of buyer val-
uations and then display the resulting estimates. Proposition 1 above implies that
the high bid from the auction will be the second order statistic of bidder valuations,
as is the case in a standard ascending auction. Therefore, Fb(-) is nonparametrically
identified from the distribution of observed high bids from auction sales in which
there were N bidders present. As discussed in Athey and Haile (2007), the following
relationship holds between the distribution of the second order statistic, FpA (-), and
the underlying distribution, Fb(.):
FpA(b) = NFb(b)N-1(1 - Fb(b)) + Fb(b)N (1.4)
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One can solve numerically for F(b) over a grid of values for b. Similarly, the density
of buyer valuations, fb(b), is given by
fb(b) = N - A(b)
N(N - 1)Fb(b)N- 2 (1 - Fb(b))
where fpA (b) is the density of high bids. Different estimates of FA(b) are available us-
ing different values of N. Therefore, I use these estimates from different N to obtain
an optimally weighted estimate of Fb(b), constraining the function to be monotone.
This procedure is mentioned by Athey and Haile (2007), but as it is has not been
implemented in practice (to my knowledge), I provide computational details in Ap-
pendix 1.C.1. In practice, I use auction observations in which N was among the ten
most common values for N observed in the sample. Depending on the sample, these
ten values range from about 45 to 60.
To estimate fpA(b) and FpA(b), I employ kernel density estimation using a Gaus-
sian kernel and the integral of a Gaussian kernel, respectively, with the asymptotically
optimal bandwidth. 2 The bounds of the buyer support, [b, b], used below in coun-
terfactual integration, are chosen to be the lower 0.001 and upper 0.999 quantiles of
the observed auction high bid."
Figures 1-3 and 1-4 display, respectively the original distribution/density of high
bids and the estimated, underlying distribution/density.4 4 Panels (c) and (d) of
Figure 1-3 demonstrate that the distribution of high bids is approximately centered
4 The asymptotically optimal bandwidth is given by h = 1.06&n- I, where n is the number of
observations in the sample used in estimating the density/distribution, and & is the sample standard
deviation. Instead of using kernel estimation to estimate FA(b), one could use the empirical CDF
of high bids. I experimented with this approach as well and found similar estimates overall, but
using a kernel estimate for the CDF aided in obtaining an estimated distribution and density which
satisfied F(b) = f' fb(v)dv. This is important in the analysis of counterfactual mechanisms below,
where I estimate a variety of integrals over the estimated densities and distributions. Henderson
et al. (2011) also advocated using a kernel for both the estimation of a density and the corresponding
distribution in an auction setting.
43The counterfactual analysis relies on choosing nodes for numerical integration, as explained
in Appendix 1.C.2. For a fixed number of nodes, the integration is more accurate over a smaller
support, so I choose the bounds as described. Overall this choice has little or no effect on the
counterfactuals other than increasing accuracy.
44Note that Figure 1-3 pools all auctions together for illustrative purposes. The actual distribution
of high bid varies depending on the number of bidders present.
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Figure 1-3: Empirical CDF and histogram of normalized high bid in used-car dealers
sample and fleet/lease sellers sample. Units are in terms of the observable value of
the car.
about one in both samples, although it is more tight for cars sold by fleet/lease sellers.
Panels (a) and (b) demonstrate that in both samples less than ten percent of cars
yield auction high bids lower than 0.5 or greater than 1.5 times the observable value
of the vehicle.
Figure 1-4 demonstrates, in panels (c) and (d), that the estimated, underlying
distribution of buyer valuations has more mass at lower values of the buyer support
than does the density of high bids, as should be the case given that the high bid
is the second order statistic among bidders drawn from this underlying distribution.
Panels (a) and (b) demonstrate that 70% of the time buyers have valuations lower
than one, indicating that most buyers are not willing to pay the amount for which the
car typically sells for at auction. This makes intuitive sense given that buyers have
differing inventory needs. Cars sold by used-car dealers tend to display more mass at
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Figure 1-4: Estimated CDF and density of buyer valuations in used-car dealers sample
and fleet/lease sellers sample. Pointwise 95% confidence bands shown by dashed lines.
Units are in terms of the observable value of the car.
very low values than do fleet/lease sales. However, the density appears quite similar
in both samples. In both samples, buyer valuations exceed 1.5 times the observable
value of the car less than two percent of the time.
1.5.3 Estimation of Bounds on Sellers' Types and Distribu-
tion
In this section I present the moment inequality approach for estimating bounds on the
seller's secret reserve strategy and then display the resulting estimates. Proposition 2
showed that the seller's secret reserve price strategy, R(s), is strictly increasing in s.
Therefore, the reserve price can be inverted to obtain the seller's type as a function
of the reported reserve, s(R). Post-auction bargaining actions yield bounds on s(R):
s(R) < pB if pB is a buyer offer which the seller accepted
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s(R) > pB if pB is a buyer offer at which the seller declined (exited)
s(R) < ps if ps is a price at which the seller countered
In order to estimate these bounds, I assume that all observations were generated
under a single equilibrium of the post-auction bargaining game. This assumption can
be relaxed by estimating the model separately on different subsamples of data, which
I do in Section 1.8.3.
One explanation for violations of these bounds is measurement error in the recorded
bargaining offers, and the estimation approach I present here is consistent with this
explanation. 46 In practice, violations at the individual observation level may also oc-
cur due to heterogeneity in individual sellers' secret reserve price strategies which is
not captured in this model, and in this case the measurement error model described
here is simply an approximation. See Section 8.2 for further discussion.
First, note that not all observations in the data contain a lower bound; an infor-
mative lower bound (other than s) is only observed if bargaining occurred and the
seller declined a buyer offer sometime during bargaining, or if immediate disagree-
ment occurred. Similarly, an informative upper bound (other than R itself or s) is
only observed if the seller did not immediately decline the auction high bid. Let bar-
gaining sequences with an informative lower bound be represented by Lj = L* + Vj,
where L* is the correctly measured lower bound and v is a mean-zero error term.47
Similarly, let Uj = Uj + v represent a bargaining sequence with an informative upper
4 5Model estimates may differ in different subsamples for other reasons as well, as discussed in
Section 1.8.3.
4 6Note that these offers are recorded by an auction house sales representative who is mediating
negotiations for multiple parties at once after the auction takes place. The reserve price, on the other
hand, is chosen several days before the sale and is observed by sales representatives, the auctioneer,
and a recording clerk who aides the auctioneer. Thus, human measurement error is more likely to
occur in the recording of bargaining offers than in the reserve price. In practice, the first offer in
bargaining, the auction high bid, can also be recorded with error as all bargaining offers, including
the high bid, are recorded in a separate portion of the database from auction outcomes. In the
estimation of, however, I use the same recorded value of the auction high bid in estimating the
buyer's distribution and in bounding seller types.
47The measurement error here is written at the j level, rather than the (j, t) (period of the
bargaining game) level. The resulting estimates are identical in either setting, but the former aids
in identifying bargaining costs below and is consistent with the fact that no violations are observed
within the same bargaining sequence j.
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bound. Let U and C represent the set of observations (j) for which an informative
upper or lower bound is observed, respectively.
Bounds on the function s(R) are then given by
E[L*IR] = E[L* +vIR] < s(R) < E[U* +vIR] = E[U*IR] (1.5)
The expression in (1.5) states that the seller's type, s, which is a one-to-one function
of R, lies between the lower and upper bounds implied by bargaining actions when
the reserve price was R. Bounds estimation can then be implemented by dividing
the support of R into K bins with end points {ro, ri, ... , rK}. For k = 1, ... , K, let
Rk = {Rj : rk_ < Rj < rk} be the set of observed reserve prices lying in bin k.
Further, let ZU = {j : Rj E Rkj E U} and RL = { Rj E Rk, j E L} be the set of
observed reserve prices in bin k which have an informative lower and upper bound,
respectively. Let Rk represent the median of the bin k. Then, averaging over the
lower and upper bounds in a given bin k yields
1 1( Li s < <O U-#(k -R - #(Rky) jcz
where #(-) returns the number of elements for a set. All values of s(Rk) satisfying
these bounds constitute the identified set for that grid point. For the counterfactual
analysis below, I select either the midpoint of the estimated bounds or the lower or
upper 95% confidence band as an estimate of s(R). Linear interpolation is used to
evaluate s(R) at non-grid points. To estimate the density and distribution of s, I use
kernel estimation with a Gaussian kernel and the intergral of Gaussian kernel, as in
Section 1.5.2 .48 The bounds of the seller support, [s, s], are chosen to be the lower
0.001 and upper 0.999 quantiles of 9.
Monotonicity of the seller's strategy is not ex-ante imposed in estimation. How-
ever, it can be used ex-post to obtain tighter bounds. This can be performed by
simply replacing the lower bound at R with the greatest lower bound for R' < R,
48As above, the bandwidth is given by h = 1.06&n- 5.
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and replacing the upper bound at R with the least upper bound for R' > R. An
alternative approach, which yields bounds which are slightly more conservative but
smoother, is to use the rearrangement method advocated by Chernozhukov et al.
(2009). In this setting, rearrangement is performed by simply sorting the estimated
lower bounds and reassigning them to the original grid points, and similarly for the
upper bounds. Chernozhukov et al. (2009) demonstrated that, when estimating a
monotone function, a rearranged estimate is always an improvement, in terms of
estimation error, over an original, nonmonotonic estimate.49
Figures 1-5, 1-6, and 1-7 show the observed distribution of secret reserve prices,
the estimated bounds, and the estimated distribution of seller types in the used-car
dealers and fleet/lease sellers samples. Figure 1-5 demonstrates, in panels (c) and (d),
that reserve prices are tightly centered around one for fleet/lease sellers. Used-car
dealers, on the other hand, choose a wider variety of reserve prices which tend to be
centered around 1.2, exceeding the average observable value of the car. Panels (a)
and (b) demonstrate that only about 20% of used-car dealers report reserves lower
than one, while about half of fleet/lease sellers do.
The estimated bounds on seller types are displayed in panels (a) and (b) of Figure
1-6 using K = 50 grid points. The estimates displayed are before applying rearrange-
ment. For used-car dealers, in panel (a), each estimated lower bound lies below the
estimated upper bound except at the far left tail, where few observations exist, as was
demonstrated in Figure 1-5. In the fleet/lease sample, shown in panel (b) of Figure
1-6, the estimated lower bound lies above the estimated upper bound at 12 out of
50 grid points. However, as panel (b) shows, the violations are very small from an
economic standpoint. Also, not shown in Figure 1-6 is the fact that nowhere does
the 95% confidence interval for the lower bound lie completely above the confidence
interval for the upper bound. Panels (c) and (d) display the 95% pointwise confidence
bands after rearrangement.
49After rearranging, I obtain conservative confidence bands from the outer limits of bootstrapped
confidence intervals for the rearranged bounds.
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Figure 1-6 can be seen as evidence in favor of the model from Section 1.3. For
example, in both samples the estimated bounds lie below the 45 degree line (s(R) <
R), indicating that sellers never report secret reserve prices which are lower than
the least they would be willing to sell the car for. Also, note that nowhere in the
estimation of panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1-6 is the restriction imposed that s(R) be
strictly increasing, yet the estimates appear to bound a strictly increasing function.
One implication of panel (a) of Figure 1-6 is that when a used-car dealer sets a
secret reserve price of 1.2 times the observable value of the car, she is really willing to
let the car go at a price equal to the one. Similarly, in panel (b), when a fleet/lease
seller sets a reserve price of one, she is actually willing to sell the car at a price of 0.9.
The estimated distribution and density of seller valuations, s, are shown in Figure
1-7, using the midpoint of the bounds as the estimate of s. Panels (c) and (d)
demonstrate that much of the mass lies below one, which is to be expected: the
existence of this market implies that sellers value these goods less than buyers (i.e.,
less than the high bidders). Panels (a) and (b) indicate that, for used-car dealers,
about 60% of the time their valuation lies below one, while fleet/lease sellers have
valuations less than one nearly 100% of the time.
1.5.4 Estimation of Bargaining Costs
This section presents an approach for estimating bounds on bargaining costs cs, CB,
and 6 = 6EI Note that 6, and 6E are not separately identified by the approach
discussed here. These bounds may be estimated using observations in which one
party chooses to counter. A necessary condition for a party to choose to counter
is that the payoff from the player's opponent accepting with probability one must
exceed the player's payoff from accepting the current offer on the table. That is,
p - cs t-1
6(b - pB 1) -CB b - ps
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Figure 1-5: Empirical CDF and histogram of normalized secret reserve prices in the
sample of cars sold by used-car dealers and the sample of cars sold by fleet/lease
sellers. Units are in terms of the observable value of the car.
Noting that 6 < 1 and (CS, CB) > 0, yields
p -
-
S B
P - Pt+1 > CB
Bounds for additive bargaining costs can then be estimated by
0 < cs min {p , - pKt_1{(j,t):djt=C}
0 <_ CB ti ~ PB+1
{ (j,t):djbt=C} P~ -P,~
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bands alone after applying rearrangement. Units are in terms of the observable value
of the car.
As above, recorded bargaining offers are considered to be measured with error vj,
which drops out of the expression for bounds on additive bargaining costs, but not
the expression of 3 bounds.50 Therefore, bounds on 6 are given by taking expectations,
and these bounds are made tighter by taking expectations in different samples of data,
5oAs noted in Section 1.5.3, the estimated bounds on s(R) are identical if measurement error is
considered to vary with t. The estimated upper bounds on cs and CB are high and uninformative
in this case, however. An empirical finding supporting the assumption that measurement error
lies at the j level is that no violations of the bounds in Section 1.5.3 are observed within a given
auction/bargaining sequence j.
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Figure 1-7: Estimated CDF and density of seller valuations in used-car dealers sample
and fleet/lease sellers sample. Pointwise 95% confidence bands shown by dashed lines.
Units are in terms of the observable value of the car.
for example, by conditioning on R:
E[pB
1> > sup. t1R
R E[ps|R]
This can be implemented as follows. Divide the support of R into K bins, as in
Section 1.5.3. Let Rs = {(j,t) : j E lZk, dt = C} represent the set of observed
bargaining periods, (j, t) in which the seller chose to counter and in which the reserve
price was in bin k. Then bounds on 6 are given by
#()(j,t)ERS pjt1>6> max B
k ? Z(j,t)ER P-1
I use a grid of K = 1,000 points. I then obtain a bias-corrected, one-sided confi-
dence interval for each of these estimated bounds using recent methods for moment
50
inequality inference developed in Chernozhukov et al. (2011), which accounts for the
fact that the estimated bound for 6 will be biased upward given that it is derived
from taking a maximum, and vice-verse for cS and cB. 51
Table 3 displays the bargaining cost bound estimates, with one-sided 95% confi-
dence estimates reported in parentheses. The estimated lower bound on 6 is 0.9365
in the sample of cars sold by used-car dealers and 0.9413 in the sample of cars sold by
fleet/lease sellers. These values are close to one, as expected. However, because the
empirical probability of exogenous breakdown in bargaining is 1-3%, naively using
these bounds as estimates of 6 would imply a larger discount factor due to impatience
than is realistic, given that the time between bargaining rounds is only 2-3 hours.
Therefore, in the analysis below I choose the estimate of 6 to be the midpoint between
one and the estimated bound on 6.
The upper bounds on the per-period costs of bargaining are relatively close to
zero. The 95% confidence bound for cs is 0.0043 in the used-car sample and 0.0051
in the fleet/lease car sample. The bound on CB is slightly tighter than on cs in the
used-car sample. Recalling that used-car dealers are both buyers and sellers in this
sample, this result suggests that buyers may dislike bargainging less when they are
on the buy side than on the sell side.
To make the comparison more concrete, recall from Table 1.1 that the average
final price, in nominal terms, is $6,346 for cars sold by used-car dealers and $9,987 for
fleet/lease sellers. Therefore, bounds of 0.0043 and 0.0051 for for cs corresponds to an
upper bound of about $28 for a used-car seller's disutility of making bargaining offers,
and $51 for a fleet/lease seller. For buyers, the corresponding nominal upper bounds
for the disutility of bargaining would be $15 and $52. This suggests that both parties
are more willing to bargain over cars sold by used-car dealers than by fleet/lease
sellers, consistent with the reduced-form statistics of Table 1.2, which demonstrated
that bargaining occurs more often in the used-car dealers sample. Also, as part of
the cost embedded in cs and CB consists of the time spent on the phone with the
51Chernozhukov et al. (2011) refer to estimators corrected in this fashion as being half-median
unbiased.
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Table 1.3: Estimated Bargaining Costs
Used-car dealers Fleet/lease sellers
5 > 0.9365 0.9413
(0.8852) (0.8973)
cs 5 0.0037 0.0029
(0.0043) (0.0051)
CB 0.0005 0.0030(0.0023) (0.0052)
Notes: Estimated bounds on the costs of bargaining. The parameter 6 represents discounting due to
impatience as well as the probability that bargaining does not exogenously breakdown. The
parameters csand cB represent the seller's and buyer's per-period disutility of bargaining in terms of
the observable value of the car. One-sided 95% confidence bounds are reported in parentheses.
auction house and off the phone determining a new counteroffer, a value of $15, for
example, seems reasonable relative to what might be the hourly wage of a used-car
dealer. In the estimation of expected gains in the dynamic mechanism below, I plug
in the upper 95% bounds as my estimates of additive costs, but as the costs are quite
small the results are not sensitive to using other values within the estimated range.
1.6 The Pareto Frontier, Counterfactual Mecha-
nisms, and the Dynamic Mechanism
This section describes how the Pareto frontier and each counterfactual mechanism
can be solved for once the distributions of seller and buyer valuations are known.
This section also details the quantile-matching approach I use to solve for the direct
mechanism corresponding to the dynamic mechanism. The counterfactuals hold the
distribution of buyer and seller types fixed. In reality, changing the mechanism could
change the distribution of types.5 2
Also, in counterfactuals I only change bargaining-I do not change the auction.
Each counterfactual mechanism is a mechanism for bilateral trade between the seller
5 2 For example, the buyer and seller types choosing to attend the auction house could change if
the mechanism were more or less favorable for certain types. Also, the distribution of seller types
could change, because embedded in the seller valuations is the option to attempt to sell the car the
following week, and the payoff from doing so would change with the mechanism.
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and high bidder after a no-reserve ascending auction has occurred. The auction iden-
tifies the high bidder, and the lower bound for the buyer's support in the post-auction
bargaining game becomes pA, the high bid at the auction." The post-auction bar-
gaining game between the high bidder and seller can then be mapped into the direct
revelation mechanism framework provided by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
Williams (1987), or an indirect mechanism framework, that of a k double auction,
provided by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989).
1.6.1 Direct Bargaining Mechanisms
In this section I discuss how I solve for the Pareto frontier and other direct, effi-
cient mechanisms. By the Revelation Principle (Myerson 1979), any static, incentive-
compatible, individually rational, bilateral trade mechanism can be written as a direct
revelation mechanism where player's truthfully report their valuations to a broker
and then trade occurs with probability x(s, b), with the buyer paying p(s, b) to the
seller." Williams (1987) demonstrated that a bilateral bargaining mechanism can
alternatively be summarized by the two objects (x, q), rather than (x, p), where q is
the expected utility for the type s." The ex-ante expected utility of the buyer and
seller in a mechanism (x, q) is given by
Us(x, q) q + Jx(s, b)F,(s) 1ip ) dsdb (1.6)
pA s1 - F(p^)
Ub(x,q) G(x) - q + b x(s,b) - Fb(b)f(s)dsdb (1.7)
qp A . s 1 - Fb(pA)
53Note that I do not work with a direct mechanism in which N buyers and one seller simultaneously
report types to a mechanism designer, primarily because this mechanism would be starkly different
from mechanisms applied in practice and because I wish to focus on the efficiency of bilateral trade
in particular. I also do not consider a secret reserve price in these counterfactual mechanisms.
5 4Note that the notation here is the reverse of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams
(1987), in which p represented the probability of trade and x represented the transfer.
55The transfer function, p, is not essential for the results here, but can be found in Appendix
1.C.4.
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where
G(x) = (#b(b) - #s (s)) x(s b)f,(s) - dsdb (1.8)
fp bb sp)dd 8
and
#5(S) = #(s, 1) #b(b) 4 b(b, 1)
#8(s, 0) S + a1 and #b(b, a 2 ) = b - 2 1fb(b)fS (S) fb(b)
Williams (1987) demonstrated further that the Pareto frontier, that is, the maximized
value of
Us + (1 - 7)Ub (1.9)
for -y E [0, 1], can be traced out by the class of mechanisms with trading rules, x(s, b),
defined by
XQ1(Y),02(-)(s, b) = 1 {#b(b, a 2 (Y)) #s(s, a1(y))}
The parameters (ai (-/), a 2 (Y)) can be solved for at each -/ using an approach devel-
oped in Williams (1987) and described in Appendix 1.C.4. Intuitively, the approach
maximizes (1.9) subject to G(xa1(Y),a2(Y)) 0, where G(x) is defined in (1.8). This
constraint implies that the worst types-the lowest buyer type and highest seller
type must receive a non-negative surplus in order to be willing to participate in the
mechanism.
Existence of these mechanisms and the success of the solution method in Williams
(1987) is guaranteed as long as #s(s) and #b(b) are weakly increasing. This assump-
tion is common in the mechanism design literature. I impose this condition on the
estimated #s(s) and 5b(b) before solving the counterfactual mechanisms. To do so, I
follow the rearrangement approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2009).56 The monotonic
56One might be tempted to impose monotonicity of #,(s) and #5(b) simply by adjusting the
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estimates of #,(s) and #b(b) can then be used to re-solve for the implied densities
and distributions as described in Appendix 1.C.3. Overall, the rearrangement has no
effect on the densities and distributions other than smoothing out small deviations
from monotonicity.
Several mechanisms of interest fit into this framework, such as
1. First-best trade (infeasible mechanism where trade occurs whenever buyer val-
ues the car more than seller): ai = a 2 = 0.
2. Second-best trade (the mechanism maximizing the gains from trade): y = 1/2,
ai = a 2 = a*, where a* solves G(x&*,'*) = 0.
3. Seller-optimal: -y = 1, ai = 0, a 2 = 1.
4. Buyer-optimal: -y = 0, ai = 1, a 2 = 0.
5. Pareto frontier: mechanisms maximizing (1.9) subject to G(x (7)X2(-0) > 0 for
-y E [0, 1].
Note that an auction followed by the seller-optimal mechanism is equivalent to a
public reserve auction.5 7 An additional mechanism with ai = a 2 = 1 is discussed in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and would maximize the gains to a broker (auction
house) with market power. This mechanism is discussed in Appendix 1.D.
I derive an additional direct mechanism which maximizes the probability of trade
rather than the gains from trade. This result is a corollary to Theorem 2 of Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) and the proof follows the same line of reasoning as in Myer-
son and Satterthwaite (1983).58 The proof of existence relies on strict monotonicity
of #,(s) and 5b(b), but in practice I am able to solve for it while only imposing weak
monotonicity as described above.
kernel bandwidths used in calculating the corresponding densities and distributions. Henderson
et al. (2011) demonstrated that this approach is not valid, and proposed a constraint-weighted
bootstrapping approach to imposing monotonicity. I find that their approach yields similar estimates
to the rearrangement approach, but rearrangement is more efficient computationally given the size
of my dataset.
57See Menezes and Ryan (2005).
58Note that the expected transfer functions for the mechanism in Corollary 1 are given by (1.17)
and (1.18) in Appendix 1.C.4
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Corollary (1). Suppose $s(s) and 4b(b) are both strictly increasing. Then the di-
rect mechanism maximizing the probability of trade has allocation rule xK(s,b) =
1{# (s) - (2i)/(1 - r,) < #b(b)}, where r, E [0,1) is the solution to G(x"(s, b)) = 0.
Once the first-stage auction is taken into account, the probability of trade in any
of these direct mechanisms is given by
ib~~ f -ff/ x(s,b;p^ s(s) b f1A(p^)dsdbdpA (1.10)
b pA s 1- Fb(pA)
To perform this integration, I use Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature, as described in Ap-
pendix 1.C.2, with 200 nodes in the s and b dimensions, and 25 nodes in the pA
dimension.5 9
1.6.2 Indirect Mechanisms: The k Double Auction
This section discusses the estimation of equilibria in the k double auction, an al-
ternative to dynamic bargaining which would be simple for the auction house and
players to understand and implement. A k double auction, as in Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989), is an indirect mechanism
in which both the seller and buyer submit sealed offers, pS and pB, to the auctioneer.
If pB ; ps, trade occurs at price
p = kps + (1 - k)pB
A k double auction with k = 1 corresponds to the seller-optimal direct mechanism
(or the public reserve auction) and a k double auction with k = 0 corresponds to the
buyer-optimal direct mechanism. Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) demonstrated
that, for k = (0,1), a continuum of equilibria exist satisfying the following linked
59Increasing the number of nodes in either dimension did not change the results. A greater degree
of accuracy in the b and s dimensions than in the p^ dimension is useful, however, as each mechanism
is solved conditional on pA
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differential equations:
p B(-)(ps(s)) = ps(s) + kp' (s)'/ (s, 1) (1.11)
PS(-l)(PB(b)) = pB(b) + (1 - k)pB'(b)Ob(b, 1) (1.12)
where pB(-1)(-) and ps(-1)(.) are the inverses of the buyer's and seller's strategies.
Solving the k double auction is somewhat more involved than estimating the
Pareto frontier. Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) provided an approach for solving
for equilibria numerically. A point (s, b, p) is chosen in the set P = {(s, b, p) : s <
s < p < b < b, s < s, b > b}, and then a one-dimensional manifold passing through
this point is traced out using differential equations defined by (1.11) and (1.12). This
path traces out an equilibrium. See Appendix 1.C.5 for details. As with the solution
method for the Pareto frontier, this approach relies on #b(b) and #,(s) being weakly
increasing.
Given that a continuum of equilibria exist, and given that the k double auction
is not a supermodular game, summarizing possible outcomes in this game is not
simple.60 However, the purpose of examining the k = 1/2 double auction in the
context of this paper is to compare the currently used, dynamic mechanism, which
has easy rules for players to understand and for the auction house to implement, to
a static mechanism which could also be easily understood and implemented by the
auction house. Therefore, in order to obtain some idea of possible outcomes under
the k = 1/2 double auction given the estimated market conditions of buyer and seller
valuations, I choose a grid of approximately 100 uniformly spaced points in P and
solve for the equilibria passing through these points. I then rank these equilibria
SoTo see that the k double auction is not a supermodular game, let irfA(pB S) represent the
buyer's payoff, which is 0 if ps < pB and b - kpB - (1 - k)pS otherwise. Let A be a small, positive
constant. Then write the following second difference
7rb A~p -2 A) -/)A(b A,p -2A)[DA+p) 7 A( Ap)
= -b+ p - kA
The final term can be positive or negative depending on b and p. Even if one requires p <; b, other
examples exist showing ambiguity of the sign of the second difference. Therefore, the game is not
supermodular or submodular.
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based on the total gains from trade achieved, and report the equilibria corresponding
to the minimum, maximum, and quartiles of this ranking.61 An example of a solution
path crossing through a point in P is shown in Figure 1-8.
2.5,
2
0.5
0
-0.
3
2 3
1 2
0 0
-1 
-1sp S
Figure 1-8: A solution to the k=1/2 double auction, lying with the tetrahedron
P = {(s, b, p) : s < s < p b < b, s < s, b > b}. Units are in terms of the observable
value of the car.
The expected gains from trade for the buyer in the k = 1/2 double auction can
be evaluated by
~ p(b) +(1 - k)p5 (s)\jP() P f*() jA (pA )dsdbdpA
lb lb 
k pBSbII (b- 2 1 I{p() }(S) B(A)
(1.13)
where pB(b) and ps(s) are equilibrium strategies solved for using the approach in
Appendix 1.C.5. The seller's expected gains from trade and the probability of trade
are calculated similarly.
6 1 Due to numerical approximation error in the differential equations techniques described in Ap-
pendix 1.C.5 and the approach in solving for the Pareto frontier in Appendix 1.C.4, equilibria in the
k double auction can be estimated to lie outside the Pareto frontier. Therefore, I eliminate these
equilibria and rank the equilibria which lie within the Pareto frontier.
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1.6.3 Estimating the Dynamic Mechanism
This section describes how I solve for surplus in the currently used mechanism by
backing out a direct mechanism corresponding to the mechanism used at auto auc-
tions. As with the above mechanisms, the direct mechanism equivalent to the dynamic
bargaining mechanism currently used at wholesale auto auctions can be characterized
by functions x and p determining whether or not trade will occur and at what price.
However, in the dynamic mechanism, these functions will vary by the period of the
bargaining game. As with the above mechanisms, x and p will also in general depend
on the high bid at the auction, pA, as this is the lower bound of the support of buyer
types when bargaining takes place.
It is important to note that the estimation procedures in Section 1.5 yields an
estimate of bounds on sj, the seller's value for car j. I then select a point estimate by
using the lower bound, upper bound, midpoint of the 95% confidence band. Section
1.5 does not, however, yield an estimate of the buyer's value. If the buyer's value could
be estimated, the direct mechanism (x, p) would be trivial to estimate. However, given
that only the distribution of buyer values is identified, a more sophisticated approach
is required.
Let the allocation function in the dynamic mechanism be written x,(s, b; p^),
representing the probability that trade occurs in bargaining period r given that the
game has lasted up until the rth period and the players' types are s and b. I assume
this function is an indicator function, as with the theoretical mechanisms in Section
1.6.1.62 The function x D(s, b; pA), can be recovered nonparametrically using the result
that s(R) is one-to-one. Let
m,(R,p) = Pr(x(s(R), b;p^) = 1|R,p^)
The object m,(R, pA) can be estimated by the empirical probability of trade in period
r when the reported secret reserve was R and the high bid was p^ and the game had
6 2More generally, the function xD(s, b;pA) could take on values on the interior of (0, 1), but in
this case the function would not be identified using the approach described here.
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lasted at least to the beginning of the period T. I estimate this function using a
linear regression of a dummy for trade on a tensor product of cubic b-splines with 10
uniformly spaced knots in each dimension. 3 Then, because x$'(s(R), b; p^) should be
weakly increasing in b given R and p^, of (s(R), b; pA) can be expressed as
x?(s(R), b; pA) = 1{b > gr(R,pA)
where g., (R,pA) can be solved for numerically as the (1 - mr(R,pA)) quantile of
F)Fb(pA) ) the distribution of the high valuation buyer conditional on the auction
high bid.64 , the fact that bargaining occurs Because s(R) is one-to-one, g.(R, pA)
may also be written gr(s, p^), and, for each pA, delineates the boundary of trade in
(s, b) space.
With the objects m, (R, pA) and g,(s, pA) in hand, the ex-ante expected surplus for
the buyer and seller in the dynamic mechanism, UD'B and U D', can be calculated as
follows. Let , be the set of all auction/bargaining sequences which ended in period
r.LtD,B Dfiathanreivdslrpr. Let , and p,'S be the final price paid by the buyer and received by the seller
in observation j. These prices are both zero if no trade occurs, and they are not
equivalent to each other because both buyer and seller pay auction house fees. Then
UDB _ (bfb(b)db 
- pDB - cBr1T even#
r 1 ES ,t>r 97i'? EJ
(1.14)
-D,S 
_1 DS - sjm(Rj, P - cS 2 1{r odd,r > 1}#f
(1.15)
In (1.14), the expression multiplying 6 inside the first summation consists of three
pieces. The first term is the expected gross payoff (ignoring price) to the buyer from
63 B-splines are finite-dimensional, piece-wise polynomials. See Chen (2007) for an explanation of
b-splines and other sieve spaces. Note that this linear regression can predict values lying outside of
[0,1]. In these cases, I replace the estimated mr(R,pA) with 0 or 1. Overall, this truncation is only
necessary in a few cases and has little effect on the estimated xD(s(R), b; pA)
64 Note that the lower bound of the buyer's support in the currently used dynamic mechanism will
not necessarily be exactly pA, because the seller also learns from the fact that the buyer must have
chosen not to opt out of bargaining. The actual lower bound will be x -(pA), defined in the proof of
Proposition 2. However, X- 1 (pA) is not identified without imposing and solving for the equilibrium
of the bargaining game. Therefore, I use pA in place of x-I (A).
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trade occurring in period T. The second term is the expected price paid by the buyer
for trade occurring in period T. The final term is the expected additive bargaining
cost paid by the buyer in a game which ended in period T. Recall that the buyer pays
this cost whenever he makes a counteroffer, so if the game ends at an even period T
(the seller's turn), the buyer will have paid this cost T/2 times.
Similarly, in (1.15), the expression multiplying 6 inside the first summation is
divided into three parts. First is the expected price received by the seller for trade
occurring in period T. Second is the forgone outside option for the seller for trade
occurring in period T. Third is the expected additive bargaining cost paid by the
seller for a game ending in period T. The seller pays this cost whenever she makes a
counteroffer, so if the game ends at an odd period r > 1 (the buyer's turn is at odd
periods), then the seller will have paid this cost (r - 1)/2 times.
1.7 Putting It All Together: How Efficient Is Bar-
gaining?
This section puts together all of the pieces from estimation (buyer and seller distribu-
tions and bargaining costs) and the mechanism design objects solved for (the Pareto
frontier, other counterfactual mechanisms, and surplus in the current mechanism) to
determine how efficient the currently used dynamic mechanism is. I first study the
comparison to the direct mechanisms described above, followed by a comparison to
the indirect, k = 1/2 double auction. Finally, I present an analysis of the region of
the type space where trade occurs. For the fleet/lease sample, the analysis below uses
the midpoint of the 95% confidence bounds for the seller's secret reserve price as the
estimate of s(R). For the used-car dealers sample, I instead use the lower confidence
bound, as this resulted in a better model fit, as discussed in Section 1.8.
61
1.7.1 Efficiency of Bargaining Relative to Pareto Frontier
and Direct Mechanisms
In this section I present a qualitative and then quantitative comparison of dynamic
bargaining to the Pareto frontier and other direct mechanisms. The performance of
the currently used dynamic mechanism relative to the Pareto frontier is displayed in
Figure 1-9. Each panel of Figure 1-9 also displays the location of the second-best and
trade-maximizing mechanisms with respect to the frontier, and for each mechanism
the 95% confidence interval is displayed. In both samples, the second-best and trade-
maximizing mechanisms are indistinguishable from one another on the frontier. Panel
(a) demonstrates that, in sales of cars owned by used-car dealers, the auction followed
by alternating-offer bargaining results in a surplus level which lies close to the Pareto
frontier, and for fleet/lease sellers the mechanism lies even closer, indicating that
bargaining is quite efficient.
Any gap between the frontier and the dynamic mechanism would represent a
deadweight loss-neither bargaining party captures this lost surplus. I refer to this
gap as the deadweight loss due to limited commitment, as this gap could theoretically
be eliminated by committing to a static, direct mechanism which lies on the frontier.
Figure 1-9 suggests that this deadweight loss is small, but still positive. In particular,
the seller payoff would be higher along the Pareto frontier than it is in the currently
used mechanism.
An additional source of deadweight loss is incomplete information. Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrated that this deadweight loss is inevitable in bilateral
bargaining with two-sided uncertainty. Intuitively, both parties trade off the conflict-
ing incentives of increasing the probability of trade and increasing the rent extracted
from the other party, leading buyers to shade their offering price downward and sellers
to shade their asking price upward, leading some trades to fail to be consummated
even when the buyer values the good more than the seller. This deadweight loss
is depicted graphically in Figure 1-10 as the gap between the Pareto frontier and
the first-best (infeasible) surplus line. In both the used-car dealer sample and the
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Figure 1-9: Estimated performance of dynamic mechanism relative to Pareto frontier
and other direct mechanisms. The dynamic mechanism is marked in red. The second-
best (marked in light blue) and trade-maximizing (marked in light green) lie close
to one another on the frontier and are indistinguishable in the figure. For each
mechanism, the pointwise 95% confidence region is displayed. The Pareto frontier is
marked in blue, with pointwise 95% confidence bands marked by dashed lines. Units
are in terms of the observable value of the car.
fleet/lease sample, the gap is small. In fact, the estimated Pareto frontier lies within
the 95% confidence band of the first-best line, indicating that incomplete information
per se is not the primary reason for inefficiency in this market.
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Figure 1-10: Estimated performance of dynamic mechanism relative to Pareto frontier
and first-best (infeasible) surplus line. The dynamic mechanism is marked in red. The
first-best line is marked in purple and the Pareto frontier is marked in blue, each with
pointwise 95% confidence bands marked by dashed lines. Units are in terms of the
observable value of the car.
Table 1.4 analyzes these mechanisms in more detail, displaying the total expected
gains from trade, the gains to each player, and the probability of sale under several
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static direct mechanisms. The current dynamic mechanism is displayed in the final
column. Because buyer and seller gains take into account fees paid to the auction
house, the total expected gains from trade for the dynamic niechanisn in the first
row is given by the sum of buyer and seller gains and fees paid to the auction house.
All outcomes are in terms of the wholesale observable value, or market value, of the
vehicle.
The final column of Table 1.4 shows that, for cars sold by used-car dealers (panel
A), the expected gains from trade in the current mechanism is 38.8% of the market
value of the vehicle, with 25.6% going to the buyer, 8.7% going to the seller, and
the remainder going to the auction house through fees. For buyers, 25.6% can be
interpreted as an expected retail markup, as a buyer's valuation should be the amount
he expects to sell the car for at his own lot. For a seller, 8.7% is the expected gain
from selling the car at the auction today as opposed to selling it through her next-best
option. This next-best option includes the possibility of taking the car back to the
seller's own lot or leaving it at the auction house to run again the following week.
Therefore, the low expected gains from trade for the seller imply that cars are being
sold for close to what the seller would be able to get for the vehicle elsewhere.
In the fleet/lease sample, shown in panel B of Table 1.4, the expected gains from
trade is 33.4% of the market value of the car, with 20% going to the buyer and 9.6%
going to the seller. From conversations with used car dealers and sellers, as well as
auctioneers and auction house employees, these markups for buyers and sellers in
both the used-car dealer sample and the fleet/lease sample are in line with reality: A
buyer expects to obtain a retail markup ranging from about 10-25%, and and sellers
expects to make a smaller gain relative to her next best option, ranging from about 0-
10%. The markups are therefore slightly high for buyers, but still within a reasonable
range.
As was shown graphically in Figure 1-9, Table 1.4 demonstrates quantitatively
that the second-best mechanism achieves nearly the first-best level of surplus. In the
used-car dealers sample, the second-best surplus is 0.440 of the market value relative
to 0.449 of the market value in the first-best, indicating that the inefficiency due to
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Table 1.4: Performance of bargaining relative to direct mechanisms
A. Used-car dealers sample
Second- Buyer- Seller- Trade- Dynamic
First-best best optimal optimal maximizing mechanism
Expected gains 0.449 0.440 0.408 0.419 0.436 0.388
from trade (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Buyer gains 0.210 0.251 0.159 0.209 0.256
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Seller gains 0.231 0.157 0.260 0.230 0.087
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
Probability of 0.893 0.773 0.620 0.662 0.777 0.715
trade (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
B. Fleet/lease sellers sample
Second- Buyer- Seller- Trade- Dynamic
First-best best optimal optimal maximizing mechanism
Expected gains 0.358 0.349 0.335 0.330 0.345 0.334
from trade (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Buyer gains 0.184 0.219 0.139 0.185 0.203
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Seller gains 0.165 0.116 0.191 0.162 0.096
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001)
Probability of 0.907 0.773 0.705 0.654 0.780 0.774
trade (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
Notes: Direct, static mechanisms compared to current dynamic mechanism based on
estimated gains and probability of trade. Standard errors are from 200 bootstrap
replications. Units (other than for probability of trade) are in terms of the observable
value of the car.
incomplete information in this market is less than one percent of the market value
of the car. Alternatively, the second-best achieves 98% of the first-best surplus level.
In the fleet/lease sample, the second-best also achieves about 98% of the first-best
surplus.
Comparing the buyer-optimal to the dynamic mechanism gives an idea of what
could occur if the auction house were to commit to an auction followed by a take-
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it-or-leave-it offer from buyer to seller. Buyer gains from trade in this case would
be approximately the same, about 25% of the market value of the car. Seller gains,
on the other hand, increase from 8.7% to 15.7% of the market value in the user-car
dealers sample and increase from 9.6% to 11.6% of the market value in the fleet/lease
sample.
The seller-optimal mechanism is equivalent to a public reserve auction in this
setting. Panel A of Table 1.4 implies that seller gains could be much higher under a
public reserve auction than in the currently used dynamic mechanism, moving from
0.087 to 0.260 of the market value of the car. Buyer gains, on the other hand, decrease
to 0.159 of the market value. This may be one reason for the use of this post-auction
bargaining: while a public reserve auction would be optimal for the seller, post-
auction bargaining in this market appears to improve the buyer's payoff relative to a
public reserve auction. Panel A demonstrates that the total gains from trade in the
used-car dealers sample would be slightly higher in a public reserve auction than in
the current dynamic mechanism, while the opposite is shown in panel B for fleet/lease
sellers. It is important to note that each of these counterfactual comparisons holds
fixed the distribution of buyers and sellers who choose to participate. In reality, if the
auction house were to implement a public reserve auction, some buyers would likely
choose not to participate.
The deadweight loss due to limited commitment can be evaluated by comparing
the expected gains from trade in final column of Table 1.4 to the second-best column.
In the used-car dealers sample, the dynamic mechanism yields gains of 0.388 of the
market value relative to 0.440 in the second-best, meaning the dynamic mechanism
captures 88% of the second-best surplus. Therefore, the deadweight loss due to limited
commitment is small, but still larger than the deadweight loss due to incomplete
information. Comparing the dynamic mechanism to the first-best demonstrates that
the dynamic mechanism captures 86% of the first-best surplus in the used-car dealers
sample.
In the fleet/lease sample, the total deadweight loss due to limited commitment
in the dynamic mechanism is also small: the dynamic mechanism yields total gains
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of 0.334 of vehicle market value and the second-best mechanism would yield gains
of 0.349 of market value. Therefore, the dynamic mechanism captures 96% of the
second-best gains from trade. A comparison with the first-best demonstrates that
the dynamic mechanism captures 93% of the first-best surplus.
The costs of bargaining account for only a small amount of lost surplus in this
setting. To measure this, I evaluate (1.14) and (1.15) with no costs of bargaining
(J = 1, cs = 0, cB = 0). I find that buyer and seller surplus increase by at most 0.005
of the market value of the car in either sample.
The final row of each panel in Table 1.4 compares the probability of trade in each
mechanism. The probability of trade at wholesale auto auctions is used by industry
analysts and individual auction houses as a performance measure, and improving the
probability of trade is a primary goal of auction houses.6 5 Table 1.4 provides insight
into how this number might change if players were to commit to a static mechanism.
In sales by used-car dealers, trade occurs in the currently used mechanism 71.5% of
the time. Under the trade-maximizing mechanism, this sales rate could increase to
77.7%. Thus, the dynamic mechanism captures 92% of the trade volume achievable
under the trade-maximizing mechanism. With the buyer-optimal or seller-optimal
mechanisms, the volume of trade would decrease to 62-66%.
In the fleet/lease sample, trade occurs 77.4% of the time in the dynamic mech-
anism and 78% of the time in the trade-maximizing mechanism, implying that the
dynamic mechanism achieves 99% of the consummated sales which are possible under
two-sided uncertainty. The level of trade is higher in the dynamic mechanism than
in the seller-optimal/public reserve auction mechanism (65.4%). This again speaks
to one reason why post-auction bargaining may be used: it can potentially lead to a
higher volume of trade than a public reserve auction, which can benefit the auction
house.
Recall that the first-best would have trade occur whenever the buyer's value is
higher than the seller's. Therefore, the first-best probability of trade will not be
6 5See Sawyers (2012) for a recent industry discussion of the probability of trade, also referred to
as the conversion ratio.
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one, but will depend on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations. The first-
best column demonstrates that in the absence of incomplete information, 89.3% of
buyer and seller matches should result in trade in the used-car dealers sample and
90.7% in the fleet/lease sample. The second-best volume of trade is about 12-13
percentage points lower. Given that the second-best surplus level is quite close to the
first-best, this result implies that the trades which fail to occur due to incomplete
information are trades which would have generated little surplus-that is, they are
cases where the buyer only values the good slightly more than the seller. The trade-
maximizing mechanism yields only a slightly higher volume of trade than the second-
best mechanism, increasing by less than one percentage point in both samples.
1.7.2 Efficiency of Bargaining Relative to a k = 1/2 Double
Auction
As mentioned in the introduction, one reason alternating-offer bargaining is such a
common form of trade may be its simplicity. It is easy for players to understand and
easy for the auction house to implement, as it does not require the auction house to
know the distributions of buyer and seller valuations. On the other hand, the second-
best direct mechanism is unlikely to actually be implemented in practice, as it would
require, first, that players understand the mechanism and recognize that truth-telling
is optimal, and second, that the auction house have knowledge of buyer and seller
distributions in order to implement the mechanism (i.e., the auction house would
need to be able to evaluate the allocation and transfer functions, (x, p), described
above). It is therefore useful to compare the currently used mechanism to an alter-
native mechanism which is similarly simple to understand and implement: a k = 1/2
double auction. However, unlike alternating-offer bargaining, a k double auction re-
quires commitment, just as with the direct mechanisms examined above. Therefore,
comparing outcomes under the dynamic mechanism yields an estimate of what might
be achieved if the auction house and players could commit to a alternative, simple
trading mechanism.
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Figure 1-11: Estimated performance of dynamic mechanism relative to k = 1/2 double
auction and relative to the Pareto frontier. 95% confidence bands for the Pareto
frontier are shown by dashed lines, and 95% confidence bands for the minimum,
maximum and quartile-ranked equilibria of the k = 1/2 double auction are shown in
purple. The confidence region for the dynamic mechanism is shown in red. Units are
in terms of the observable value of the car.
The results of this comparison are displayed in Figure 1-11 under different possible
equilibria for the k = 1/2 double auction. I rank double auction outcomes by the
total gains from trade and select equilibria corresponding to the quartiles of these
outcomes as well as the minimum and maximum. Figure 1-11 demonstrates that the
k = 1/2 double auction can perform quite well, in particular for the seller, relative
to the dynamic mechanism. The equilibria do not appear to perform better for the
buyer than the dynamic mechanism, as the dynamic mechanism already yields close
to the maximum buyer payoff possible under two-sided uncertainty.
Figure 1-11 also demonstrates new numerical evidence about the efficiency of the
k = 1/2 double auction. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) demonstrated that when
both buyer and seller types are distributed uniformly on [0, 1], the k = 1/2 double
auction reaches the Pareto frontier. However, Satterthwaite and Williams (1989)
showed the symmetric uniform setting is a knife-edge case, and that generically only
the k = 1 and k = 0 double auctions can attain the Pareto frontier. Intuitively, the
k = 1 and k = 0 double auctions correspond exactly to the seller-optimal and buyer-
optimal mechanisms, lying on the frontier, whereas for k = 1/2 or for any k E (0, 1), it
is not obvious how close outcomes will lie relative to the efficient frontier. 66 However,
66 Evaluating (1.11) and (1.12) at k = 1 and k = 0 yields the seller-optimal and buyer-optimal
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Figure 1-11 illustrates that the k = 1/2 double auction has equilibria which can
closely approximate the frontier.
Table 1.5: Performance of bargaining relative to k = 1/2 double auction
A. Used-car dealers sample
Second- 0.25 0.5 0.75 Dynamic
best quantile quantile quantile Max mechanism
Expected gains 0.440 0.256 0.348 0.390 0.431 0.388
from trade (0.006) (0.034) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Buyer gains 0.210 0.136 0.164 0.195 0.211 0.256
(0.005) (0.018) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Seller gains 0.231 0.120 0.185 0.195 0.221 0.087
(0.005) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001)
Probability of 0.773 0.332 0.513 0.605 0.732 0.715
trade (0.005) (0.081) (0.059) (0.042) (0.012) (0.002)
B. Fleet/lease sellers sample
Second- 0.25 0.5 0.75 Dynamic
best quantile quantile quantile Max mechanism
Expected gains 0.349 0.183 0.249 0.305 0.341 0.334
from trade (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Buyer gains 0.184 0.088 0.109 0.162 0.173 0.203
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Seller gains 0.165 0.096 0.140 0.144 0.168 0.096
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Probability of 0.773 0.307 0.443 0.642 0.743 0.774
trade (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002)
Notes: Indirect (k=1/2 double auctoin) mechanism compared to current dynamic
mechanism based on estimated gains and probability of trade. First column reports the
second-best direct mechanism. Columns 2 through 5 report the outcomes of various
equilibria in the k double auction, ranked by estimated gains from trade. Standard errors
are from 200 bootstrap replications. Units (other than for probability of trade) are in
terms of the observable value of the car.
Table 1.5 displays the quantitative results corresponding to Figure 1-11.67 The
mechanisms discussed in Section 1.6.1.
67The estimated minimum equilibrium is omitted from Table 1.5 for the sake of space.
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second-best direct mechanism is also reported for comparison. In the used-car dealers
sample, shown in panel A, the dynamic mechanism achieves a similar total gains from
trade as does the 0.75 quantile equilibrium of the k = 1/2 double auction: both yield
gains of approximately 0.39 of the market value of the car. The seller's gains are lower
in the dynamic mechanism than in all of the k double auction equilibria in Table 1.5.
For example, if the 0.25 quantile equilibrium of the k = 1/2 double auction were to
occur, the seller's payoff would increase from 0.087 of the market value of the car to
0.120 of the market value. The probability of trade, on the other hand, is higher in
the dynamic mechanism in all but the maximum estimated equilibrium.
In the fleet/lease sample (panel B), seller gains are again estimated to be higher
in each of the equilibria of the k = 1/2 double auction. Specifically, seller gains
would increase from 0.096 to 0.168 of the market value of the car if the maximum
equilibrium were played. By other measures, on the other hand, it is the dynamic
mechanism which outperforms the k = 1/2 double auction. Only the maximum
equilibrium achieves a higher total gains from trade than the dynamic mechanism,
increasing from 0.334 to 0.341 of the observable value of the car. The probability of
trade (77.4%) and buyer gains (0.203 of the market value) are higher in the dynamic
mechanism than in all of the double auction equilibria estimated. These findings
are suggestive that a k = 1/2 double auction would do little to improve outcomes
in fleet/lease bargaining, but could potentially result in slightly more efficiency for
bargaining over vehicles sold by used-car dealers.
1.7.3 The Region of Trade
This section takes the analysis of trade one step further by examining the region
of buyer and seller types where trade occurs. This type of plot is common in the
theoretical bargaining literature; here I merge the plot of the theoretical region with
an estimate of this region under real-world bargaining.
Figure 1-12 plots this estimated region under the dynamic mechanism (marked in
blue) and under the second-best mechanism maximizing the total gains from trade
(marked in red). For the dynamic mechanism, this region of trade is determined by
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the allocation function 4' estimated using the quantile-matching procedure described
in Section 1.6.3, where I use the region of trade for r = 2, or bargaining that ended in
the second period of the game. The region of trade for the second-best mechanism is
determined by the allocation function, x, from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
Williams (1987), described in Section 1.6.1. Both mechanisms depend on the auction
high bid, so it is only possible to plot the region of trade after selecting a particular
value of the auction high bid. Figure 1-12 displays the region of trade when the high
bid is approximately 0.5 of the market value, represented by the horizontal dashed
line. The diagonal dashed line marks the 45 degree line.
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Figure 1-12: Estimated boundary of trade for the dynamic mechanism (marked in
blue) and the boundary of trade in the second-best mechanism maximizing the total
gains from trade (marked in red). The horizontal dashed line represents the auction
high bid (approximately 0.5) at which the region of trade was evaluated for this figure
(marked in green) and the diagonal dashed line represents the 45 degree line (marked
in black). The seller's type is displayed on the horizontal axis, and the buyer's type
on the vertical axis. Units are in terms of the observable value of the car.
The first-best outcome would be for trade to occur whenever the buyer values
the good more than the seller, which is the region northwest of the dashed lines.
The gap between the dashed lines and the second-best mechanism represents the
region of buyer and seller types where trade will fail to occur because of incomplete
information. This gap appears to be of similar magnitude in both the used-car and
fleet/lease sellers samples, and the failed trades occur primarily in cases close to the
45 degree line, where the buyer and seller have similar valuations for the car. For
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example, panel (a) indicates that if a seller values a car at 0.6 of the market value,
trade will occur under the second-best mechanism if and only if the buyer's valuation
exceeds 0.8 of the market value.
Figure 1-12, panel (a) indicates that at a high bid value of 0.5 the region of trade
is smaller under the dynamic bargaining mechanism than under the second-best for
cars sold by used-car dealers. The figure implies that if a seller values a car at 0.4 of
the market value, trade will only occur in the dynamic mechanism when the buyer's
valuation exceeds the market value (that is, a normalized valuation of one). In panel
(b), for cars sold by fleet/lease sellers, on the other hand, the region of trade appears
quite similar under the second-best and the dynamic mechanism. When the seller
has a valuation of 0.4 of the market value, trade occurs under either mechanism when
the buyer's valuation is approximately 0.7 of the market value.
1.8 Model Fit and Robustness
Various issues of model fit and robustness have already been discussed above in the
presentation of results. Here I discuss several additional tests looking at the fit of the
buyer distribution, the moment inequalities in the estimation of seller types, and the
independence of the model's various moving pieces.
1.8.1 Tests of Buyer Distribution Fit
The estimation approach in this paper relies on the assumption that the auction
takes place in a symmetric, independent, private values environment.68 One test of
68 As discussed in Athey and Haile (2007), identification results in ascending auctions outside
of the IPV framework are quite limited. Roberts (2010) provided one approach to account for
unobserved auction heterogeneity, but the approach requires the assumption that reserve prices
contain no private information of sellers. This assumption is natural in the setting of Roberts (2010),
where it is the auction house and not sellers who choose the reserve price. The measurement error
approach to allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, developed in Li and Vuong (1998) and applied in
Krasnokutskaya (2011) and Asker (2010), has not been applied to ascending auction bids because of
dependencies among order statistics, as pointed out in Aradillas-Lopez et al. (2012) and Athey and
Haile (2002). It may be possible to apply the measurement error approach using the auction high
bid and secret reserve price as two different measures of the unobserved heterogeneity, as Decarolis
(2009) does in a first price auction setting, but the approach would not yield an estimate of seller
types needed for the estimation of the dynamic mechanism described in Section 1.6.3. Finally,
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this assumption is a linear regression of normalized high bids on the number of bidders
present, treating the number of bidders as exogenous. Under the null hypothesis that
the auction environment is a symmetric IPV setting, bids should be increasing in
the number of bidders.69 In both the used-car and fleet/lease sellers samples, this
regression yields a slope coefficient which is positive and significant at the 95% level.
A more powerful test is to regress quantiles of bids on the number of bidders present,
as suggested in Chetverikov et al. (2012).70 Estimating this regression for the 0.05,
0.1, ..., 0.95 quantiles yields positive and significant slope coefficients at every quantile
except the 0.9 and 0.95 quantiles of the fleet/lease sample, where the slope coefficients
are insignificant. The test indicates that the distribution of the second order statistic
increases as the number of competitors increases, consistent with a symmetric IPV
environment.
Two additional tests are discussed in Athey and Haile (2007). The first test relies
on the property that, under the null hypothesis of symmetric IPV, the estimate of
the distribution of buyer valuations obtained using observations in which N bidders
were present should be the same as the estimate obtained using observations in which
N' = N bidders were present. To implement this test, I use a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test to compare the estimated distribution from auctions in which 48 bidders
were present (the most frequently occurring N) to the estimated distributions from
each of the nine other most frequently occurring values of N, which range from 45
to 57. For the used-car dealers sample, four of the nine tests failed to reject the null
of symmetric IPV. For the fleet/lease sellers sample, all nine tests failed to reject
symmetric IPV. Therefore, by this standard, evidence in favor of the symmetric IPV
Aradillas-Lopez et al. (2012) examined ascending auctions with correlated values and presented an
approach for estimating bounds on buyer and seller surplus but not for estimating the underlying
distribution of buyer valuations, and hence the approach cannot be used to compare alternative
mechanisms.
"As pointed out in Athey and Haile (2007), this condition is necessary but not sufficient for a
setting to be symmetric IPV; prices can also increase with the number of bidders in a common values
environment.
70I perform this regression for a given quantile u by selecting, for each value of N (the number of
bidders present) with at least 1,000 auction observations, the uth quantile of high bids from auctions
with N bidders. I then regress these quantiles on N. This regression could also be performed
using standard quantile regression. For a comparison of standard quantile regression to this type of
grouped quantile regression estimation, see Chetverikov et al. (2012).
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environment is weaker in the used-car dealers sample than in the fleet/lease sample.7 1
A second test suggested by Athey and Haile (2007) is to compare estimates of
the buyer distribution obtained by using different order statistics; under the null
hypothesis of symmetric IPV, these estimated distributions should coincide. In order
to apply this approach, I use a small subset of 6,362 auction sales by fleet/lease sellers
for which both the second and third order statistics are observed. The details of the
construction of this subset are found in Appendix 1.B. Again using the ten most
frequently observed values of N in the data, I find that, at nine out of these ten
values, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject that the estimated distributions are
the same when using the second vs. third order static, again consistent with the
symmetric IPV assumption.72
Each of the tests in this section and the approach for obtaining the buyer distribu-
tion in Section 1.5.2 uses estimated values of N, the number of bidders present at each
auction sale. An alternative approach which does not rely on knowing the number of
bidders was proposed by Song (2005) and applied to Korean wholesale auto auctions
by Kim and Lee (2008). The key insight of Song (2005) is that the density of the kth
order statistic conditional on the jth order statistic (where k < j) does not depend on
N. 73 Therefore, as long as two or more order statistics are observed, the underlying
distribution can be estimated using semi-nonparametric maximum likelihood, as in
Gallant and Nychka (1987) and Chen (2007). I perform this exercise using the sample
of 6,362 auction sales for which the second and third order statistics are observed. I
71Note that in both the used-car sellers sample and the fleet/lease sellers sample, when comparing
the estimates of the buyer type distribution from auctions with N far below the most frequently
observed range of 45 to 57 to the estimates from auctions with N lying within the most frequently
observed range, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does reject that the estimated distributions are equiva-
lent.
72The order statics relationship used to estimate the distribution of underlying valuations from
the observed third order statistic, b3, is given by
Fb,(b) = N(N - 1)Fb(b)N-2(1 - Fb(b)) 2 + NFb(b)N-1(1 - Fb(b)) + Fb(b)N (1.16)2
73This conditional density is given by
fkj (j - 1)!(F(y) - F(x))ik--1 (1 - F(y))k-f(y)
(j - k -- 1)!(k - 1)!(1 - F(x))j-l
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then compare the estimated distribution using the Song (2005) approach to the main
estimates obtained in Section 1.5.2. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects that the dis-
tributions are the same at the 95% level, indicating that, maintaining the symmetric
IPV assumption, the estimated values of N are at best an imperfect measure of the
true number of bidders participating. See Appendix 1.C.6 for further details on this
estimation procedure.
The procedure applied in this paper for imputing the number of bidders assumes
that all bidders present at the auction house are indeed participating. Therefore, those
who are not actively participating are treated as though they had very low valuation
draws. An alternative to this approach would be to assume that only some fraction
of bidders present at any given time actually receives a draw from the distribution of
buyer valuations and that the remaining bidders are not participating. To implement
this approach, I estimate the model assuming that only half of the bidders present at
any point in time were actually partipating in the auction. The resulting estimates
yield a worse fit in terms of the theory, yielding estimates of buyer surplus which lie
slightly beyond the Pareto Frontier.74
1.8.2 Robustness of Moment Inequalities Estimation of Seller's
Type
This section provides evidence of the robustness of the moment inequalities approach
for estimating the seller's inverted secret reserve price, s(R). The main results of the
paper use a grid over R with K = 50 grid points. This approach can result in an
estimated lower bound exceeding the estimated upper bound at certain grid points.
When K = 50, bounds cross at one grid point in the used-car dealers sample and at
twelve grid points in the fleet/lease sample. With K = 100, these numbers increase
to four and 29 grid points with crossings, and at K = 25, there are zero and three
crossings, respectively.
74The resulting estimates are similar to those in panels (a) and (c) of Figure 1-13.
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Pakes et al. (2011), Bontemps et al. (2011), and others discuss the case when
bounds cross, leading to a point estimate rather than a set. One test of model speci-
fication in this setting is given by Andrews and Soares (2010), and is analogous to an
over-identification J test in a traditional GMM setting. Under the null hypothesis of
correct specification, the confidence set calculated from a generalized moment selec-
tion procedure should be nonempty." I employ this approach by modeling s(R) as
a b-spline function with 15 uniformly spaced knots, and estimate the confidence set
using the approach described in Andrews and Soares (2010). I find that the test fails
to reject the null hypothesis of correct model specification.
Moreover, several arguments suggest that these crossing bounds are not problem-
atic. First, from Figure 1-6 above, it is clear that when the lower bound does lie
above the upper bound, it is not by an economically relevant amount. Also, not im-
mediately evident from Figure 1-6 is the fact that nowhere does the 95% confidence
interval for the lower bound lie strictly above the 95% confidence interval for the up-
per bound. Finally, as K increases from 25 to 100, the pointwise confidence interval
for the identified set does not change by an observable amount.
While the number of crossings of the estimated upper and lower bounds does not
appear large, the number of individual observations violating these bounds is large.
Recall that the overall upper and lower bounds for seller types are estimated by tak-
ing means of individual-level upper and lower bounds. I find that the individual-level
observations with informative lower bounds (cases in which the seller walked away
from bargaining) lie above the overall estimated upper bound 55% of the time in
the fleet/lease sellers sample and 47% of the time in the used-car dealers sample.
Similarly, individual-level observations with informative upper bounds lie below the
overall estimated lower bound 29% of the time in the fleet/lease sellers sample and
27% of the time in the used-car dealers sample. Under the measurement error inter-
pretation of these violations, these results would imply that one-fourth to one-half of
the bargaining records with informative bounds are recorded with error (note that
"Andrews and Barwick (2011) provided a refinement of this generalized moment selection proce-
dure.
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this does not imply that one-fourth to one-half of all observations are recorded with
error, as not all records have informative bounds, as described in Section 1.5.3).76
In practice, these violations may be due to other factors such as heterogeneity in
sellers' bargaining costs or different equilibria being played in the bargaining game,
either of which would imply that different sellers can have differing secret reserve
price functions. Unfortunately, accounting for these alternative factors structurally
would be infeasible, as the outcomes of the dynamic bargaining mechanism would
depend on these factors and surplus in the dynamic bargaining would no longer be
identified.77 Therefore, the additive, mean-zero measurement error model may be an
approximation to a more complex structure of heterogeneity among sellers. 78
In order to analyze the sensitivity of the welfare estimates to the choice of using
the midpoint, upper bound, or lower bound of the pointwise confidence interval for
s(R), I estimate the model under each specification. The baseline estimates from
Figure 1-9 use the lower confidence bound for the used-car dealers sample and the
midpoint for the fleet/lease sample. The other specifications are displayed in Figure
1-13. Note that the choice of the midpoint, lower bound, or upper bound does not
affect the estimate of buyer surplus in the dynamic mechanism, as this is solved for
using the quantile-matching approach from Section 1.6.3. The choice does affect the
76When considering all records, 8% of observations display an informative lower bound less than
the estimated lower bound in both the used-car dealers sample and the fleet/lease sellers sample.
14% display an informative upper bound greater than the estimated lower bound in the fleet/lease
sample, while 18% fall into this category in the used-car dealers sample.
77For example, consider the case where the per-offer bargaining cost, cs, varies by seller. Then
the secret reserve price strategy, R(s, cs), would depend on s as well as cs. It can be shown
that R(s, cs) should be strictly decreasing in cs for any s, and hence s(R, cs) should be strictly
increasing in cs for any R. Therefore, it is true that at each R the r-quantile of cs, Q' , satisfies
QLR s(R, Qs) /| QJR, where QEiR and QvIR represent the r-quantile of the individual-level
lower and upper bounds observed from bargaining when the secret reserve price was R. Using this
approach, one can bound a different inverted secret reserve function at each quantile of cs. The
main challenge with carrying this approach through the rest of the steps of the paper is that the
direct revelation mechanism corresponding to the dynamic bargaining mechanism would depend not
only on the valuations of the buyer and seller, but also on the bargaining costs of the buyer and
seller, and as these costs are unobserved the approach presented in Section 1.6.3 to estimate the
direct mechanism (and, consequently, the surplus under the dynamic bargaining) would no longer
be feasible.
78For example, if sellers have heterogeneous per-offer costs, the approach of taking expectations of
individual-level upper and lower bounds would be capturing bounds on the conditional expectation
of s given R rather on the true s(R). That is, E[LIR] E[s(R, cs)|R] 5 E[UIR].
78
0.25 1 0
Dynamic 0.250.2
0.2
0.15 Dynamica o~is 0.15
Pareto Pareto
0.1 0.1
0.05 0.05
01 01
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Seller payoff Seller payoff
(a) Used-car dealers, midpoint (b) Fleet/lease sellers, lower
0.2 i _ -
0.25 Dynamic
0.2 Dynamic 0.15
cL 0.15 0.1 Pareto
0.1 Pareto .0.10
0.05
0.05
0 0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Seller payoff Seller payoff
(c) Used-car dealers, upper (d) Fleet/lease sellers, upper
Figure 1-13: Estimated performance of dynamic mechanism relative to Pareto frontier
using the midpoint and upper confidence bounds of seller types for used-car dealers,
and using the lower and upper confidence bound of seller types for fleet/lease sellers.
Second-best and trade-maximizing mechanisms are shown on the Pareto frontier. 95%
confidence bands are shown around the frontier and each mechanism. Units are in
terms of the observable value of the car.
estimated seller surplus and the estimated Pareto frontier.
As seen in panels (a) and (c) of Figure 1-13, for the used-car dealers sample,
estimation using the upper bound or midpoint yields an outcome for dynamic bar-
gaining which lies slightly beyond the outcomes which the estimated frontier predicts
are possible. The fit using the lower bound, shown in Figure 1-9, is much better,
yielding a Pareto frontier which is consistent with estimated surplus because the 95%
band about the Pareto frontier overlaps the 95% confidence band about the dynamic
bargaining surplus. In the fleet/lease sellers sample, estimation with the lower bound
results in more seller gains, and estimation with the upper bound results in less seller
gains. Intuitively, using a lower estimate of the sellers types s implies that sellers must
have been gaining more from trades which occurred. In both panels (b) and (d), the
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95% confidence region for the dynamic bargaining outcome lies below or overlaps the
region of surplus which is predicted to be achievable by the Pareto frontier, yielding
a better fit that in panels (a) and (c). 79
1.8.3 Additional Tests of Independence Assumptions
The model and estimation approach in this paper assume independence of various
moving pieces. For example, the approach controlling for observables assumes that
covariates are independent of players' private valuations. A simple test of this as-
sumption is to examine whether the variance of normalized high bids depends on
F(X), the observable component of buyers and sellers types estimated in Section
1.5.1. I find that the variance is quite different for cars with F(X) <$5,000 than for
cars with F(X) >$5,000, implying there is heteroskedasticity in the first-stage regres-
sion. I then re-estimate the distributions and counterfactuals using only observations
with f(X) <$5,000 . The results are displayed in row 2 of Table 1.6. The full sample
estimates are displayed for comparison (using the midpoint of the confidence bounds
for the seller types). For both used-car dealers and fleet/lease sellers, the estimated
gains from trade lie within 0.49 to 0.60 of the market value of the car, whereas in the
baseline case gains were in the range of 0.33 to 0.40 of market value. This finding is
indicative that gains from trade (relative to the market value of the car) are higher
on vehicles with a lower market value.
Estimating the model on low vs. high-value cars can be viewed as a check on
whether heteroskedasticity matters in the first-stage regression estimated in (1.3).
Alternatively, the exercise can be viewed as a check on whether differences in seller
demand uncertainty, (, affect estimation, as I find that high-value cars exhibit smaller
differences in estimates of F(X) from (1.3) using secret reserve prices and estimates
79While the exercise illustrated in Figure 1-13 treats the outcome in panels (a) and (c) as an issue
of model fit, Bazerman et al. (1998) argue that real-world bargaining can potentially yield more
efficient outcomes than the theoretical bounds of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams
(1987) would predict possible. Bazerman et al. (1998) review evidence from the behavioral and
experimental literature suggesting that more efficient outcomes can occur due to non-traditional
utility functions (where one player's utility nests the other's), limits on players' abilities to mimic
other types, and other features of bounded rationality.
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from an analogous regression using high bids. While the gains from trade clearly
differ in low vs. high-value cars, the qualititative findings are the same. First, the
deadweight-loss due to incomplete information is small, as the first-best gains are close
to the second best gains. Second, the deadweight loss due to limited commitment is
also small, as the dynamic mechanism lies close to the second-best in the used-car
dealers sample and even more so in the fleet/lease sample.
A similar check on this assumption uses only cars which are less than four years
old, shown in row 3 of Table 1.6. For both used-car dealers and fleet/lease sellers, the
estimated gains from trade decrease to a range of 0.17 to 0.23 of the market value,
indicating that less gains from trade exist on newer cars, a finding consistent with the
estimated expected gains from trade from websites such as Edmunds.com. As above,
the main qualitative results are unchanged.
Table 1.6: Estimated expected gains from trade in selected subsamples
Used-car dealers sample Fleet/lease sellers sample
Second- Dynamic Dynamic
First-best best mechanism First-best Second-best mechanism
Full Sample, midpoint 0.404 0.393 0.353 0.358 0.349 0.334
of seller bounds (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Observable 0.538 0.525 0.493 0.598 0.585 0.579
value < $5,000 (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Less than 4 0.2111 0.2051 0.1727 0.2344 0.232 0.2187
years old 0.0405 0.0364 0.0291 0.0038 0.0038 0.0061
First run of car 0.417 0.408 0.387 0.397 0.390 0.373
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
First car sold 0.422 0.411 0.359 0.409 0.401 0.406
by seller (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Notes: Estimates of expected gains from trade using various sample restrictions. First row displays
full sample estimtes using the midpoint of seller bounds for s(R). Second row uses only cars with an
estimated observable value, F(X), less than $5,000. Third row uses only cars less than four years old.
Fourth row uses only the first attempt to sell a given vehicle. Fifth row uses only the first car offered
by a seller on a given auction day. Standard errors are from 200 bootstrap replications. Units (other
than for probability of trade) are in terms of the observable value of the car.
A potential concern with the estimation approach in this paper is that players'
values for cars in different auction observations may not be independent. I examine
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here two different ways in which sellers types may be correlated across auctions.80
First, I limit the sample to the first time a given car went up for sale (recall that cars
can go up for sale multiple times if they do not sell on the first run), as a seller's value
for the same car in different runs is likely to be correlated. The results are displayed
in row 4 of Table 1.6, and yield estimates similar to the full sample estimates. Second,
I re-estimate the model using only the first car which a seller sold on a given auction
day, as any correlation between auction sales due to inventory behavior is likely to
be the strongest for cars sold on the same day. The results are displayed in row 5 of
Table 1.6. The estimated expected gains from trade are again quite similar to the full
sample estimates, indicating that this type of correlation may not be a concern. 81
One limitation of this paper is the maintained assumption that buyer and seller
types are independent. The correlation between buyer and seller types cannot be
tested directly because buyer types are not identified (only the distribution of buyer
types is identified). However, the raw correlation between normalized secret reserve
prices and normalized auction high bids is available. Before outliers above the 9 9 th
percentile are trimmed (as explained in the description of which observations were
dropped in Section 1.4), this correlation is 0.05 in both samples. However, after
eliminating outliers, the correlation is 0.36 in the fleet/lease sample and 0.57 in the
used-car sellers sample. Extending the above analysis to take this correlation into ac-
count would pose significant challenges. In particular, the estimation of the allocation
function corresponding to the dynamic mechanism would not be straightforward.82
80 Correlation may also exist in buyer types across different auctions but testing is simpler with
seller types as each buyer is only observed if he is the high bidder.
8 11n practice, there may be some dependencies between auction observations which these tests
cannot account for. For example, if items sold are considered close substitutes by participants,
inventory optimization behavior by buyers or sellers could lead to some valuations being dependent
across auctions. While assuming independence of auction observations is common throughout the
empirical auctions literature, it is particularly useful in the setting of this paper for honing in on the
dynamics within an auction/bargaining sequence rather than between auctions. In conversations
with auction participants, sellers claim to consider each auction in isolation, and buyers often have a
specific retail consumer lined up for a specific car, lending some support to the assumption. Recent
papers which have explored dynamic dependencies of valuations between multiple sealed-bid second
price auctions include Zeithammer (2006), Ingster (2009), Sailer (2006), and Lewis and Backus
(2010).
82As mentioned above, the measurement error technique of Li and Vuong (1998) would not yield
an estimate of seller types (instead, it would only provide an estimate of the distribution of seller
types), which is essential for the estimation of the dynamic mechanism described in Section 1.6.3.
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One test of the implications of ignoring correlation between seller and buyer values
is to simulate from the observed marginal distributions of the high bid and seller's
secret reserve price to measure how often the high bid should exceed the reserve. In
the used-car dealers sample, this simulation implies that trade should occur through
the auction 30% of the time, whereas it only occurs 16% of the time in practice
(from Table 1.2). For fleet/lease sellers the fit is much better: in the data, the high
bid exceeds the reserve price 37% of the time, and simulating from the marginal
distributions implies this should occur 41% of the time under independence of the
two variables. Therefore, correlation between buyer and seller types appears to be
less problematic in the fleet/lease sellers sample than in the used-car dealers sample,
and estimating the model separately for the two samples, as is done throughout the
paper, serves as an additional check on the effects of ignoring correlation. As shown
in Section 1.7, the findings are qualitatively similar in both samples.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper examines the efficiency of bargaining from a real-world setting with two-
sided incomplete information. I develop a model and strategy for estimating the
distributions of valuations on both sides of the market without relying on a particular
structure or equilibrium for the bargaining game.
To estimate the distribution of buyer valuations, I use an order statistics approach.
To estimate the distribution of seller valuations, I present a new approach using
moment inequalities to bound the inverse of the seller's secret reserve price strategy.
The bounds are consistent with the seller using a strictly increasing strategy, as
implied by the model. I also use a bounds approach to obtain simple bounds on the
costs of bargaining. I find these costs to be small and reasonable; the discount factor
is close to one and the costs of making counteroffers are close to zero.
After estimating the distributions of buyer and seller types, I map these distri-
butions into the static, direct revelation mechanism framework which traces out the
efficient frontier derived in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987).
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These mechanisms depend on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations. I
measure the deadweight loss due to incomplete information as the gap between the
first-best trade line and the second-best frontier. This gap is also small in this market.
I find that the second-best mechanism achieves 98% of the first-best gains from trade.
I also find that the deadweight loss due to limited commitment is quite small. The
dynamic mechanism achieves 88% of possible surplus for cars sold by used-car dealers
and 96% of possible surplus for cars sold by large fleet and lease companies. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis of Wilson (1986) and Ausubel and Deneckere
(1993) who suggested that it may be that "[dynamic bargaining mechanisms] survive
because they employ trading rules that are efficient for a wide class of environments."
Although the findings are suggestive that bargaining is quite efficient, improve-
ments are still possible, particularly for cars sold by used-car dealers. The gains from
trade and the probability of trade could increase by 14% and 8% if bargaining out-
comes were to move to northeast-most point of the frontier. I demonstrate that these
findings are robust to a variety of specifications.
I also compare the currently used dynamic mechanism to a k = 1/2 double auction,
a simple, static alternative to dynamic, alternating-offer bargaining. I adapt methods
from Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) to solve for equilibria of the k = 1/2 double
auction given the estimated distributions. Findings indicate that the currently used
dynamic mechanism performs about as well as the 0.75 quantile equilibrium examined
here. I find that a wide range of other equilibrium outcomes is possible in this setting;
some of these equilibria would be improvements over dynamic bargaining and others
would not, and without a model of equilibrium selection it is impossible to say what
would happen in practice if the k = 1/2 double auction were to be implemented.
The use of dynamic, post-auction bargaining may seem puzzling at first: why
wouldn't used cars be sold with a standard auction format, such as an auction with
no reserve price or an auction with a public reserve price? The findings of this paper
shed some light on this question. Recall that an auction house is a platform in a two-
sided market, required to attract both buyers and sellers, each of whom has a private
valuation for the good. A no-reserve auction could drive some high-value sellers out
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of the market. And while a public reserve auction is optimal for the seller, alternative
mechanisms, including post-auction bargaining, may be preferred for the buyer or for
the auction house, and may allow the market to achieve a more efficient allocation.
Alternating-offer bargaining in particular is a natural mechanism which is easy for
players to understand and for the auction house to implement, and which does not
require the same level of commitment as static bargaining mechanisms, which, while
more efficient, require players to sometimes walk away from negotiations even when
it is discovered ex-post that gains from trade exist.8
An auction followed by dynamic, alternating-offer bargaining, therefore, can po-
tentially dominate a public reserve auction inl terms of the buyer's payoff, total sur-
plus, or the overall level of trade, and this paper provides evidence that the mechanism
performs well in this market: gains from trade for the buyer are 61% and 46% higher in
the dynamic mechanism than in a public reserve auction for used-car and fleet/lease
sellers, respectively. Similarly, the volume of trade-an indicator used throughout
the industry as a measure of auction house performance- is 8-18% higher under the
currently used dynamic mechanism than it would be under a public reserve auction.
The nature of wholesale auto auctions as a two-sided market may also provide an
explanation for the result found above that buyers appear to obtain a higher share
of surplus than sellers. As discussed in Rochet and Tirole (2006), it is often the
case in two-sided markets with network effects that participants on one side of the
market obtain a higher share of surplus than those on the other side. In the case
of auto auctions, a competing auction house which offered a higher payoff to sellers,
for example, by switching to a public reserve auction, might be unable to attract a
sufficient volume of buyers for the market to function.84 Therefore, it may be the case
83 An auction (or some form of bid solicitation) followed by bargaining occurs in numerous real-
world settings, often in transactions which account for large shares of GDP. Examples include res-
idential and commercial real estate, corporate takeovers (Burkart 1995), FCC spectrum auctions
(Lenard et al. 2009), and many procurement auctions (Huh and Park 2010). Other examples in-
clude privatization auctions in post-Soviet Europe (Dooley et al. (1993)) and French timber auctions
(Elyakime et al. 1997).
8 4The original founder of the auction houses studied in this paper was vehemently opposed to
post-auction bargaining. Eventually, however, the auction houses adopted the practice in order to
be in line with the rest of the industry, suggestive that network effects in attracting buyers and
sellers to the auction house may indeed be at play.
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that two-sided uncertainty and competition among auction houses plays an important
role in a platform's choice of mechanism.
L.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Note that 7rB (Oj , bi) is given by
7rB(0j, bi) = M16 E ((b - Oj) Pr (dS = Aj)
+6IEPr(dS =C/) E~q max {bi -pS,0,V 3B (bij, p~)j )-CB
This expression is the payoff to the buyer from stating the auction high bid as a
counteroffer, which is how the post-auction bargaining game begins.
Because the high bidder, after learning that the high bid did not meet the secret
reserve price, has the option to immediately walk away without entering bargaining,
the payoff M(#, bi) cannot be negative. To see that truth-telling is a dominant
strategy, suppose first that bidder i drops out at some #i < bi.
1. If bi < 1j, then /#i < b < 3j, so bidder i is not the high bidder, and would not
have been even if he had bid 3i = bi.
2. If bi > 13j, then the following is true:
(a) If Oj < #i < by, then bidder i is the high bidder and gets an expected payoff
of M(/3, bi).
(b) If /i < #j < bi, then bidder i loses, but i would have been the high bidder
if he had bid bi, and would have again made M(#3j, bi).
Thus, dropping out at a price less than bi will never raise bidder i's payoff, and in
some cases may decrease it.
Now, suppose that bidder i drops out at some Oi > bi
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1. If 3j < b, then #j < bi < #3, then bidder i is the high bidder and gets payoff
M(/3, bi), but would have received this same payoff dropping out at bi. Also, as
noted above, because it is the auctioneer, rather than the bidders, who calls out
bids, a player cannot actually outbid himself in an attempt to win the object
while avoiding costly bargaining.
2. If #3 > bi, then the following is true:
(a) If bi < #3 < #j, then bidder i loses, and would not have been the high
bidder even if he had bid #3 = bi.
(b) If bi < #3 < #i, then bidder i is the high bidder, but would not choose to
enter bargaining because the condition that the seller never accepts offers
below the auction high bid rules out the possibility that bidder i could
receive a positive payoff by bargaining.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In order to prove this result, the following Lemma is useful
Lemma (A). For any finite T and history ht, VS (sIht) is weakly increasing in s and
t+1 (blht+l) is weakly increasing in b for all t < T.
Proof of Lemma A
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of periods remaining. Suppose there
are T total periods in the game and there is currently one period remaining: it is the
seller's turn and after her turn the buyer will only be allowed to accept or decline.
Let hT-1 represent the history at the beginning of period T - 1 and hT the history
in the final period. The seller's payoff from countering at a price of p is then
61Wj(s,ph T-1) - Cs =6 (p6EPr(d T) + S(6E( Pr(d Ah T)) + 1 - 6E)) - CS
Let p*(slhT-1) = arg max, Ws(s,plhT-1). That is,
Vs_1(s~hT- ) = W 1 (sp*(slh- )Ih- )
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Now let VT1 (s, s' hT-1) represent the payoff to the seller of type s who mimics
type s' < s. Clearly VT1(s, sIhT") > VT_1(s, s'|hT-1) because VT_1(s, sjhT-1) is
the maximized counteroffer payoff given the seller's true value, s. It remains to be
shown that VT-1(s, s'IhT-1) Vr_1(s', s' hT-1). Below, let hT represent the history
in period T when the seller of type s has mimicked type s' in period T - 1. That is,
hT = {hT-1, p*(s'|hT-1)}. Observe that
VT 1(s, s'|hT-1) = 61 (p*(s'|h T-1 )6E Pr(dB - Ah T) + s(EE(1 - Pr(dB Al/ T)) + 1 - 6E)) - CS,
and
VT_1(s', s'|h T-1) = 6, (p* (s'|hT-1 )6E Pr(d B = Alhi T) + s'oE (1 - Pr (dTB AlIT)) + 1 - 6E)) - CS
Thus,
VT_1(s, s'h T-1) - V_1(s', s'|hT-1) = (s - s')(JE(1 - Pr(dTB= AhT)) + 1 - 6E)
> 0
Therefore, VT-1(s, sIhT-1) > VT-1(s', s'IhT-1), and the seller's counteroffer payoff is
weakly increasing in her type when there is one period remaining.
To complete the proof by induction,, let VT-(t_)(sjhT-(t-1)) denote the seller's
counteroffer payoff with t - 1 periods remaining, and suppose VT (t-(s|h-(-1)) is
weakly increasing s. Note that when there are t periods remaining, VTt(s, sIhT-t)
VT_1(s, s'|hT-t) by the same argument as above. It remains to be shown that
VT-t (s, s' hT-t) > VT-t (s', s' hT-t). Let
hT-(t-1 ) { h T, p*(s'|hT-t)}
hT(t-2) = {hT-- ,p*(s|hT-), pB( 1 )
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Note that
VTt(s, s'|h'-t) - VT 1(s', s'|hT-t)
(s - s') (6E Pr (-(td-) =Dh-(t- 1)) + 1 - 6E)
+ 6 1 6 E Pr T(t-1) = (t-1) )
x(6EEB [mx p_(t_1), IS, VT _(t-1) (s, s'|hr-t2
- max {pT (t-1),', V(t- 1) (s', s'hT-(t- 2)) }T-(t + (s - s')(1 + 6E)
> 0
Therefore, VTt(s, s~hT-t) > Vrt(s', s|hT-t), completing the proof. The proof that
the buyer counteroffer payoff, V (blht+1), is increasing follows by the same steps.
D
(Continuation of Proof of Proposition 2)
Let X(b) be defined by 0 = rB(X, b), where irB is defined in the proof of Proposition
1. Intuitively, x is the high bid at the auction which would make a high bidder of
type b indifferent between bargaining and not bargaining. Note that, for b' > b,
rB(y(b), /) > 0, because V3B(.) is increasing in b by Lemma A. Thus, X(b') > x(b),
and hence x-1 , the inverse, exists and is also strictly increasing. To make notation
clear, if y = x(b), then this inverse function gives b = x-1 (y), which defines the
lowest buyer type who would enter bargaining when the high bid is y. Also, note that
X(b) < b because 7rB(b, b) < 0 due to cB > 0.
Recall that ( represents the demand uncertainty which is unknown at the time the
seller chooses R. Let Z represent the support of (. Let Fb(-; () and FpA (-; () denote
the distributions (and similarly for the densities) of buyer valuations and high bids
conditional on (. Also note that before ( is realized, x will depend on (, as will the
seller's bargaining payoff, 7rs.
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The seller's ex-ante expected payoff can then be written as
R x"1(p;()A;~
E( [J.PAfpA (pA; ()dpA + 1 R [jXGl(PA;() sfb(b; <)db + J 7s (PA, s; ) fb(b; ()db] 1 h P dpA
R b p^1;() 1 - (p ;()
=E( .pA (P;dp^ + IR [S (Fb (X-I& ;);< - Fb(pA -)) +,r (sA, S;<(1- Fb (X-I(AC;
Xfp^ (P A dpA
1 - Fb(pA *) I
Differentiating the above
condition for R:
expression using Leibniz Rule yields the following first-order
a R([p(R ) E Fb(x -'(R; ()) - Fb(R; () fAR
a 1 - F _(R;()
+ E( 7rc (R, s; () 1 [Fb( x 1 f (R;()
1 1 - Fb(R; ()
Lemma A implies that irS (pA, s; () is weakly increasing in s, and thus & will be
strictly increasing in s because Fb(x- (R; ()) > Fb(R; () given that x-; () is strictly
increasing. Given that - is strictly increasing in s, the Edlin and Shannon (1998)
Theorem implies that, as long as the optimal R*(s) lies on the interior of the support
of R, R*(s) will be strictly increasing in s. The support of R is the real line (nothing
prevents sellers from reporting a negative reserve), thus completing the proof. Note
that without costly bargaining a weak monotonicity can still be obtained following
Topkis Theorem.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Given the structure of multiplicative separability in the willingness to pay/sell,
the goal is to show that the auction high bid, players' bargaining counteroffers, and
the seller's secret reserve price will also be multiplicatively separable in F(X). That
the auction high bid will be multiplicatively separable in F(X) is obvious, given that
the bidding function is the identity function. To demonstrate that bargaining offers
are also multiplicatively separable, the proof proceeds by induction on the number of
periods remaining. Suppose there is currently one period remaining in the bargaining
game: it is the seller's turn and after her turn the buyer will only be allowed to
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accept or decline. Suppose the buyer's type is given by bF(X) ~ Fbp(x)(bF(X)), with
density ')fbr(x)(bF(X)). The seller's type is given by s]F(X), and the per-period
bargaining disutility by csF(X).
In the final period, the buyer will accept a price, P, if and only if P <; bP(X). The
seller's payoff from countering at a price of P is then
6 1 (6E(I - Fbr(x)( )) + sF(X) (6E Fbr(x)(P) + 1 - 6E) - cslr(X)
which has a first order condition of
sF(X) + F(X)I fblNx)()
fbr(X)(pi)
Dividing by F(X) and changing variables from bF(X) to b yields
P_+ 1 - Fb(P/F(X))
F(X) fb(p/L'(X))
Thus, the penultimate bargaining offer in the heterogeneous setting is simply the
bargaining offer from the homogeneous good setting scaled by F(X). Note that it is
also the case that the seller's maximized payoff in the heterogeneous setting is simply
the payoff from the homogeneous good setting scaled by F(X).
To complete the proof by induction, suppose that offers and payoffs in periods
T - (t - 1) and T - (t - 2) are simply the homogeneous good objects scaled by F(X).
It remains to be shown that this would imply that the same holds true for the offers
and payoffs in period T - t. Let all (7) expressions represent the heterogeneous model
expressions. The seller's payoffs from accepting, declining, or countering in period
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T - t can be written as follows:
A : P-(t+) = F(X)p(t+)
D : = F(X)s
C : Pf_, (g|NT-t)
=6 (max OE Pr (d (_) = A hT-(t-1) + ( 3EPr (d_(t_) = DIhT-(-1)) + 1 - 6E
+ 6 16E Pr (d_ (t_1) = C|hT-(t-1)
X 6EE3 B max p_ g, , (t2) (sgrjT(t-2)) } h - 1) + g(1 - 6E)
- IF(X)cs
Note that the probability of the buyer accepting, declining, or countering in period
T - (t - 1) will be the same in the heterogeneous good model as in the homogeneous
good model given the induction assumption that payoffs and offers are scaled by 1(X)
in this period. This can be seen from the buyer's payoffs for each action:
A: -p =(X)(b-p )
D:O
C : VT_(t-1) (|hT-(t-1)
E max(b - ,i) Pr d-(t 2 ) AIhT-(t-2)
+ 6 I 6 E Pr d (t- 2 ) Cl (t-2) E 3 S max { P -p(t-2), 0,-(t-3) (b|T(t 3))} hT-(t-2)
- F(X)CB
= (X)VT 
_(t_1) (b~h T-(-)
Therefore, the P in the seller's counteroffer payoff can be replaced with p1F(X), and
the seller's choice over p can be replaced with a choice over p. Dividing by F(X) then
yields the same payoffs and offers as in the homogeneous good auction.
Finally, observe that the seller's secret reserve price will then also be scaled by
F(X) in the heterogeneous goods auction. That is, this result requires the assump-
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tion that the seller's uncertainty about demand, (, referred to in the the proof of
Proposition 2, does not enter F(X) The first order condition for her secret reserve in
this case is the following:
R - RF(X)E [fpA(R;()] + sF(X)E [Fb(x- (R;)Fb(R;() fpA(R;)
- F1(x 1(R; ())
+ F(X)E( 7rs (R, s; () 1 - F(R; () f A(R;
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. This proof follows similar steps to those in the proof of Theorem 2 of Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) and relies on results from Theorem 1 of Williams (1987).
The problem is to find an allocation rule x : [p^, b] x [s, s] -> [0, 1] to maximize
J x(s, b)f,(s)fb(b)dsdb
fpAs
subject to the players' participation constraint, which is
0 J J (#2 (b, 1) - #1(s, 1)) x(s, b)f9(s)fb(b)dsdb
pA s
See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) for more details. Letting A denote the Lagrange
multiplier, the unconstrained problem is to maximize
J (1 + A (#2(b, 1) - #1(s, 1))) x(s, b)fs(s)fb(b)dsdb
For any A > 0, the Lagrangian is maximized when x(s, b) = 1 if and only if
(1 + A (# 2(b, 1) - # 1(s, 1))) > 0. To achieve this result, let
1 _ 2
A 1 -pr
K E [0, 1) may then be solved for to equate the participation constraint to zero. That
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is, let
H() j (#2 (b, 1) - #1(s, 1)) xK(s, b)fs(s)fb(b)dsdb
where
xK(s,b)={s(s, 1) 1 <b(b, 1)
-K
Observe that xK(s, b) is decreasing in n. Therefore, for some a < K, H(a) will
differ from H(K) only because 0 = xa(s, b) < xK(s, b) = 1 for some (s, b) where
/b(b, 1) < #s(s, 1) - 2, implying that at that same (s, b), it must be the case that
#b(b, 1) < #,(s, 1). Thus, as K increases, XK(s, b) yields trade at regions of the type
space at which (#b(b, 1) - #s(s, 1)) is negative. Therefore, H(K) is decreasing in K.
To prove the H(K) is continuous, note that if #s(s, 1) and #b(b, 1) are both strictly
increasing, then given any b and K, the equation #(b, 1) = 0,(s, 1) - has at most
one solution in s, so H(K) can be written as
H(K) = j J (#b(b, 1) - #s(s, 1)) fs(s)fb(b)dsdb
where h(b, K) is continuous in b and K, SO H(K) is continuous. Note also that H(0) >=
0, and lim,,1 H(K) = -oo. Therefore, there exists a unique K E [0, 1) such that
H(K) = 0.
By Theorem 1 of Williams (1987), the transfer function of this mechanism will by
given by (1.17) and (1.18). 0
1.B Construction of Number of Bidders and Mul-
tiple Bids
This section describes how the number of bidders at each auction sale is estimated
and how the sample with multiple bids is created. To estimate the number of bidders,
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I first divide the auction sale day (typically a span of three hours) into 100 equal time
bins.
Each bidder receives a time stamp when arriving at the auction (or, for online
bidders, when logging into the website). The data does not record when bidders exit.
Therefore, to estimate the actual number of bidders present at the auction house, I
assume that no bidders exit until at least one-third of the way though the auction sale
day. This is consistent with my own observations from auction sales, as well as auction
activity observed in a second dataset. Specifically, this second dataset records the
number of bids placed by floor bidders (those physically present at the auction house),
the number placed by online bidders, and the number of online bidders participating.
Examining each of these quantities over the course of the auction day yields clear
evidence that activity increases until about the one-third mark, at which it point it
slowly declines. I measure the rate of decline using the following regression:
Yt = 0 + 61t + ut
where t = 33, .. ., 100 represents the 100 time bins starting at the one-third point; yt
is either the number of floor bids, online bids, or online bidders; and ut is an error
term. Each of the three yt yields an estimate of about 61 = -0.008. This number is
then used to calculate the total number of bidders present at time bin t as:
Nrese"i = N rrved(1 + 61 * 1{t > 33})
where NArrived is the total number of bidders who have arrived up to point t. Ntpresent
is then divided by the number of active lanes at time t in order to estimate the number
of bidders per lane.
To construct the sample of multiple bids discussed in Section 1.8.1, I use a third
dataset which contains information on auctions broadcast online ("simulcast" auc-
tions). The simulcast data records all of the bids which were placed, but the identity
of the a bidder is only recorded if the bidder is participating online. Therefore,
multiple order statistics are distinguishable only in a small sample of auctions. For
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example, suppose the final four bidders recorded in the bid log for a given auction are
"Floor, Floor, Simulcast 413, Floor," and the final bids are "1000, 1100, 1200, 1300."
This implies that the fourth and third highest bids were placed by an unspecified
floor bidders (those who are physically present), the second to last bid was placed
by a specific online bidder, number 413, and the final bid was placed another floor
bidder, who could have been the same as the bidder who placed the third highest
bid. Therefore, while is is clear that 1300 can be interpreted as the second order
static of valuations (given that the players are following the button auction model as
described), it is by no means clear whether 1200 is indeed the third order statistic.
Cases in which the third order statistic is clearly observable include the following:
1. The last three bidders are unique (e.g., "Floor, 413, 117").
2. The second-to-last and third-to-last, or the last and second-to-last, bidders are
floor bidders and the other of the last three is a simulcast bidder.
Cases satisfying these conditions yield a sample size of 6,362 observations.
1.C Additional Computational Details
1.C.1 Optimal Weighting of Multiple Estimates of Buyer
Distribution
This section describes how the distribution of buyer valuations is estimated using an
optimal weighting of the estimates coming from auctions with different numbers of
bidders. In practice, in each data sample, I use auction observations in which N, the
number of bidders, was among the ten most common values for N observed in the
sample. Depending on the sample, these ten values range from about 45 to 60.
Let {u 1 , u2 , ... , UM} be a set of M grid points on which F(b) will be estimated.
Let K be the number of distinct subsamples of auctions where all auctions in a given
subsample had the same number of bidders present. I use K=10. Let Nk be the
number of bidders present in auction k, where k = 1, ..., K. At each grid point,
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UM, equation (1.16) yields an estimate of F(um). Call this estimate #F(um). Let
{a : k = 1, ..., K; m 1, ... , M} be weights to be determined, and let the vectors
am = [a a 2...aK/
ae = za a1
Fb~ [f'J(Urn) F (Um)..F U)]
Let Fb(um,) = amFb,m and let nm be an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of
#b,m, which I estimate through 50 bootstrap draws, and let n denote a KM x KM
block diagonal matrix with the Qm matrices along the diagonal. The weights, am,
can then be determined by solving the following quadratic programming problem:
min a'na
s.t. Fb(Um) < Fb(Um+1), m = 1, ... ,M - 1
K
a = 1,M = 1,..L
k=1
1.C.2 Gauss-Chebyshev Quadrature
The counterfactual analysis in this paper requires the evaluation of a significant num-
ber of integrals, such as (1.10). In order to achieve accuracy and limit the computa-
tional burden, I employ Gauss-Chebyshev integration, as advocated by Judd (1998),
with a large number of nodes. Specifically, let zk, k = 1, ... , K be the Chebyshev
nodes, given by zk = cos(7r(2k - 1)/(2K)). Let g(v) be the function to be integrated.
Then
[V lr( -) ~xK wg (v) dv~ 2K (U ) (kW
IV 2K k=1
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where zk = (1/2)(zk + 1)(U - v)+ v and Wk = (1 - z2) 1/ 2 . For integration in multiple
dimensions, I use a tensor product:
" "gr2g _V)(U - U) K K
/ g(v,u)dvdu ~ (2i Xj)wkwj
j=1 k=1
See Kythe and Schsferkotter (2005) or Judd (1998) for additional details. In the
estimation of integrals in this paper, I use 200 nodes when integrating in the dimension
of the seller's or high bidder's type. Accuracy in these two dimensions is essential, as
this is the level at which I solve for counterfactual mechanisms (conditional on the
high bid). The integration over the high bid, on the other hand, is not involved in
solving for mechanisms, so I use 25 nodes in this dimensions. Increasing the number
of nodes beyond 25 does not change results.
1.C.3 Imposing Monotonicity and Solving for Implied Den-
sity/Distribution
I impose that #,(s) and #b(b) be weakly increasing following the rearrangement ap-
proach of Chernozhukov et al. (2009). In practice, this operation can be performed
as follows. Let a grid of values on [s, -] be given by zs = [zs, ... , z] and on [b, b
be given by zB = [ziB, ... , zB]'. Let 4 ,(zs) and 4b (zB) be the estimates of #,(s) and
#b(b) obtained by plugging in the estimated distributions and densities from Sections
1.5.2-1.5.3 evaluated at zB and zS. Rearrangement is performed by simply sorting
the vector 5,(zs) and reassigning the sorted values to the original zS vector, and
similarly for q$ (zB). Let q* (zs) and q4 (zB) denote the rearranged estimates.
The implied densities and distributions corresponding to the rearranged estimates
can then solved for by noting that d ln F,(s)/ds = f,(s)/F,(s), which implies
j , 1 du = In F,(s) - In F,(s) -> F,(s) = e +s - du+ln F ())
and similarly for Fb(x). The above integration can be performed simply and accu-
rately by choosing the grid zs to be the Chebyshev nodes on [s,3] and performing
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Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature. I use K = 200 nodes in each dimension, s and b. See
Appendix 1.C.2 for more details. Thus,
F*(z) = e u-"du+inF(zi))
F 4) = - e(k *)du+1n(1-Pb(Z)))F* (zk)= -  U>"
and (z) = s (z)$Zk*(zs) - zS
- 4z
and f*(zB) = 1 (4)
zk -- kz
1.C.4 Solving for the Pareto Frontier and the Transfer Func-
tion
The Pareto frontier which can be achieved
rational, bilateral trade mechanisms can
(1987), which states the following. Recall
objects, (x, q), defined in Section 1.6.
by static, incentive compatible, individually
be solved for using Theorem 3 of Williams
that each mechanism is summarized by two
Theorem (from Williams 1987).
Suppose p,(s) and $b(b) are weakly increasing. Then
1. For 0 < -y < 1/2, if G(x51-0 ) > 0 for ai = 1 - //(1 - ), then (x5i'O, 0) is
the unique solution maximizing (1.9) for this y; if G(x1,O) < 0, then there
exists a unique (a*, a*) that satisfies the equations G(xa1,a2) - 0 and (a 2 - 1) =
(a1 - 1)(1 - -y)/-y, and (x'a', 0) is the unique solution maximizing (1.9) for
this y.
2. For 1/2 < y < 1, if G(xo&2) 2 0 for a 2 = 1 + (y - 1)/-/), then (xOA2, G(xO52))
is the unique solution maximizing (1.9) for this y; if G(xO,52) < 0, then there
exists a unique (a*, a*) that satisfies the equations G(xa1,a2) - 0 and (a 2 - 1) =
(a 1 - 1)(1 - y)/, and (x"*i'a, 0) is the unique solution maximizing (1.9) for
this y.
For these direct mechanisms defining the Pareto frontier, Theorem 1 of Williams
(1987) implies that, given (x, q), the expected transfer for a seller of type s or for a
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buyer of type b, which I denote ps(s) and Pb(b), respectively, are given by
|5fb(b) *~f fb(b)
Ps(s) = q + s x(s, b) db + S x(u, b) f(u)dbdu (1.17)1 - Fb(pA) 1 - Fb(pA)
pb(b) = G(x) - q + b jx(s, b)f,(s)ds + j Jx(s, u) 1 (U)fs(s)dsdu (1.18)
i s 1 - b(p^)
1.C.5 Estimation of Equilibria in k Double Auctions
Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) demonstrated that a continuum of differentiable
equilibria exist satisfying (1.11) and (1.12), and also satisfying several regularity con-
ditions (see Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) for these conditions). They demon-
strated how these equilibria can be solved for numerically in the case where both
buyer and seller types have support on [0, 1]. Only a slight modification is required
for the case of asymmetric supports.
Let p represent the bid/offer of a player and consider p to be a parameter. Write
the player's inverted strategy as the player's type as a function of p, i.e. s(p) and
b(p). Let =- ds/dp and b _ db/dp. Then s = ps( 1 )(p), b = pB(-1)) p i S)'S
and pB'(b) = 1/b. Substituting into (1.11)-(1.12) yields
sk bSS)-
b - p
(1 - k)#b(b) - b
s - p
Let P = {(s, b, p) : s < s < p < b < b, s < s, b > b}. Any point in P has an
equilibrium which passes through it. To solve for an equilibrium, pick any point in
(s, b, p) E P and move in the direction (A, b, p) for a small step size, repeat the process
until the path leaves P. Then begin again at (s, b, p), moving in the opposite direction
until the path leaves P. This path defines an approximate solution, p(s) and p(b).
Graphically, this procedure traces out a one-dimensional manifold in R3.
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1.C.6 Estimation of Buyer Distribution When Number of
Bidders is Unknown
As mentioned in Section 1.8.1, Song (2005) demonstrated that the density of the kth
order statistic conditional on the Jth order statistic (where k <j) is given by
fk|i(yIX) = (j - 1)!(F(y) - F(x))'-k-1(1 - F(y))k-I (y) (1.19)
(j - k - 1)!(k - 1)!(1 - F(x))j-1
Following Kim and Lee (2008), I approximate f 213 (yIx) using the space of normalized
Hermite polynomials, given by
zA(J)2 A)
fA(J)) f(z, ) = OH +co(Z), 02 + Fo = 1
i=1 i=1
where co is a small positive constant, #(-) is a standard normal pdf, Hj(z) s defined
recursively by
H (z)= exp - --
(o. 2-I) 1/2 4 o
H12 (z) = ep1(Z o.2 V2)1/2 4 0
1
Hi (z) = V zHi_1(z) - v'i - 1Hi-2(), for i = 3, ... , A(J)
The parameters , and - are location and scale parameters. Using (1.19), I form
the likelihood function of the second order statistic conditional on the third and
estimate the parameters y, o-, and 0. A(J) is assumed to increase in J, the number
of auctions. The estimates described in Section 1.8.1 are for A = 5, but the approach
yielded similar estimates with A = 6, 7, or 8.
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1.D Auction House Revenues and the Broker Op-
timal Mechanism
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrated that the mechanism which would
maximize revenue for a broker with market power is given by allocation function x,
with transfers given by pB(s, b), the amount paid by the buyer to the auction house,
and ps(s, b), the amount which the auction house then passes on to the seller. The
difference constitutes auction house revenue. These transfer functions can be defined
in many ways. One such way is given by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) as
PB(s, b) = x"'(s, b) * minjuju > b, Ob(U) > S}
PS(s, b) = x"(s, b) * max{vlv < -s, #,(v) < b}
Revenue is given by G(xz"), where G(-) is defined in (1.8). This expression is the par-
ticipation constraint which must be satisfied in any individually-rational, incentive-
compatible mechanism. In the mechanisms which maximize the gains from trade or
the probability of trade, this expression is equal to zero. In the mechanism maximiz-
ing the auction house revenue, however, the auction house wishes to leave some slack
in the participation constraint in order to extract surplus from participants.
The performance of this mechanism relative to the dynamic mechanism is shown
in Table 1.7. The expected revenue for the auction house in the dynamic mechanism
was estimated using data on fees when trade occurred. Table 1.7 demonstrates that
the broker-optimal mechanism would result in auction house revenues of 0.131 of the
market value for cars sold by used-car dealers and 0.087 of the market value for cars
sold by fleet/lease sellers, between two to three times as much as under the currently
used dynamic mechanism. Both buyer gains and seller gains would be lower under
the broker-optimal mechanism than under the currently used mechanism, although
less so for sellers.
The expected auction house revenue can also be seen as the difference between the
payment from the buyer to the auction house and the amount which the auction house
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Table 1.7: Performance of broker-revenue maximizing mechanism
Used-car dealers sample Fleet/lease sellers sample
Dynamic Dynamic
Broker-optimal mechanism Broker-optimal mechanism
Auction house revenue 0.131 0.046 0.087 0.035
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Expected gains 0.304 0.388 0.244 0.334
from trade (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Buyer gains 0.084 0.256 0.070 0.203
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
Seller gains 0.083 0.087 0.060 0.096
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Payment from auction 0.331 0.688 0.351 0.763
house to seller (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Payment from buyer 0.467 0.745 0.466 0.799
to auction house (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Probability of 0.362 0.715 0.377 0.774
trade (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Notes: Estimates of welfare measures under the broker-optimal mechanism and dynamic
mechanism. For the dynamic mechanism, auction house revenue comes from observed
buyer and seller fees when trade occurs. The broker-optimal mechanism comes from
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Standard errors are from 200 bootstrap replications.
Units (other than for probability of trade) are in terms of the observable value of the car.
passes on to the seller after removing fees. Note that in the broker-optimal mechanism,
the payments themselves are much smaller but the gap between payments of buyers
and seller is larger. The probability of trade and total expected gains from trade are
both lower under the broker-optimal mechanism, as this mechanism introduces an
additional deadweight loss due to the broker's rent-extraction behavior.
It is difficult to interpret these results given that a shift to this mechanism would
likely drive buyers and sellers away from the auction house and toward competing
sourcing venues, and this competition is not expressed in the model. Therefore, while
auction house revenue is clearly of primary interest to the auction house, competition
among auction houses may impede an individual auction house from achieving the
payoff of the broker optimal mechanism. Townsend (1983) demonstrated, in a general
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equilibrium framework, that competition among auction houses, or even the threat
of competition, leads to the Walrasian equilibrium as the number of buyers and
sellers grows large. Thus, auction houses may appear to behave as though they
were maximizing surplus rather than achieving the optimal revenue for a solo auction
house. However, Economides and Siow (1988) showed, in a competition-on-a-line
framework, that liquidity provides positive externalities for buyers and sellers which
are not fully internalized by the auction house, and this may prevent efficient entry of
auction houses and hence prevent the market from achieving the surplus-maximizing
allocation. It is theoretically ambiguous how close auction houses would come to
achieving the revenue-maximizing outcomes in a setting with two-sided uncertainty.
For these reasons, and due to the fact that I have no data on competing auction
houses, I do not focus on this mechanism.
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Chapter 2
Occupational Licensing and
Quality:
Distributional and Heterogeneous
Effects in the Teaching Profession
2.1 Introduction
Occupational licensing affects a growing number of people. Analyzing a recent Gallop
survey, Kleiner and Krueger (2013) found that 29% of US employees are licensed by
the government. Kleiner (2006) observed that there are more workers who are licensed
than who are in unions or covered by minimum wage laws. He also reports that over
800 jobs require licenses in at least some states, including fortune tellers, frog farmers,
auctioneers, and interior designers.
Licensing has a long history in labor markets. Smith (1776), in his seminal
work, "The Wealth of Nations," analyzed the economics of the medieval guild system
and apprenticeships, criticizing them as means of raising rents for those currently in
the occupation. Friedman (1962), Stigler (1971), and Mulligan and Shleifer (2005)
offered similar explanations. Other researchers, including Law and Kim (2005), Ar-
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row (1963), Leland (1979), and Weingast (1980), have argued that licensing laws
may arise as a means of decreasing asymmetric information, providing a minimum
level of quality to consumers.1 Proponents argue that licensing is particularly impor-
tant in professions associated with consumer safety concerns, such as construction or
medicine. 2
In previous studies examining the effects of occupational licensing on quality,
researchers focused on average quality for the average consumer. The current study
addresses the following questions:
1. What is the effect of occupational licensing on the quantiles of the input and
output quality distribution, rather than on average quality?
2. How does the effect of occupational licensing vary across consumers who differ
by income?
Occupational licensing is, from a public interest standpoint, intended to eliminate
the worst candidates from entering into an occupation (i.e., regulating input quality),
or, similarly, to prevent the worst outcomes from occurring (i.e., regulating output
quality). Therefore, this paper argues that evidence of the success of licensing laws is
better measured in terms of the effects of licensing on the lower quantiles of the quality
distribution rather than on the mean of the quality distribution. If occupational
licensing does improve the lower tail of quality, benefits should be weighed against
the costs. If licensing is not associated with improved quality, its value is in question.
This paper examines the effect of occupational licensing on the teacher quality
distribution, as well as the effect on average teacher quality, using variation in state
teacher certification requirements from 1983 to 2008 and two national datasets con-
taining information on teacher quality for teachers licensed during the same time
'Leland (1979) models occupational licensing as a means of handling an Akerlof-like lemons
problem Akerlof 1970.
2Many other occupations also present consumer safety as an argument for licensing. A notable
recent example is in Florida, where interior designers, lobbying against a bill which would have made
their occupation an unlicensed profession, argued that the actions of unlicensed designers would lead
to furniture in jail cells being used as weapons, hospital fabrics spreading disease, and flammable
rugs spreading fires, contributing to 88,000 deaths every year Campo-Flores (2011). The interior
designer lobby won the debate.)
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period. Input quality is captured by the selectivity of undergraduate institutions
from which teachers graduated, as measured by the average SAT score of the en-
tering class. Output quality is measured by student test scores from the National
Assessment of Educational Progress.
It is important to note that the terms input and output quality are not meant
to imply that this paper estimates or attributes factors to a particular education
production function. That is, it is not necessarily the case that the qualifications
of a candidate entering the occupation (input quality) lead to increases in student
test scores (output quality). Rather than attempting to establish a link between the
two, this paper treats input and output quality as separate measures which could
potentially be affected by occupational licensing laws.
To examine how the effects of occupational licensing on quality vary in areas
with differing income levels, this study interacts teacher certification laws with the
income level of the school district. This question is motivated by a prediction from
the theoretical model of Shapiro (1986), in which licensing induces professionals, who
choose between providing low quality or high quality services, to invest in human
capital (i.e., training), lowering their marginal cost of providing quality. This in turn
lowers prices for high quality services but raises prices for low quality services. While
the Shapiro (1986) model is not a perfect fit to the setting of teachers, this paper
finds evidence consistent with the models prediction that high income consumers
benefit from increased quality when licensing stringency increases, while low income
consumers do not.3
This study also searches for evidence of how licensing laws may induce consumers
to substitute away from licensed professionals. In the context of education, if licens-
ing tends to raise the qualifications of teachers entering the occupation then school
districts which are unable to attract these more qualified candidates, be it through
higher wages or other incentives, may substitute to alternatives, such as emergency
3 The Shapiro (1986) model describes a general product/service setting, in which prices depend
directly on the quality of the product/service and the marginal cost of providing the product/service.
This feature may not be appropriate for a model of teachers, particularly in public schools. Therefore,
the only feature of the Shapiro (1986) model which is examined in this paper is whether high-income
areas indeed benefit more from occupational licensing than low-income areas.
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certified teachers or larger class sizes.
2.2 Literature Review
Various authors have studied the effects of occupational licensing on wages. Kleiner
(2006) pointed out that raising wages may be socially beneficial, as it can provide
greater incentive for workers to invest in human capital (i.e., improve their skills
through greater education or training) because they will be able to reap greater
returns from doing so. Maurizi (1980b) and Kleiner and Petree (1988) found that
licensing had no impact on the pay of nurses and teachers, respectively. Positive
impacts on pay are found in more recent work, including Angrist and Guryan (2008),
Kleiner (2000), Kleiner and Kudrle (2000), Tenn (2001), and Kugler and Sauer (2005),
who found that licensing increased the pay of workers in the educational, medical,
and legal professions.
Occupational licensing may have effects on minority group participation in the
licensed occupation. The evidence is unclear as to the direction of these effects.
Federman et al. (2006) found that occupational licensing requirements for manicurists
resulted in disproportionate exclusion of Vietnamese people. Law and Marks (2009)
analyzed Census data from 1870 to 1960 to study occupational choice of blacks and
females. They found that licensure laws improved the likelihood that blacks or females
would participate in occupations in which quality is difficult to observe. Angrist and
Guryan (2008) estimated the effect of state licensing laws on the minority make-up
of teachers in the school district. They found no effect other than a small negative
effect of licensing on the participation of Hispanic teachers.4
The literature has found mixed effects of occupational licensing laws on both the
quality of workers entering the occupation (input quality) and the quality of ser-
vices provided by professionals (output quality).5 For example, Carroll and Gaston
(1981) found that licensing policies restricting the entry of electricians and dentists
4This effect, they explained, is likely due to lower performance of Hispanics on the national
teaching exam (Gitomer and Latham (1999), cited in Angrist and Guryan (2008).
5This terminology distinguishing between input and output quality follows Shapiro (1986).
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led to more electrical accidents and longer waits for dental appointments, respectively.
Maurizi (1980a) found that policies restricting entry of contractors led to more cus-
tomer complaints. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) found that the stringency of dental
licensing had no effect on average dental outcomes of patients. Kugler and Sauer
(2005), studying a natural experiment among immigrant physicians in Israel, found
that average physician quality decreases when re-licensing exams are required. In
theoretical work, Goldhaber and Brewer (2000), Guasch and Weiss (1980), Wang and
Weiss (1998), and Wang (1997) show that worker screening devices, such as teacher
certification tests, won't necessarily lead to improvements in average quality. This is
because testing may not accurately detect workers' true underlying quality levels or
may drive some candidates from choosing to participate.
Several authors have studied the relationship between teacher certification testing
and quality as measured by student achievement, a measure of output quality: For
example, Kleiner and Petree (1988) and Goldhaber and Brewer (2000), found no rela-
tionship between state licensing requirements and students standardized test scores.
Rockoff et al. (2008) and Kane et al. (2008) found that average outcomes of students
taught by regularly certified teachers did not differ from those of students taught by
teachers with a non-standard certification. Berger and Toma (1994) studied teacher
education requirements and found that average student SAT scores were lower in
states which required teachers to have a masters degree. Overall, these studies found
a zero or negative impact of teacher certification on student achievement.
Researchers have examined other measures of teacher quality and have similarly
found a zero or negative effect. For example, Angrist and Guryan (2008) measured
quality by the average SAT score of entering freshmen at a teachers undergradu-
ate institution, a measure of input quality. They found that that input quality did
not improve with stricter state licensing requirements. Hanushek and Pace (1995)
found that state licensing requirements lowered the probability that a teacher would
complete training, another measure of teacher quality.
Ballou and Podgursky (1998) presented one reason why average teacher quality
may be lower with licensing than without: the time costs of licensure may induce those
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candidates with higher outside opportunities to choose a different career. Wiswall
(2007), using a dynamic structural model of occupational choice, and Sass (2011), us-
ing variation in teachers paths to certification (standard vs. alternative certification)
found evidence of this effect.
A final branch of the occupational licensing literature is the theoretical model of
Shapiro (1986), described above, which suggested that licensing laws could benefit
higher income consumers at the expense of lower income consumers. Evidence of this
effect is found in Currie and Hotz (2004), who demonstrated that tighter educational
requirements for child care professionals led to higher quality for children who received
care, but also led to price increases resulting in less children being served. Kleiner
(2006) also found that more restrictive licensing requirements in dentistry tended to
benefit high income states and had no effect on low income states.
2.3 Background on Teacher Certification Laws
Competency tests for teachers were used in many states in the early twentieth cen-
tury Rudner (1987). Over time, testing requirements were replaced by educational
requirements for prospective teachers, such as a bachelors degree or specific education
coursework. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, states developed a renewed interest in
teacher testing, sparked by professional organizations, such as the American Associ-
ation of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), and by the influential report, A
Nation at Risk, Gardner (1983) commissioned by the Department of Education. This
document advocated for educational reform, arguing that education professionals too
often came from the bottom quartile of high school graduates. The American pub-
lic was, for the most part, behind the movement, with 85% favoring teacher testing
Rudner (1987).
In this time period, certification tests returned, developed by individual states as
well as by the Educational Testing Service (ETS). These tests fall into the categories
of basic skills, testing listening, reading, writing, communication, and mathematics;
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professional knowledge of teaching; and subject matter.- Figure 2-1 displays the
proportion of states requiring each type of certification test during the years 1983
to 2010.7 Data on teacher certification test laws were gathered from the following
teacher certification manuals, which list historical details of certification requirements
for each state: AACTE (1990, 1991, 1993-1996), Boydston (1995-1999, 2001-2010),
Coley and Goertz (1990), Goddard (1983-1993), Goertz (1986, 1988), NASDTEC
(1991, 1994, 1996, 1996, 2000-2002), NASDTEC (2003-2010), Neuweiler et al. (1988),
Rudner (1987).
1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Subject test law Basic skills test law
Prof knowledge test law
Figure 2-1: Proportion of states requiring certification tests, 1983-2010.
By the late 1980s, most states required some form of teacher testing, and all
required candidates to graduate from an approved program, which in some states
meant simply obtaining a bachelors degree but in most states also included specific
pedagogy requirements (Goertz (1988), Neuweiler et al. (1988). In the late 1990s,
professional teacher organizations, such as the National Commission on Teaching
and Americas Future (NCTAF), the National Council of Accreditation of Teacher
'Some tests are referred to as general knowledge tests, and can include general knowledge of social
studies, math, literature, fine arts, and science. However, in the historical certification manuals
referenced in this paper, both general knowledge tests and basic skills tests are often referred to
as basic skills tests, and are thus indistinguishable. Therefore, the current study refers to both as
basic skills tests. Note that for elementary school teachers, a subject test does not refer to a specific
subject such as math or reading, but rather to a test regarding content specific to elementary school
teaching.
7For most of this paper, only years 1983-2008 are used because quality measures are not available
for 2009-2010.
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Education (NCATE), and the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards
(NBPTS), argued for even stricter certification requirements and stricter national ac-
creditation standards for educational programs (NCTAF 1996). Opponents of this
movement argued that increasing the restrictiveness of licensing requirements would
only drive away more qualified applicants who have higher opportunity costs. These
opponents advocated instead that performance would be improved more by allow-
ing district-level administrators the flexibility to hire the teachers they deem to be
effective Ballou and Podgursky (1998).
In the most recent decade, as seen in Figure 2-1, the use of basic skills tests and
professional knowledge tests has decreased, and the use of subject matter tests has
greatly increased, in part due to the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. A
portion of this legislation required that, by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, 100%
of public school teachers in each state meet the definition of a Highly Qualified Teacher
(HQT), and future federal funding was conditioned on this goal being achieved Kuenzi
(2009). The HQT definition includes a requirement that teachers show competence
in their subject area, which may consist of a passing level of performance on a State-
required certification or licensing test in each of the academic subjects in which the
teacher teaches or, alternatively, majoring in their teaching subject Kuenzi (2009).
Therefore, in response to this law, many states previously not requiring subject tests
began requiring them.
Table 2.1: Number of states changing certification test laws over the period 1983-2008.
Prof
Number of states Subject Basic skills knowledge
With test law over whole sample 8 8 9
period
With no test law over whole 4 5 18
sample period
Changing from having no test law 39 34 23
to having a test law
Changing from having a test law 2 13 9
to not having a test law
Table 2.1 displays the number of states (including Washington, D.C.) which ex-
perienced a change from having no subject test law to having a subject test law, or
vice-verse, and similarly for the other types of tests. Notice that very few states (2)
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experienced a change from having a subject test law to having none. Subject test
laws have been a major focus of legislation and play a focal role in the analysis in
this paper.
While certification test requirements are not the only requirements for teacher
licensure, there are several features of these requirements which make them partic-
ularly useful for measuring the restrictiveness of a states teacher licensing regime.
First, certification tests must be passed by nearly all candidates. Most states include
in their teacher licensure programs several types of certification: regular, alternative,
and emergency. Alternative certification is typically for candidates who did not com-
plete an education major for their undergraduate degree but who have completed
certain post-baccalaureate requirements. Emergency certification is a temporary per-
mit to teach during periods of labor shortage. Few teachers receive the latter form of
certification. 8 All others, that is, regularly and alternatively-certified teachers, must
pass state certification tests.
Second, these exams represent an obstacle to at least some candidates. Evidence
for this lies in the fact that some students do not pass these exams. The nationwide
pass rate was 93% in 2000 and 96% in 2006 (Paige et al. (2002), Duncan and Ochoa
(2002). Much lower pass rates were reported in the past. Rudner (1987), who did not
report the overall pass rate, reported that in 1984 the pass rate was 76% for whites
and 42% for non-whites on what was then a commonly used basic skills exam.' Note
that the test could be a costly obstacle to some even if the reported pass rate were
100%, as this pass rate is an equilibrium outcome of test difficulty and candidates'
preparation effort.10 Further evidence that certification tests are a challenge to at least
8Ballou and Podgursky (1998) report that fewer than 2% of teachers were emergency certified in
1994. Appendix Table 2.6 demonstrates that 13% of the sample of first-year teachers used in this
paper were emergency certified.
9 1t is important to note that some states do provide options for candidates who fail to pass
certification tests. For example, in 1992, New Mexico implemented a plan under which candidates
who failed certification tests could prepare a detailed portfolio of their work, which, subject to a state
committees approval, would allow the candidates to be certified. After the first 2-3 years of program,
160 candidates had used this process, further evidence that, for some candidates, certification tests
can represent a real obstacle (AACTE 1995).
10It is useful to note, however, that in some states cutoff scores are directly manipulated to achieve
a particular pass rate
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some candidates is found in the fact that test preparation companies offer numerous
study products to aid students in preparing for the Praxis exams, the set of exams
used by most states today.
Third, certification tests are a requirement for initial licensure. This feature makes
it simple to identify which subgroup of teachers would be affected by changes in
certification test laws. This is not the case with other licensing requirements, such
as specific coursework requirements or a requirement to have a masters degree within
a certain number of years, which differ by state and by whether or not the teacher
was regularly or alternatively certified; in some states, a change in such laws would
affect a potential teacher after completing a bachelors degree, while in others, a
change in requirements would affect the candidate midway through an undergraduate
program.1
Fourth, certification testing requirements vary greatly by state and across time,
allowing for identification of the effect of increasing licensing restrictiveness on out-
comes under standard difference-in-differences assumptions, which will be discussed
below.
'Fifth, certification test laws are easily quantifiable. Coursework or degree require-
ments, while potentially more costly to candidates than certification tests, are difficult
to translate into a measure of licensing stringency.12
2.4 Input and Output Quality Measures
In this paper, input quality refers to the qualifications of the candidates entering
the teaching profession. The proxy for input quality used in this paper is the se-
lectivity of the teachers undergraduate institution. Specifically, teacher survey data
specifying each teacher's undergraduate institution is linked to the data containing
11In some certification manuals from which information was gathered, states report having had
a basic skills test requirement for initial certification when this test was in reality administered
prior to admission into an undergraduate education program. In these cases, this paper records
the teacher cohort which began teaching three years after the law went into place as being the first
cohort required to have passed the basic skills exam.
"Wiswall (2007) is one example which directly uses coursework requirements for teachers in a
dynamic structural model.
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the average SAT score of entering freshmen at each institution. The teacher data
come from the Schools and Staffng Survey (SASS), a restricted-use dataset provided
for researchers by the US Department of Educations National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES). The SASS survey was administered in years 1988, 1994, 2000,
2004, and 2008 to a nationally representative sample of teachers.1 3 The dataset pro-
vides information about the school district in which a teacher is employed, such as
total enrollment, percent minority students enrolled, indicators for the districts sub-
urb/rural/city status, average teacher salary (used only in the salary regression in
the study of substitution effects reported below), and the percent of students eligi-
ble for free school lunch, which serves to proxy for the income level of the district.
This dataset also contains information about individual teachers, such as their years of
teaching experience, the state in which they teach, their certification status (standard
vs. emergency-certified), and their undergraduate institution. The undergraduate in-
stitution is recorded as a Federal Interagency Committee on Education (FICE) code,
which can be merged to data on the average SAT score of entering freshmen, from
a survey conducted by the Higher Education Research Institute (Astin et al. (1983)
and described in Angrist and Guryan (2008).
Summary statistics for the main variables of interest from the SASS dataset are
displayed in Table 2.2. The mean and standard deviation of the teacher input quality
measure are 916 and 107 SAT points, respectively. In the analysis performed below,
this quality measure is standardized so as to have mean zero and variance one within
the sample, so all quality results are reported in terms of standard deviations. Teach-
ers' years of experience ranges from 1 to 11 in the sample used. The analysis below
will take advantage of teachers observed in the same state and year and of the same
experience level, referred to as a cohort. Table 2.2 shows that the number of teachers
in a state-year-experience level cohort, described below, ranges from 10 to 113, with
a mean of 33.
13These numbers refer to the year the school year ended. The same convention is followed through-
out this paper. An additional SASS survey was administered in 1991 but did not contain information
on teachers undergraduate institutions, and thus is omitted from the analysis except in the regres-
sions examining substitution effects, where additional dependent variables (salary and emergency
certification) are obtained from the SASS survey.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of SASS and NAEP variables of interest
Standard
Sample size Mean deviation Min Max
SASS Variables
Teacher undergraduate 60,820 915.98 106.65 570 1,410
institution average SAT
Percent eligible for free lunch 60,820 39.11 24.17 0 100
Teacher years of experience 60,820 5.29 3.07 1 11
Cohort size 60,820 32.76 17.23 10 113
NAEP Variables
Eighth grade math scores 366,100 261.85 39.03 79.86 388.65
Teacher years of experience 366,100 4.54 2.58 1 11
Cohort size 366,100 203.00 106.76 10 1,439
Notes: Summary statistics for SASS (60,820 observations) and NAEP (366,100
observations) datasets. In SASS dataset, cohort size represents the number of
teachers in a state/year/experience level cell. In NAEP dataset, cohort size
represents the number of students in a cell taught by teachers in the same
state/year/experience level.
Figure 2-2: Kernel density estimate of percent free lunch distribution in SASS dataset
Kemel density estimate
a -
so
0
0 -
0-
0 20 40 60 80
% free lunch
100
kemel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 2.3448
Notes: Kernel density estimates of the district-level variable in the SASS dataset defining the percent of students
eligible for free lunch in the district.
116
The percent of students in the school district eligible for free lunch is 39% on aver-
age, but both extremely low income and extremely high income districts are observed
in the sample. Figure 2-2 displays a kernel density estimate of the percent free lunch
distribution. The left half of the distribution represents relatively high income school
districts, where few students qualify for free lunch, and the right half represents rel-
atively low income school districts. Summary statistics for other covariates from the
SASS dataset are reported in Appendix Table 2.6.
The years in which the SASS survey was administered will be referred to as survey
years, and teachers of a given experience level will be referred to as a cohort. For
example, a teacher who began teaching in the 1992-1993 school year and who was
surveyed in 1993-1994 school year would be in the cohort of teachers with two years
of experience.
In the context of occupational licensing, output quality refers to the quality re-
ceived by consumers who purchase the service of licensed professionals. In education,
the most common measure of teacher performance is student test scores. This paper
uses student test scores from the eighth grade math National Assessment of Edu-
cational Progress (NAEP) exam, known as the nations report card. The test was
administered in years 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2007.14 Like SASS, the
NAEP datasets are restricted-use datasets available to researchers through the NCES.
Data from student NAEP files includes race dummies, a gender dummy, a dummy for
the student reporting an encyclopedia in the home, and the students NAEP scores.
The data does not record raw test scores for students, but rather reports five plausi-
ble scores calculated using student responses and item response theory (IRT), which
Kolstad (2006) explains represent random draws from the posterior distribution of
potential scores for all students who have similar characteristics and identical patterns
of item responses. The test score used in this paper is the average of the five IRT draws
for that student, as in Fryer (2011). See also Jacob (2007) for a discussion. Summary
statistics are displayed in the lower half of Table 2.2. Observe that student scores on
"Eighth grade reading tests were also administered during many of these years, and math and
reading tests were also administered to fourth grade students. Other grades and subjects were also
tested through the NAEP, but not for as many years.
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the NAEP eighth grade math exam are on average 262, with a standard deviation
of 39. As with input quality, in the analysis below these test scores are standardized
to have mean zero and variance one within the sample, so all results are reported
in standard deviation units. The number of students in each state-year-experience
cohort ranges from 10 to 1,439, with a mean of 203.
Data from NAEP teacher files includes percent black or Hispanic at the school,
rural/suburb/city dummies, school enrollment, and the percent of students eligible
for free lunch. The latter two variables are reported in bins rather than as continuous
variables. A school is classified as having either 0-5%, 6-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, 51-
75%, or 76-100% of its students qualify for free lunch. The histogram of the percent
free lunch bins is displayed in Figure 2-3. The distribution is roughly uniformly
distributed, with approximately 20-25% of the sample lying in each quartile of the
percent free lunch distribution. Summary statistics for other variables from the NAEP
dataset are found in Appendix Table 2.6.
Figure 2-3: Histogram of percent free lunch distribution in NAEP dataset
0.3
.
0-5% 6-10% 11-25% 25-50% 50-75% 76-100%
Notes: Histogram of the school-level variable in the NAEP dataset defining the percent of students at the school
who are eligible for free lunch.
The years in which the NAEP test was administered will be referred to as survey
years, and students being taught by teachers of a given experience level will be referred
to as a cohort. For example, students who were tested in 1994 and who were taught
by a teacher who began teaching in the school year ending in 1993 would be in the
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cohort of students taught by teachers with two years of experience. One additional
data source is used in the regressions below studying the effects of teacher certification
laws on pupil to teacher ratios. This dataset comes from the NCES Common Core of
Data (CCD) from 1987-2010. This data is available publicly on the NCES website.
2.5 Estimating Distributional and Heterogeneous
Effects
2.5.1 Estimation of Distributional Effects of Licensing Re-
quirements
This paper models the distribution of input and output quality within a given state
and given year as a function of teacher certification requirements. A model of the
input quality distribution is presented first, demonstrating an individual level model
which can be collapsed to the state-year level to measure distributional effects. A
model of output quality is then described. Each of these models uses a difference-
in-differences approach by comparing a treatment and control group before and after
a change in teacher certification laws, controlling for state and year fixed effects.
State fixed effects capture characteristics of states which are unchanging over time
(e.g., some states may have higher quality teachers than others over the entire sample
period). Year fixed effects capture characteristics which affect every state in a given
year (e.g., in 2005, No Child Left Behind legislation affected all states by mandating
that each state specify a method for ensuring competence in teachers subject areas).
Let qist represent the input quality of teacher i in state s who began teaching in
year t, given by
qist= ys (uist) + Atf(uit) + Law't(uist) + E(uistSt) (2.1)
where -ys is a state effect, At is a year effect, and Law, is a three-element vector
containing dummies equal to 1 if a subject test, basic skills test, or professional
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knowledge test was required in state s in year t, and 0 otherwise. d represents the effect
of teacher certification test laws on teacher input quality. The term uist represents
the unobserved quantile of teacher i's input quality conditional on observables. The
term E(nist, 7,t) describes how unobserved factors at the state-year level, denoted q7t,
affect the input quality of teacher i.
Because occupational licensing requirements vary only at the state-year level, the
above model can be estimated using the minimum-distance estimation procedure of
Chamberlain (1994a) and Chetverikov et al. (2012). Specifically, let qr represent the
empirical Tth quantile of teacher input quality within state s for teachers who began
teaching in year t, given by
q = 7. ((r) + At (T) + Law' J (T) + _-(T, TjSt) (2.2)
Equation (2.2) describes how the distribution of teacher input quality, as measured
by the selectivity of the undergraduate schools attended by teachers entering the
profession, will vary as teacher certification testing laws change, addressing the first
question posed in the introduction. A positive and significant estimate of d(r) at r =
0.1, for example, would indicate that these occupational licensing laws are increasing
the lower tail of quality by barring some less-qualified candidates from the occupation.
A comparison between two states in two survey years illustrates the interpretation
of the model. The control state never adopts a teacher testing law. The treatment
state adopts a law in the second survey year. The regression model above will com-
pare input quality in the treatment state before and after to that in the control state
before and after. The identifying assumption of this model is that no state-year spe-
cific factors affecting the quantiles of the teacher quality distribution are correlated
with the incidence of state certification laws. In other words, 77,t should be inde-
pendent of Lawst. This assumption would be violated, for example, if changes in
state certification requirements were imposed at the same time as other state-specific
policies which also affected the teacher quality distribution.
A robustness test of difference-in-differences models, such as (2.2), can be per-
120
formed by including state-specific linear time trends, yielding the following model
qst = No(T) + -/I(T)t + At(T) + Law'to6(T) + E (7, qst) (2.3)
Equation (2.3) represents one approach to control for unobserved factors which af-
fected the quality distribution and which changed continuously over time. If equation
(2.2) is well identified, one would find similar estimates of the effects of licensing on
quality from (2.2) and from (2.3).
To incorporate data from other experience cohorts, Equation (2.2) can be modified
by letting the rth quantile of input quality of teachers within state s, in survey year
t with experience c, be written as
Ic= T ) + At(T) + ac(T) + Law'tc6(T-) + E(r, riqte) (2.4)
where -y, and At are as above, and ac represents a cohort fixed effect. Lawste is a
three-element vector containing dummies equal to 1 if a subject test, basic skills test,
or professional knowledge test was required in state s for teachers surveyed in year t
belonging to cohort c, and "0" otherwise. Therefore, the test law dummies correspond
to the year in which the teacher cohort would have received initial certification. The
term ?)Stc represents unobserved factors at the state-year-cohort level which affect the
distribution of teacher input quality. 15
The intuition behind equation (2.4) can be best understood by comparing, in a
given year, such as 1994, the quantiles of the input quality distribution for first and
second year teachers in a treatment and control state. In the control state, neither
group was required to pass a test prior to licensure (i.e. there was no test requirement
in 1993 or 1994). In the treatment state, there was no testing law in 1993 but there
was a law in 1994. The regression model described by equation (2.4) compares first
and second year teachers in the treatment state to first and second year teachers
i 5 Forming cohorts in this fashion and pooling the data together in estimation forms a synthetic
panel or pseudo panel as discussed in Verbeek and Nijman (1992) or Deaton (1985). Group sizes
in the SASS dataset are not as large in this application as Verbeek and Nijman (1992) recommend,
and hence the robustness checks employed here are particularly important.
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in the control state, at the same time as making the comparison described above for
equation (2.2), comparing teachers of the same cohort in different states across survey
years. The identifying assumption of this model is that there were no unobserved
shocks affecting the distribution of quality for teachers who in survey year t had been
teaching for c years in state s and which are also correlated the state certification
laws.
One concern with pooling all experience cohorts is that the experienced teachers,
for example, those with five years of experience, who are present in survey year t
consist of a group which has self-selected to remain in the profession five years. This
is not a problem if the experience/cohort effect does not differ by state, because this
effect is controlled for by ac. However, if the effect of experience on quality differs
by state, and if this effect is related to policy changes occurring simultaneously with
changes in teacher certification requirements, J would suffer from omitted variables
bias. One check of this specification is to replace ac above with state-specific returns
to tenure, ac + asc, similar to the state-specific linear time trends in equation (2.3).
And, as in equation (2.3), the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends also serves
as a valuable robustness check.
Equation (2.2) above can be modified to estimate the effect of teacher certification
laws on the distribution of output quality (student test scores from the NAEP) by
simply letting q', be the Th quantile of the student test score distribution among
students taught by teachers who began teaching in state s and survey year t. Equation
(2.4) is similarly modified, with the q', being the Th quantile of the student test score
distribution among students taught by teachers with c years of experience in state s
and survey year t. Therefore, for students appearing in the NAEP sample in survey
year t taught by cohort c, the certification test law dummy codes correspond to the
year in which the teaching cohort which taught these students would have received
initial certification.
In the results discussed below, some specifications also include an additional vector
of state-year observable covariates, X,, including student enrollment; the percent of
students eligible for free lunch; the percent minority enrollment; the proportion of
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the state categorized as suburban, city, or rural; and a quadratic term in the state
unemployment rate. Output quality regression models also include the percentage of
students who report having an encyclopedia in the home as a measure of the baseline
ability of students.
2.5.2 Estimation of Heterogeneous Effects Differing by In-
come
To estimate the effect of occupational licensing on school districts of differing income
levels, equation (2.1) above is modified to include an interaction term with each type
of test law. Let i represent an individual teacher. Then the qualifications of teacher
i in school district d in state s and survey year t is given by
qidst = ys + At + Law'to + Lunchdat * Law't4 + Eidst (2.5)
where Lunchdst represents the percent of students in district d, in state s, in
survey year t who qualify for free school lunch. Thus, a higher value of this variable
represents a lower income school district. Unlike (2.1), equation (2.5) is not a model of
conditional quantiles, and hence all unobserved heterogeneity is captured in the term
Eidst Thus, ordinary least squares estimation of this regression equation measures
the effect of stricter licensing requirements on average quality for areas of differing
income.16 In the case where all experience cohorts are pooled together, equation (2.4)
is similarly modified. The effect of teacher certification laws on the input quality of
teachers found in a school district with income level I, i.e., a given percentage of
students qualifying for free lunch, is given by 3 + I0.
To examine heterogeneous effects on output quality, qidst is replaced with the
NAEP test score of student i in school d in state s in survey year t. In the NAEP
datasets, the percentage of students qualifying for free lunch is not recorded as a con-
tinuous variable. Instead, discrete data are recorded, classifying the school as having
16Given that the variation in this model lives at the state-survey year-district level, this regression
equation could also be estimated after first collapsing to the district level.
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either 0-5%, 6-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, or 76-100% of its students qualify for
free lunch. Therefore, rather than containing an interaction with a single continuous
variable, the output quality regression equation is fully saturated with interactions
between law dummies and percentage free lunch dummies:
6 6
qidst = 1s + At + p * Law'st j +Zp * j + eidst (2.6)
j=1 j=1
where p,t are dummies specifying which of the six free lunch categories contains
school d in state s in survey year t. The parameters (j capture the main effect of
the percent free lunch variables. A similar modification yields the pooled cohorts
specification.
2.5.3 Limitations
The methodology previously described has several limitations. The measures of qual-
ity employed are only proxies for the true underlying quality. Measuring quality in
any occupation is difficult, and a source of debate among researchers Gross (1986).
The measure of input quality, or qualifications of professionals, used in this paper is
the average SAT score of entering freshman at the teacher's undergraduate institu-
tion. Similar measures have been used to proxy for teacher qualifications/quality in
Bacolod (2007), Kane and Staiger (2008), and Angrist and Guryan (2008). This mea-
sure is not meant to capture everything about an individual teacher's qualifications;
instead, it is meant to serve as some measure of the impressiveness of a candidate's
resume to employers when entering the job market. It is reasonable to assume that
the selectivity of a teacher's undergraduate institution is correlated with the prestige
of the teacher's resume.
To measure output quality, it would be desirable to translate student test scores
into a measure of teacher value-added, as in Kane and Staiger (2008), for example.
However, the NAEP does not constitute of representative sample of teachers, and
survey designers specifically warned against any teacher-level analysis (Rogers and
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Stoeckel 2008. Also, in many cases only several students assigned to a particular
teacher appear in the dataset. Finally, as the data is in the form of a repeated cross-
section rather than a panel, no baseline measure of student ability is available, which
Kane and Staiger (2008) show greatly increases the explanatory power of teacher
value-added measures. Therefore, this project focuses directly on the distribution of
student test scores rather than teacher value-added. While not a perfect measure
of the output quality distribution, student test scores still serve as a valuable proxy,
as improvements in the teacher value-added distribution should be correlated in the
overall distribution of student test scores. Moreover, this measure of output quality
still allows the researcher to study how licensing affects the distribution of outcomes,
and whether lower tail (bad) outcomes are more or less likely when licensing laws are
in place.
A final limitation, as noted above, is that if unobserved factors at the state-year
level are correlated with changes in teacher certification testing requirements, the
difference-in-differences approaches described above will yield biased estimates of the
effects of testing laws on teacher quality. For example, other education policies may
have changed simultaneously with teacher certification requirements. If such pol-
icy changes did occur, and these policies are complements with teacher certification
testing, the measured effects could simply be interpreted as the total effect of the
policy changes rather than the specific effect of certification tests. If, however, unob-
served policy changes and certification testing are substitutes, the estimated effects
from the difference-in-differences regressions will be biased and difficult to interpret.
This study uses a variety of robustness checks and an event study to explore whether
omitted factors are biasing results.
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2.6 Findings
2.6.1 Distributional Effects: Input Quality
Before addressing the question of whether stricter occupational licensing laws lead
to an increase in the lower tail of the distribution of teacher input quality, Table
2.3 displays the results of a regression of average teacher input quality on teacher
testing laws. The first three columns of Table 2.3 display the results of estimating
equation (2.2), using first-year teachers only, where the dependent variable is qst, the
mean of input quality in state s in survey year t. Column (1) includes only state and
year fixed effects, column (2) adds state-year level demographic controls as explained
above, and column (3) adds a state-specific linear time trend. Columns (4)-(6) repeat
the exercise for the pooled sample of teachers. Column (7) adds a term capturing
state-specific returns to teacher experience, and column (8) includes both the time
trend and the experience trend.
Table 2.3: Average effect of certification test laws on input quality
Dependent Variable: Input quality (undergrad institution avg SAT)
First year teachers only
(1) (2) (3)
All experience levels pooled
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subject test law -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.07**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Basic skills test law -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Prof. knowledge test law 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) -(0.02) -(0.02) -(0.02) -(0.02) -(0.02)
Demographic controls - Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend - - Yes - - Yes - Yes
State-specific exp. effect - - - - - - Yes Yes
Sample Size 245 2,318
Notes: Dependent variable is standard deviations of teacher undergraduate institution average SAT. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects. All pooled regressions include experience cohort fixed
effects. Regressions are run after collapsing to the state-year level, weighting by teacher sample weights.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * = p < 0.05, ** = p <0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
Columns (1)-(3) show that none of the test laws appear to have a statistically
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significant impact on the average teacher input quality of teachers in the profession,
which is consistent with the results of Angrist and Guryan (2008). This may imply
that these occupational licensing laws have little effect on first-year teachers on aver-
age, which of itself would be an interesting result given the cost of licensing. However,
because surveys occurred at 4-6 year intervals, using only first-year teachers does not
allow the researcher to take advantage of all historical variation in teacher certifica-
tion test laws. The pooled sample of teachers, on the other hand, uses all teacher
cohorts, thus using a larger sample and using variation in certification test laws over
the entire period (1983-2008).
Column (4) indicates that a subject test law is associated with a statistically
significant increase in average teacher input quality of 0.08 standard deviations, sig-
nificant at the 0.001 level. The basic test law and professional knowledge test laws
have an effect on average teacher input quality which is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Columns (5)-(8) indicate that these findings are robust to the inclusion of
demographics, time trends, experience trends, or both.
In order to approach the question of how teacher certification laws affect the
distribution of input quality, equation (2.2) is estimated separately for each decile (T =
0.1, 0.2, ... , 0.9) of teacher input quality, as described above. The results are shown
in Figure 2-4. Panels (a), (c), and (e) display the effects of the subject, basic skills,
and professional knowledge test laws at each quantile using the sample of first year
teachers. These regressions include demographic variables and state and year fixed
effects, as in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2.3. Point-wise 90% confidence intervals
are represented in gray. Estimation using the first-year teacher sample demonstrates
a downward sloping quality effect, implying that, among first-year teachers, teacher
certification test laws may raise the lower tail of teacher qualifications and decrease
the upper tail. For subject test laws, the decrease in the upper tail (the 0.8 quantile)
is shown to be statistically significant. This decrease in the upper tail of qualifications
presents some evidence in favor of the hypothesis of Ballou and Podgursky (1998) that
occupational licensing drives away highly qualified candidates.
The pooled sample of teachers yields a significant effect of subject test laws on
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Figure 2-4: Effects of certification test laws on input quality distribution
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Notes: Effects of subject test law, basic skills test law, and professional knowledge test law on quantiles of teacher
input quality distribution. Panels on the left display first-year teacher sample and on the right display pooled
teacher sample. Robust, pointwise 90% confidence bands are displayed by dashed lines.
the distribution of teacher qualifications, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 2-4. The
effect of licensing is positive, implying that the sample of teachers who remain in
the occupation for multiple years is of higher quality when subject test laws are in
place than when they are not. Interestingly, this result is relatively flat across the
distribution, indicating that subject test laws do not appear to differentially affect
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the lower tail of the distribution. This is in contrast to the Ballou and Podgursky
(1998) hypothesis and the results in panel (a), which found a decrease in the upper
tail of input quality due to licensing. Together, these results suggest that stricter
licensing may drive away some highly qualified first-year teachers, but these teachers
would likely not have remained in the occupation anyway.
To examine the robustness of these results, Figure 2-5 displays the same results
as in panel (b) of Figure 2-4, that is, the effect of subject test laws using the pooled
sample of teachers, but with time and experience trends included. Note that the
results do not change drastically with the inclusion of these trends, lending support
to a causal interpretation of the results.
2.6.2 Distributional Effects: Output Quality
To analyze the effects of occupational licensing on the distribution of output quality,
equation (2.2) is estimated with the dependent variable being the quantile of the
eighth grade math NAEP score within each state and year. As a first pass, equation
(2.2) is estimated with the state-year average score as the dependent variable. The
results are displayed in Table 2.4. For the pooled sample columns, the dependent
variable is the mean among students taught by teachers in cohort c in state s in
survey year t. Subject test laws appear to have no effect, while basic skills test
laws appear to have an effect of about 0.05 standard deviations, but this effect is
not robust to the inclusion of time trends. Professional knowledge test laws appear
to have a small but imprecisely-measured negative effect. As a baseline comparison,
other interventions in education, such as the class size experiments of Krueger (1999),
have led to increases in student test scores of approximately 0.2 standard deviations.
The effects on the distribution of output quality (NAEP student test scores) are
displayed in Figure 2-6. As above, these results come from estimating equation (2.2)
at each decile of output quality, with demographics and state and year fixed effects
included. In the case of the pooled sample regressions, experience fixed effects are
also included. Panel (a) demonstrates that, in the first-year teacher sample, sub-
ject test laws are associated with a 0.15 standard deviation drop in the lower tail of
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Figure 2-5: Trend robustness input quality distributional effects
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Notes: Effects of subject test law on distribution of input quality with pooled teacher sample, with state-specific
linear time trends and/or state-specific returns to teaching experience included.
the distribution. The effect also appears to be increasing with the quantile. In the
pooled sample, panel (b), the effect on the lower tail is smaller and insignificant, but
the increasing shape is preserved, and a positive impact of 0.05 standard deviations
is detected at the 0.9 quantile. Panel (d) demonstrates that basic skills test laws have
about a 0.05 standard deviation effect on the upper half of the test score distribu-
tion, while panel (f) shows a marginally significant negative impact of 0.05 standard
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Table 2.4: Average effect of certification test laws on output quality
Dependent Variable: Input quality (undergrad inst. avg. SAT, standardized)
First year teachers only All experience levels pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subject test law -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.05*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Basic skills test law -0.07 -0.08 -0.17** -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Prof. knowledge test law 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Demographic controls -- Yes Yes -- Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend -- -- Yes -- -- Yes -- Yes
State-specific exp. effect -- -- -- -- -- -- Yes Yes
Sample Size 7,900 62,810
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects. All pooled regressions include experience cohort
fixed effects. Regressions are run at the individual level, weighting by teacher sampling weights. Standard errors,
clustered at the state-year level, are reported in parentheses. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
deviations for professional knowledge test laws on the middle and far right quantiles.
Figure 2-7 checks the robustness of the effects of subject test laws and basic skills
test laws in the pooled sample. The subject test results remain similar even with the
inclusion of experience trends, lending support to this finding being causal. The basic
skills test results change shape somewhat when state specific time trends are included,
in particular in the upper tail, suggesting that the argument for a causal relationship
of basic skills test laws on student test scores is less strong than for subject test laws.
2.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects: Input Quality
The next question of interest is whether occupational licensing laws differentially af-
fect areas of differing income levels. The Shapiro (1986) general model of occupational
licensing suggested that the answer to this question may be in the affirmative, but
there is little empirical evidence. Shapiro (1986) predicts that licensing may result in
higher quality for high income consumers, but lower quality for low income consumers.
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Figure 2-6: Effects of certification test laws on output quality distribution
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quality distribution. Panels on the left display first-year teacher sample and on the right display pooled teacher
sample. Robust, pointwise 90% confidence bands are displayed by dashed lines.
Estimating equation (2.5) tests this prediction.
The results of this estimation are displayed in Table 2.5 and Figure 2-8. First,
Table 2.5 displays the results when the teacher testing law effect is evaluated at the
mean of the percent-free-lunch variable. Standard errors, clustered at the state-year
level, are reported in parentheses. In the pooled teacher sample, subject test laws
appear to have a positive impact of about 0.06 standard deviations, similar to the
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Figure 2-7: Trend robustness
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Notes: Effects of subject test law on distribution of output quality with pooled teacher sample, with state-specific
linear time trends and/or state-specific returns to teaching experience included.
average effect measured in Table 2.3 above. In the first-year teacher sample, in column
(3), basic skills test laws appear to have a large negative effect on the average teacher
input quality, but this effect is only significant with the inclusion of the time trends,
making it more difficult to attribute a causal interpretation.
Figure 2-8 then displays the estimated average effect of certification test laws
on input quality evaluated at each quantile of the percent-free-lunch variable. It is
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Table 2.5: Average effect of certification test laws on input quality controlling for
heterogeneous income effects
Dependent Variable: Output quality (NAEP grade 8 math scores, standardized)
First year teachers only All experience levels pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subject test law -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Basic skills test law 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.06** 0.04* 0.03 0.05* 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Prof. knowledge test law 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Demographic controls -- Yes Yes -- Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend - -- Yes -- - Yes -- Yes
State-specific exp. effect -- -- - -- -- -- Yes Yes
Sample Size 259 2,277
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects. All pooled regressions include experience cohort fixed
effects. Regressions are run after collapsing to the state-year level, weighting by student sample weights. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *= p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
important to note that, unlike the figures in the distributional effects sections above,
all of the points plotted in panels (a),(c), and (e) of Figure 2-8 come from the same
regression, with the different estimates representing the effect of teacher testing laws
evaluated at different quantiles of the percent-free-lunch distribution. Similarly, all
of the points plotted in panels (b), (d), and (f) come from the same regression, where
the pooled sample was used.
Panel (b) shows that there is a strong, decreasing relationship which is statisti-
cally significant at least over the lower half of the income distribution, where the 90%
confidence band lies strictly above zero. These results indicate that stricter occu-
pational licensing laws are associated with an increase in teacher qualifications, but
only at the wealthiest school districts those with a lower percentage of students who
qualify for free lunch. Figure 2-8 indicates that at the 0.1 quantile of the percent
free lunch variable, subject test laws are associated with an increase of nearly 0.15
standard deviations in average teacher qualifications. This effect decreases as income
decreases, as shown by movement to the right on the horizontal axis. For the poorest
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Heterogeneous effects of certification
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in areas differing by income, where income is measured by the percent of students eligible for free lunch. Panels on
the left display first-year teacher sample and on the right display pooled teacher sample. Robust, pointwise 90%
confidence bands are displayed by dashed lines.
districts shown, those at the 0.9 quantile, subject test laws are associated with an
insignificant drop in teacher qualifications.
Panel (f) of Figure 2-8 demonstrates that professional knowledge test laws have
the same relationship as subject test laws, leading to increases in teacher input quality
in wealthier areas of approximately 0.07 standard deviations and a decrease of the
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Figure 2-9: Trend robustness of input quality heterogeneous effects of subject test
laws
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Notes: Effects of subject test law on input quality by quantiles of percent free lunch distribution using pooled
teacher sample, with state-specific linear time trends and/or state-specific returns to teaching experience included.
Unlike the average effect reported in Table 2.3, the heterogeneous effects displayed
in Figure 2-8 are robust to the inclusion of time trends, as demonstrated in Figure
2-9. This lends support to the causal interpretation of these effects. In summary,
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the estimated effects of subject test laws on school districts of differing income levels
support the Shapiro (1986) prediction that quality would improve for higher income
areas and not for lower income areas.
2.6.4 Heterogeneous Effects: Output Quality
The effect of licensing on student test scores for areas of differing income levels is
displayed in Figure 2-10. A table analogous to Table 2.5 is omitted because the
mean value of the percent free lunch variable is not reported in the data; instead,
the percent free lunch variable is reported in six bins. 90% confidence intervals are
displayed around each estimate, where standard errors are calculated by clustering
at the state-year level.
In Figure 2-10, the first-year teacher sample displays noisily measured effects,
without the same strong patterns observed in the pooled sample. For example, panel
(a) does not display a significant positive effect of subject test laws for the wealthiest
schools, and displays a significant negative effect for schools in the second quartile
of income (25-50%). In the pooled sample, subject and basic skills test laws are
associated with a larger increase in test scores (0.05 standard deviations for subject
test laws and 0.15 standard deviations for basic skills test laws) for higher income
districts, and professional knowledge test laws display the opposite effect, with a large
and significant decrease of 0.15 standard deviations for the wealthiest districts. Figure
2-11 demonstrates that the basic skills results are robust to the inclusion of trends.
2.6.5 Heterogeneous Effects: Substitution Away From Li-
censed Professionals
Given the results from this and the previous section, it is natural to ask how, if
at all, consumers substitute away from licensed professionals in response to stricter
occupational licensing. As referenced previously, various authors have demonstrated
that more stringent licensing requirements, including teacher certification tests, lead
to higher wages. This is as theory would predict: licensing requirements restrict
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Figure 2-10: Heterogeneous effects of certification test laws on output quality by
income
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quality in areas differing by income, where income is measured by the percent of students eligible for free lunch.
Panels on the left display first-year teacher sample and on the right display pooled teacher sample. Robust,
pointwise 90% confidence bands are displayed by vertical lines.
supply and hence increase wages. If it is the case that higher income schools are better
equipped than lower income schools to raise wages in response to this restriction of
supply, lower income schools might be expected to respond to stricter occupational
licensing by substituting away from licensed professionals.
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Figure 2-11: Trend robustness of output quality effects by income level
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teacher sample, with state-specific linear time trends and/or state-specific returns to teaching experience included.
Specifically, lower income schools could increase class sizes or hire more emergency-
certified teachers, i.e. those who did not have to pass certification tests. Jepsen and
Rivkin (2009) found some evidence that lower income schools were less able to retain
teachers during supply shortages. These authors study Californias 1996 law to reduce
class sizes, finding that the law led to a shortage of teachers. Many teachers left low-
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income schools to fill coveted vacancies at higher income schools.
A search of the literature found no work examining how licensing laws differentially
affect wages at high vs. low income schools. While not a focus of this study, Figure 2-
12 demonstrates some weak evidence that basic skills test laws tend to increase wages
primarily in high income areas. The estimates in this figure result from estimating
equation (2.5) with the left hand side variable replaced by the log of teacher salary
(in 2008 dollars) for teachers with a bachelors degree, as reported in the SASS survey
years. Summary statistics for the dependent variable of this regression and of the
other regressions estimated in this section appear in Appendix Table 2.6.
Panel (b) shows that, in higher income schools, teacher salary increases by ap-
proximately 2%. In lower income schools, those with a higher percentage of students
qualifying for free lunch, the estimated increase is not statistically significant. The
significant results for basic skills test laws, however, were not robust to the inclusion
of state time trends (not shown). The results are difficult to interpret given that
Figure 2-8 (d) showed that basic skills test laws did not have a significant effect on
teacher qualifications in areas varying by income. Note, however, that these salary
regressions use much less variation in licensing regimes, as salary data is only recorded
in survey years. In panels (a) and (c), estimates of the effects of subject and profes-
sional knowledge test laws are not significant, although professional knowledge test
laws do appear to have the same upward sloping relationship as basic test laws.
The effects of substituting to emergency-certified teachers can be examined using
data in the SASS survey, which contains an indicator for whether or not the teacher
is emergency certified. This can be performed by estimating the same specification as
in equation (2.5) but where the dependent variable is replaced with this emergency-
certified dummy. The results are displayed in the first column of Figure 2-13. No
significant effect was estimated for any of the three test laws. However, for basic skills
and professional knowledge test laws, the effect appears to be more positive at higher
levels of the percent free lunch variable. This would imply that low income areas may
be more likely than high income areas to hire emergency certified teachers in response
to stricter occupational licensing, although this effect is not precisely measured.
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Figure 2-12: Heterogeneous effects of certification test laws on log of teacher salary
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Notes: Effects of subject test law, basic skills test law, and professional knowledge test law on teacher salary in
areas differing by income, where income is measured by the percent of students eligible for free lunch. Results
correspond to first-year teacher sample only. Robust, pointwise 90% confidence bands are displayed by dashed
lines.
Changes in class size are explored in the second column of Figure 2-13, which
displays the results of estimating equation (2.5), but with the dependent variable
replaced by the pupil to teacher ratio as recorded in the Common Core of Data
(CCD) from the NCES, using all school districts in the database from the years 1988
to 2010. The years 2009-2010 are included because, unlike the SASS and NAEP
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Figure 2-13: Heterogeneous effects of certification test laws on proportion of
emergency-certified teachers and pupil-to-teacher ratio
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Notes: Effects of subject test law, basic skills test law, and professional knowledge test law on proportion of
emergency certified teachers (observed in the SASS dataset) and pupil to teacher ratio (observed in the CCD) in
areas differing by income, where income is measured by the percent of students eligible for free lunch. Robust,
pointwise 90% confidence bands are displayed by dashed lines.
datasets, the CCD contains data for these years, and certification test law data is
available for these years as well. Years prior to 1988 are not available in the CCD for
the variables studied. Panel (b) demonstrates that there is not a significant effect of
subject test laws on class size. Panel (d) indicates that there is a significant increase
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of approximately 0.25 in the student to teacher ratio at the lowest income school
districts, as the 90% confidence interval lies above zero at upper quantiles of the
percent free lunch distribution. At higher income schools, a marginally significant
decrease in the pupil to teacher ratio of about 0.25 occurs. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that occupational licensing may lead to larger class sizes at these schools.
Professional knowledge tests, on the other hand, are associated with larger class sizes
(an increase of 0.3-0.4 in the student to teacher ratio) at both high and low income
schools.
2.7 Event Study
In addition to the robustness checks discussed in the previous sections, namely the
inclusion of state-specific time and/or experience trends, an event study framework
can be used to determine if the observed changes in input and output quality occurred
after the changes in occupational licensing laws. This event study focuses solely
on subject test law changes for several reasons. First, overall, subject test laws
appear to have as strong of effects on input and output quality as do basic skills
or professional knowledge test laws. Second, as demonstrated in Table 2.1 above,
few states eliminated the requirement of a subject test for certification once this
requirement was in place, making it simple to determine the year in which the law
change took place. Finally, these laws have been the focus of legislation.
For state s in year t, let d(- 2 ) be a dummy variable which is equal to '" 1" if year
t was two years prior to the year in which state s changed its subject test law and is
equal to "0" otherwise. For one year prior to a law change, d(-') is defined similarly.
Let d(f) be an indicator for whether state s changed its subject test law in year t. The
variables dfl, d(2) , d 3 ) , and d are dummies for year t being 1, 2, 3, or 4 or more
years after state s changed its law. If a state never instituted a subject test law, all
of the dummies are set to zero. Let the vector of these dummies be given by
_ - st st s t st s t st St
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To estimate the effects of subject test laws on the distribution of teacher input
quality in the framework of this event study, equation (2.1) can be estimated by re-
placing the subject test dummy in the Lawst vector with the vector of event dummies,
d8 t. The pooled regression model is modified similarly.
The results are displayed in Figure 2-14. Nine regression, one regression for each
decile (r = 0.1, 0.2, ...0.9), were estimated to create Figure 2-14. Only the pooled
teacher sample results are reported. Thus, the results in Figure 2-14 are an event
study version of those in panel (b) of Figure 2-4. The results demonstrate that
in the two years prior to the law change, the effect is zero or insignificant at each
quantile of input quality. In the year of the law change and the two years immediately
following the change, there is also no significant effect. However, at three years and
at four or more years after the law change, there is a significant, positive effect on
the distribution, as shown by the 90% confidence band lying above zero, at many of
the quantiles. This lends support to a causal interpretation of the result that subject
test laws do appear to raise the distribution of teacher input quality, demonstrating
the cause, i.e., the change in subject test law, appears to occur prior to the effect, i.e.
the change in the distribution of teacher qualifications. In particular, the main effect
of the law change appears to occur several years after the law is first implemented.
This phenomenon may arise from announcements of law changes affecting decisions
of undergraduates to enter the teaching occupation.
Figure 2-15 displays the same estimation but for output quality as measured by
eighth grade math scores on the NAEP. That is, these results can be compared with
those in panel (b) of Figure 2-6. Recall that in Figure 2-6 a positive impact of 0.05
standard deviations was detected at the 0.9 quantile, with insignificant results at
other quantiles. A similar pattern is seen in Figure 2-15, with the 0.9 quantile, panel
(i), demonstrating a marginally significant effect, arriving at approximately two years
after the law change.
To apply this event study to the measurement of heterogeneous effects by income,
equation 5 can be estimated with the subject test law dummy in the Lawt variable
replaced by the event dummies, d8 t, and similarly for the pooled sample model. Note
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that each of the event dummies is also interacted with the percent free lunch variable.
The results of this estimation for the pooled sample are displayed in Figure 2-16. Once
again, at most quantiles, no significant effects are measured prior to or coincident to
the law change. Rather, the effects appear to occur four or more years after the
change takes place.
To examine the timing of the effects of subject test laws on output quality, equation
(2.5) can be estimated including interactions of the percent free lunch dummies with
the event study dummies in d8t. The results are displayed in Figure 2-17. The effects
of the subject law change are larger for the wealthier areas (panels (a) and (b)), and
these effects arrive mainly one and two years after the law change took place.
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Figure 2-14: Event study: effect of subject test laws on input quality distribution
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Figure 2-16: Event study: heterogeneous effects of subject test laws on input quality by income
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2.8 Conclusion
This study uses state level variation in teacher certification testing requirements over
the period from 1983 to 2008 to examine how more stringent occupational licensing
standards affect the composition of candidates who meet these standards and enter
the occupation, and the distribution of the output of these candidates. The compo-
sition of the candidates entering the occupation is measured by the selectivity of the
candidates' undergraduate institutions as captured by the average SAT score of en-
tering freshmen. Output is measured by the eighth grade math test scores of students
taught by teachers affected by changes in certification requirements. Together, these
measures provide proxies for the input quality, or qualifications, and output quality,
or quality of service, or licensed teachers.
This study first examines the effect of stricter licensing requirements on the distri-
bution of input and output quality, providing evidence as to whether licensing indeed
prevents less-qualified candidates from entering the occupation and undesirable out-
comes from occurring. These are the primary arguments in favor of licensing by its
proponents but have received little attention in the literature. Second, this study tests
the theoretical prediction that quality would increase more in high income areas than
in low income areas, as predicted by the theoretical model of Shapiro (1986). Finally,
this study also sheds some light on the question of how licensing requirements may
lead some consumers to substitute away from the services of licensed professionals.
This study finds that, for first-year teachers, more stringent requirements for
teacher licensure, in the form of subject tests, lead to a small but significant de-
crease in the upper tail of input quality. This is suggestive that these laws may be
repelling some highly qualified candidates from the occupation.
For the pooled teachers sample; Figure 2-4 demonstrates positive and significant
quality effects of subject test laws on the composition of teachers who remain in
the occupation for multiple years. However, these effects appear to be relatively flat
across the distribution of teacher quality. Increases in the extreme lower tail are not
observed, which may be an indication that these tests do not fully weed out less-
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qualified candidates. The upper tail of the input distribution also increases, contrary
to the result in the first-year teacher sample, suggestive that any first-year teachers
who are driven away by stricter licensing requirements may have likely not have
remained in the occupation for many years.
Summarizing Figure 2-6, it appears that most of the effects of teacher certifica-
tion tests on the distribution of student test scores accrue to the upper half of the
distribution." It is not clear why this result would occur. One hypothesis is that
stricter occupational licensing laws, in the form of certification tests, admit candi-
dates to the occupation who are better equipped to aid students who perform at or
above the median. This has not been researched in the existing literature. Whatever
the underlying cause, it appears that teacher certification tests are associated with
a widening of the student test score distribution. As mentioned above, it would be
informative to also examine effects on the distribution of teacher value-added rather
than the distribution of student test scores, but the available national data does not
lend itself to the calculation of teacher value-added.
An examination of heterogeneous effects by income demonstrates that certifica-
tion test laws are primarily associated with increases in quality for higher income
areas. This result is demonstrated in the input quality as well as the output quality
measures, as shown in Figures 2-8 and 2-10. States which impose subject test laws
can expect high income areas of the state to attract teachers from more selective
undergraduate institutions, while low income areas will attract candidates from less
selective institutions. Subject and basic test laws also appear to increase test scores
in higher income areas, coinciding with the model predictions of Shapiro (1986). Pro-
fessional knowledge test laws, on the other hand, have the opposite effect, yielding
an increase in scores for low income schools and a decrease in scores for high income
schools. While the cause of this effect for professional knowledge test laws is unclear,
it may be that the skills required to pass these tests are skills better equipped for
helping students in low income areas.
17This effect was found using other measures of output quality as well (NAEP test scores from
other grades/subjects).
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This study also finds that teacher certification tests, in particular basic skills tests,
are associated with increases in teachers' salary and pupil to teacher ratios. These
results are seen in Figures 2-12 and 2-13. This serves as some evidence that teacher
certification laws may lead consumers in lower income areas, in this case, schools and
school districts, to substitute away from the use of licensed professionals, another
interpretation of the Shapiro (1986) model.
The results of the difference-in-differences estimates in this study are shown to
be, for the most part, robust to the inclusion of state-specific time trends and state-
specific returns to teacher experience. These findings, along with the event study for
subject test laws, lend support to a causal interpretation of the measured effects.
Although the focus of this study has been on the teaching profession, the ques-
tions and approaches employed here can play a valuable role in the study of other
occupations as well. In particular, the licensing literature to date has focused on the
effect of licensing on changes in average levels of quality, while the stated purpose of
licensing by many proponents is instead to provide a minimum level of quality which
candidates and services must meet. Future research could look for distributional ef-
fects in other occupations, especially those in which consumer safety or asymmetric
information of professionals vs. consumers is a major concern, such as medicine or
law, to see if licensure laws in fact do prevent the worst candidates from entering the
occupation or prevent the worst outcomes from occurring.
Future research could also aid in determining the effects of occupational licens-
ing on heterogeneous consumers, examining whether these laws tend to harm low
income consumers relative to high income consumers. This study sheds some light on
this question, as well as on how low income areas may substitute away from licensed
professionals, indicating that policymakers may do well to consider potentially unin-
tended effects of licensing on low income areas. However, the question merits further
research, again, particularly in professions providing services with a greater safety or
informational concern, or in occupations in which safety concerns are small, as licens-
ing regulations in these occupations may be more likely to result from rent-seeking
behavior by those in the profession.
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.6: Summary statistics for SASS, NAEP, and CCD variables
Standard
Sample size Mean deviation Min Max
SASS Variables
District enrollment 60,820 67,771 204,023 0 1,197,117
Percent minority enrollment 60,820 35.59 29.37 0 100
Suburb dummy 60,820 0.47 -- - --
Rurual dummy 60,820 0.25 -- -- --
Emergency certified dummy 8,771 0.13 0.34 0 1
Salary (2008 dollars) 8,771 27,674 7,395 11,800 51,400
Log salary (2008 dollars) 8,771 10.45 0.14 9.59 10.98
CCD Variables
Pupil to teacher ratio 328,812 14.94 3.90 4.00 26.67
NAEP Variables
School percent black 366,099 16.03 23.57 0 100
School percent Hispanic 366,099 14.68 23.13 0 100
NAEP Dummy Variables (means)
Encyclopedia in home dummy 0.61 Enrollement: 1-99 0.01
Suburb dummy 0.46 Enrollment: 100-299 0.07
Rural dummy 0.25 Enrollment: 300-499 0.18
Black dummy 0.17 Enrollment: 500-749 0.29
Hispanic dummy 0.15 Enrollment: 750-999 0.23
Asian dummy 0.04 Enrollment: 1000-1499 0.17
Male dummy 0.50 Enrollment: 1500+ students 0.05
Notes: Summary statistics for variables not displayed in Table 2. Data on salaries and
emergency certification comes from the SASS sample of first-year teachers. Data on pupil
to teacher ratios comes from the CCD from 1988-2010.
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Chapter 3
IV Quantile Regression for
Group-level Treatments
3.1 Introduction
We propose a simple approach for estimating distributional effects of a group-level
treatment when there are unobservable components at the group level which may be
correlated with the treatment. Our estimator is applicable in situations in which the
researcher has micro-level data on the outcome of interest. For example, a researcher
may be interested in a policy which varies across states or cities, and wish to examine
the effects of the policy on the distribution of individual outcomes within the state
or city. The estimator consists of 1) calculating the desired quantile for the outcome
within each group, or, if micro-level covariates are also available, performing quantile
regression within each group; and 2) applying two-stage least squares (2SLS) to the
group-level quantiles, or, if there is no concern of endogeneity, applying ordinary least
squares estimator (OLS) to the group-level quantiles. Intuitively, in the exogenous
case with no individual-level covariates, the estimator reduces to a between estimator
with group quantiles replacing group means.
Our estimator provides a variety of advantages over traditional quantile regres-
sion. First, our grouped instrumental variables (IV) quantile regression estimator
provides a simple and consistent solution to situations in which the treatment may
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be correlated with unobservables. Alternative approaches for IV quantile regression,
in which the researcher is concerned with an individual-level treatment being cor-
related with unobservables, such as the situations described in Abadie et al. (2002)
or Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), do not apply in this setting and, moreover,
are much more complex. Angrist and Pischke (2009) described IV quantile methods
as "a relatively new development and not yet as flexible as conventional 2SLS." An
advantage of the estimator proposed here is that it is as flexible as 2SLS.
Second, even in the absence of endogeneity, standard quantile regression will be
inconsistent in this setting, as the group-level unobservables are equivalent to left-
hand side measurement error. Hausman (2001) pointed out that such measurement
error will bias quantile regression estimates toward those of median regression. Our
approach, on the other hand, reduces in the end to using OLS or 2SLS, in which
left-hand side measurement error is not a problem. In the case of no endogeneity,
and when no individual-level right-hand side variables are included, our estimator
is equivalent to the minimum distance estimator proposed in Chamberlain (1994b)
and discussed further in Angrist et al. (2006). To our knowledge, the use of the
Chamberlain (1994b) estimator to solve group-level left-hand side measurement error
in quantile regression has not before been discussed.
Third, quantile regression estimators in standard statistical packages can impose
a computational burden when many fixed effects are included due to the incidental
parameters problem. Koenker (2004), Lamarche (2010), and Galvao (2011) discussed
this issue, mentioning that a linear fixed effects model is able to reduce the dimension-
ality of the problem greatly by subtracting off fixed effects, but, in standard quantile
regression, "this decomposition of projections is not available and we are required to
deal directly with the full problem" (Koenker (2004)).1 We avoid this problem by
treating different groups separately in the first stage, which can speed up computation
times in large datasets with many fixed effects.
Finally, we demonstrate that standard errors for the proposed estimator can be
1Koenker (2004) suggests that approaches for storing sparse matrices in memory can reduce the
computational burden somewhat.
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obtained using traditional heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for 2SLS, mak-
ing inference particularly simple. We demonstrate that the estimator is consistent
and asymptotically normal. We also show the existence of confidence bands for the
coefficient of interest which hold uniformly over a set of quantiles of interest, and
present a subsainpling approach for estimating these confidence bands.
Our results are based on the asymptotics where both the number of groups and
the number of observations per group grow to infinity. In contrast with other papers
studying quantile panel data models, our results on asymptotic normality hold under
the assumption that the number of observations per group grows at least as quickly
as the square-root of the number of groups (up to logarithmic terms). Other papers
require at least linear growth; see, for example, Kato and Galvao (2011) and Kato
et al. (2011). This gives an advantage when the number of observations per group
is relatively small in comparison with the number of groups. However, our estimator
is consistent at a rate equal to the square root of the number of groups, a relatively
slow rate given that the number of observations equals the product of the number of
groups and the number of observations per group.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to present a framework for
estimating distributional effects as a function of group-level covariates. Other papers
studying quantile models for panel data are concerned with estimating distributional
effects of individual-level covariates. See, for example, Koenker (2004), Abrevaya and
Dahl (2008), Lamarche (2010), Canay (2011), Galvao (2011), Kato et al. (2011), and
Kato and Galvao (2011).
Several papers have applied special cases of our approach but do not discuss
the consistency of the estimator. We draw on these papers to provide examples of
our estimation method. The first example comes from Angrist and Lang (2004),
who estimate the effect on the lower tail of student test scores when urban students
are reassigned to suburban schools through Boston's Metco program. The second
example is Larsen (2012b) who estimates the effect of teacher certification laws on
the distribution of teacher quality. The third example comes from Palmer (2011),
and illustrates the use of our estimator in an IV setting, measuring the effects of
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suburbanization on urban decline. The final example suggests a simple test of the
symmetric, independent private values assumption in English auctions which could
be used in a non-IV setting or in an IV setting given appropriate instruments for the
number of bidders.
We present Monte Carlo simulations demonstrating the performance our estima-
tor. Findings indicate that, when the treatment variable is endogenous, group-level
unobservables lead to bias in standard quantile regression. The grouped IV quantile
estimator, on the other hand, has very low bias. The simulations also demonstrate
that standard quantile regression is biased even if the treatment variable is exogenous,
as group-level unobservables induce left-hand side measurement error. The grouped
approach derived in this paper again has very low bias in this setting. We show that
these results are true even with few groups and few individual observations per group.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe the
model and estimator. Section 3.4 provides several motivating examples of settings
where our estimator is useful. Section 3.5 derives the asymptotic theory. Section 3.6
presents evidence from Monte Carlo simulations. Section 3.7 concludes. All proofs
are contained in the Appendix.
We will use the following notation. Let C denote a generic strictly positive ar-
bitrarily large constant that is independent of n but may vary at each appearance.
Let || - || denote the Euclidean norm. Let B(x, r) denote a ball with the center at x
and radius r in a metric space that should be clear from the context. The symbol =>
signifies weak convergence, and l(U) for a set U denotes a set of bounded functions
onU.
3.2 Model
We study the following model for the response variable yig of individual i in group g,
yig = zi'Y (uig) + x'13(uig) + (uig, rg),
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where zi9 and x, are dz- and dx-vectors of individual and group-level observable covari-
ates (x 9 contains the constant), r is a vector of group-level unobservable covariates,
and ui, is a scalar random variable representing individual heterogeneity. To turn this
model into a quantile regression, we assume that for any given value of (zig, x 9 , 77g) on
its domain, Yig is increasing in Uig, and uig is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Given
these assumptions, the conditional u quantile of yig given (zig, Xg, ?lg) is
Qyg Izig'xg' 7g(f) = z y(u) + x, (u) + e(u, g).
We assume that a researcher has data on G groups with Ng individuals within group g,
g = 1,..., G. In this paper, we are interested in estimating and performing inference
on the parameter 0(u) representing the effect of observable group-level covariates
either for some particular value of index u or for a set of indices U.
In this model, zig'y(uig) is the individual effect, and x'13(uig) + E(uig, %b) is the
group effect. We allow for arbitrary correlation between these effects. Unobservable
component e(uig, m) is modeled as a general nonparametric function. Thus, we also
allow for arbitrary nonlinear effects of the group-level unobservable covariates. In
addition, note that we do not need to specify the dimensionality of Tg, which may be
either a scalar or a vector.
A strong assumption in our model is that the distribution of unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity is not allowed to vary across groups. This assumption restricts
possible interpretations of uig. However, our model does allow for the distribution
of observed individual-level covariates to vary across groups. Our model also allows
for groups to vary because of group-level covariates. Extending our results to allow
for varying distributions of unobserved individual heterogeneity would require some
other assumptions or richer data structures like those in Athey and Imbens (2006).
In many applications, it is likely that observable covariates zig and xg are related
to the unobservable 71g. Therefore, we assume that zig and x, are endogenous in the
sense that r/, is not independent of zig and x.. Our model is related to that in Cher-
nozhukov and Hansen (2005) who study endogenous quantile treatment effects. The
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key difference is that we model the endogeneity of the treatment as "7g is not inde-
pendent of zi9 and xg", whereas they essentially model it as "Uig is not independent
of zig and x9 ".
Note that under the endogeneity of zi, and x., 0(u) is not identified without
further assumptions. To achieve identification, we assume that there exists a de-
vector of instruments w 9 satisfying E[e(u, lg) Iwg] = 0 a.s. (mean-independence) and
E[wgx'] is nonsingular (relevance). These are well-known conditions from the classical
instrumental variable estimation theory. Note that one sufficient condition for mean-
independence is that r9 is independent of wg. Our mean-independence, however, is a
much weaker condition. In particular, it is required only for a particular value u of
interest.
In contrast with classical panel data models, we assume that both the number
of groups G and the number of individuals in each group Ng are large. In other
words, we study the asymptotics that Ng goes to infinity for every g = 1,..., G as the
number of groups G increases. This gives a relevant approximation in many empirical
applications.
3.3 Estimator
In this section, we develop a two-stage estimator. Our main emphasis is to derive a
computationally simple, yet consistent, estimator. In the first stage, for each group g
and each quantile index u from the set U of indices of interest, we estimate u-quantile
regression of yig on zig and the constant using the data {(yjg, zig) : i = 1, ..., Ng} by
the classical quantile regression estimator, which can be written as
Ng
(, &g(u)) = arg min Zp(yil - zigh - a),(h,a)ERdz+1 p
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where pu(-) is a "check" function of Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978), i.e. pu(x) =
(u - I{x < 0})x.2 Define
a(u) = xg#(u) + E(u, g),
&,(u) = xg/3(u) + e(u,ilg) + vg(u) = xg3(u) + xg(u)
where vg(u) = &(u) - ag(u) and Xg(u) = E(u, ,q) + vg(u).
The second stage consists of running 2SLS estimator of &g(u) on xg using wg as
an instrument to get an estimator (u) of #(u), i.e.
/3(u) = (X'PwX)1 (X'PwA(u))
where X = (x 1 , ... ,XG)', W = (W1,..., wG)', A(u) = (&1(u), -- -, &G(U))', Pw = W(W'W)- 1W'.
Intuitively, as the number of observations per group increases, Vg shrinks in absolute
value, and we obtain a classical instrumental variables problem. The theory presented
below provides a lower bound on the growth of the number of observations per group
that is sufficient to achieve consistency and asymptotic normality of /3(u).
Note that in the first stage we run the quantile regression independently for every
group. Another approach would be to estimate all parameters {ag(u) : g = 1, ..., G}
jointly. This would provide an efficiency gain given that, in this model, individual-
level effects -y(u) are group-independent. This is the approach taken up in Koenker
(2004) for quantile regression with panel data. Although our method is less efficient,
it is computationally much less demanding since only few parameters are estimated
in each regression, which can greatly reduce computation times in large datasets with
many fixed effects.
Two special cases of the estimator are worth noting. First, if no individual-level
covariates zig are included, the first stage simplifies to selecting the uth quantile of
outcome variable yig within each group. Second, if xg is independent of 7g, OLS of
&g(u) on xg may be used rather than 2SLS. When there are both no individual-level
2Note that there may be some efficiency gains from estimating parameters jointly for the whole
index set U. For simplicity, however, we do not consider this possibility in the paper.
161
covariates and no endogeneity, the grouped IV quantile regression estimator simplifies
to the minimum distance estimator described in Chamberlain (1994b).
In summary, the steps of our estimator are
1. Run u-quantile regression of yig on zi, and a constant for each group, g =
1, ... , G. If zi, is not included, simply select the uth quantile of yig within each
group.
2. Perform 2SLS regression, regressing the estimated constants from each group
(or, with no individual-level covariates, the uth quantile of yi9 within each group)
on xg, instrumenting with w9 . If endogeneity is not a concern, instead perform
OLS of the estimated constants on x9 .
Standard errors may then be obtained using classical heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors for 2SLS or OLS as if there were no first stage, as demonstrated
section 3.5. Section 3.5 also derives subsampling procedures that are suitable for
constructing uniform confidence bands for the case when the researcher is interested
in the set U of quantile indices u.
3.4 Examples
In this section, we provide several motivating examples for which our estimator may
be useful.
Example 1: Peer Effects of School Integration
Angrist and Lang (2004) study how suburban student test scores were affected by the
reassignment of participating urban students to suburban schools through Boston's
Metco program. Before estimating their main instrumental variables model, the au-
thors test for a relationship between the presence of urban students in the classroom
and the second decile of student test scores by estimating
Qyj,jtngjt ,sgjt,,,gjt(0.2) = a9 + #3 + -It + 6 mgjt + As9 gj + uggt (3.1)
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where Qygj,,,(0.2 ) represents the second decile of student test scores within a group,
where each group is a grade g x school j x year t cell. The variables s~gj and mgjt
denote the class size and the fraction of Metco students, respectively, within each
g x j x t cell ag, #l, and -yt represent grade, school, and year effects. The unobserved
component, gjt, is analogous to the E(.2, 7g) of our model.
Angrist and Lang (2004) estimate equation (3.1) by OLS, which is equivalent to
the non-IV application of our estimator with no individual-level covariates. Similar
to their OLS results on average test scores, they find that classrooms with higher
proportions of urban students have lower second decile test scores. 3
Example 2: Occupational Licensing and Quality
Larsen (2012b) applies the estimator developed in this paper to study the effects of
occupational licensing laws on the distribution of quality within the teaching profes-
sion. This application uses a difference-in-differences approach. Similar to Example
1, the explanatory variable of interest is treated as exogenous and the researcher is
concerned that there may be unobserved group-level disturbances. In this applica-
tion, a group is a state-year combination (s, t), and individuals are teachers with a
particular state in a given year.
Let qist represent the quality of teacher i in state s who began teaching in survey
year t, where quality is proxied for by a continuous measure of the selectivity of the
teacher's undergraduate institution. qist is modeled as
qist = ys(uist) + At(uist) + Law't6(uist) + E(uist, iet ) (3.2)
where -ys is a state effect, At is a year effect, and Lawt is a three-element vector
containing dummies equal to one if a subject test, basic skills test, or professional
knowledge test was required in state s in year t.
Because no individual-level covariates are included, the grouped regression can be
3Note that Angrist and Lang (2004) find no effect on average test scores once they instrument
for a classroom's level of Metco exposure. The authors do not estimate model (3.1) by 2SLS and
therefore do not address the causal distributional effects of Metco exposure.
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obtained by simply selecting the uth quantile of quality in a given state-year cell,
QqmitILawst,?st(u) = -y,(u) + At(u) + Law't(u) + e(u, rit) (3.3)
The grouped quantile estimator is obtained via OLS on equation (3.3). Larsen (2012b)
finds that, for first-year teachers, occupational licensing laws requiring teachers to
pass a subject test lead to a small but significant decrease in the upper tail of qual-
ity, suggestive that these laws may drive some highly qualified candidates from the
occupation.
Example 3: Distributional Effects of Suburbanization
Palmer (2011) applies the grouped quantile estimator to study the effects of subur-
banization on resident outcomes. This application illustrates the use of our estima-
tor in an IV setting. In this application, a group is a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), and individuals are MSA residents. As an identification strategy, Palmer
(2011) uses the results of Baum-Snow (2007) in instrumenting suburbanization with
planned highways.4
The model is
AQyigtxg,sg,,7g(u) = 0(u) -suburbanization, + x'7i(u) + E(u, etag)
suburbanizationg = 7r(u) - planned highway raysg + xg7 2 (u) + vg(u)
where AQyIx,s,,1 (u) is the change in the uth quantile of log wages yigt within an
MSA between 1950 and 1990 and x. is a vector of controls (including a constant)
conditional upon which planned highway rays, is uncorrelated with Tg and v,(u). The
variable suburbanizationg is a proxy measure of population decentralization, such as
the amount of decline of central city population density. /3(u) is the coefficient of
interest, capturing the effect of suburbanization on the within-MSA conditional wage
4Baum-Snow (2007) instruments for actual constructed highways with planned highways and
estimates that each highway ray emanating out of a city caused a decline in central city populations
of 18%.
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distribution. For example, if the process of suburbanization had particularly acute
effects on the prospects of low-wage workers, we may expect 3(u) to be negative for
U = 0.1. For a given u, the grouped IV quantile approach estimates /3(u) through a
simple 2SLS regression.
Example 4: Testing the Symmetric, Independent, Private Val-
ues Assumption in English Auctions
This example describes a simple test of the symmetric, independent, private values
(IPV) assumption in English auction models. The example illustrates the use of
the grouped quantile estimator in an IV or non-IV setting, where individual-level
covariates are included. In this example, a group is a particular value of B, the number
of bidders present at the auction, and an individual observation is the transaction
price from a particular auction sale (the second order statistic in a traditional button
auction model). A necessary condition for the symmetric IPV setting is that the
distribution of bids should increase in the number of bidders.
To test this assumption, one can group auction sales together based on the number
of bidders present at the sale (B). Let g = 1, ..., G denote these groups. Let pgj
represent the second order statistic from auction j in group g, and let B9 represent
the number of bidders present at the sale. Let p9 3 be written
p93 = o(ug) + /(ug )B, + -y(ugj)Xj + E(ugj , ,g)
where X9, represents observable auction heterogeneity. The term ?7g captures group-
level unobservables which specifically affect prices in auctions in which there are B
bidders present. If the number of bidders, B9 , is treated as exogenous, grouped
estimation can be performed by first doing u-quantile regression of p93 on X 3 and
a constant, separately for each group, and then regressing this constant on B9 using
a linear regression. If X 3 is not included in the equation, our grouped estimator
consists of simply selecting the uth quantile of bids for each group and regressing this
quantile on B 9. Larsen (2012a) applies this approach to data from wholesale used-
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car auctions and finds a positive and significant coefficient on the number of bidders
present at each u quantile tested, consistent with the symmetric IPV assumption.
If instead the number of bidders is treated as endogenous, that is, rg affects prices
as well as the number of bidders participating, then the second step of the grouped
estimator would be replaced with 2SLS using an instrument for the number of bidders.
For example, Haile et al. (2003) study US timber auctions and develop a different test
of the IPV assumption which also relies on instrumenting for the number of bidders
present. As instruments, they use the numbers of nearby sawmills and logging firms
as instruments for the number of bidders.
3.5 Asymptotic Theory
Let Fig(.) and fig(.) denote the conditional cumulative distribution function of yi,
given (zig, x9 , qg) and its derivative respectively where we suppress dependence on
(zig, xg, ijg) for the brevity of notation. Let Eg[-] = E[-Ix, g]. Denote
Jg(u) = Eg[(1, z'g)'(1, z g)fig(ag(u) + Z' g(u)|].
We will assume the following regularity conditions:
Al (Design). Observations are independent across groups. In addition, observations
{(yig, zig), i = 1, ..., Ng} are independent and identically distributed conditional on
(xg, I 7g) .
A2 (Covariates). |jzig|| < C and ||xg|j C a.s.
A3 (Density). (i) For all u E U, fig(-) is continuously differentiable in B(ag(u) +
zig'Y(u), 1/C) with the derivative fi(-) satisfying Ifig(x)I C for all x E B(ag(u) +
zig-)(u), 1/C) and |fj'g(ag(u) + z'g (u)|) > 1/C a.s. (ii) For all u E U and x E
B(ag (u) + z'g-y(u), 1/C), fig(x) C a.s.
A4 (Matrix Jg(u)). (i) For all u E U, all eigenvalues of Jg(u) are bounded from below
by 1/C a.s. (ii) For all u1 , u 2 E U, IIJgI(ui) - J- 1 (u2)|| Clui - U2 |1/ 2 .
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A5 (Coefficients). (i) For all u, u2 E U, ||7(ui) - 7(u 2)|| Clui - U21. (ii) For all
Ui, U2 E U, ||#(ui) - /3(u 2)1| Clmi - U21-
A6 (Noise). (i) For all U1 ,u 2 E U, |E(Ui, ?,) - E(u2 ,)I < CUl -U21 a.s. (ii) For
some u c U, E[lE(u, r,)I] < C.
A7 (Quantile indices). U is a compact set included in (0, 1).
A8 (Instruments). (i) E[E(u, y,)|w9] = 0 a.s. (ii) ||wg|| < C a.s. (iii) All eigenvalues
of E[wgw'] and all singular values of E[wgx'] are bounded away from zero in absolute
value.
A9 (Growth Condition). vx/maxg=1,...,G(log(N)/Ng) -+ 0 as G -* oo.
Assumption 1 excludes inter-dependence across groups and conditional inter-
dependence across individuals within groups given group-level information. Assump-
tion 2 can always be satisfied by a suitable transformation of the data. Assumption 3 is
a mild regularity condition. Assumption 4 holds if all eigenvalues of E[(1, z')'(1, z9 )]
are bounded away from zero by 1/C, which is a standard condition in regression
analysis, and fig(ag(u) + z' 7(u)) > 1/C a.s. Assumptions 4-ii, 5, and 6 are mild
continuity conditions. Assumption 7 excludes quantile indices that are too close to
boundaries. Assumption 8-iii implicitly means that E[w 9w'] and E[wgx',] exist (the
existence of the former expectation also follows from assumption 8-ii). Finally, as-
sumption 9 implies that the number of observations per group grows sufficiently fast
and gives a particular growth rate that suffices for our results. Thus, the estimator
should be suitable for situations where the researcher has micro-level data on indi-
viduals within a group, and each group is assumed to come from a large population,
such as a city, state, school district, etc.
We start with establishing a subgaussian tail bound for the first stage quantile
estimator. This result also applies to a general quantile estimator and, thus, might be
of independent interest. It implies that large deviations of the quantile estimator from
the true value are extremely unlikely. Note also that the result is non-asymptotic.
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Theorem 1 (Subgaussian tail bound). Let assumptions 1-9 hold. Then for all g =
1, ...,I G,
P{sup ||(&g(u), j(u)')' - (agu, g(u)')'|| > x} CeCX2 Ng
uU
In particular,
P{sup|&g(u) - ag(u)| > x} < Ce-CX2Ng
uU
Remark 1. In principle, it is possible to calculate the exact constants in the inequal-
ity (3.4). We do not do that because it is not needed for our results.
We now present our main convergence result that establishes the asymptotic be-
havior of our estimator.
Theorem 2 (Main convergence result). Let assumptions 1-9 hold. Then we have
'\_(()- !3Q-)) =:> G(.), in £f0(U)
where G(-) is the zero-mean Gaussian process with uniformly continuous sample paths
and covariance function C(u 1,u 2 ) = SJ(U1 , u 2 )S' where S = (QxQlQ'x1 Q- Q1-I
and J(u, U 2 ) = E[e(ui, rg)e(U2 ,rg)wgw'].
Remark 2. In particular, Theorem 2 implies that for any u E U, -V/(#(u) -3(u)) =>
N(O, V). where V = SJ(u, u)S'.
The result in Theorem 2 derives the asymptotic behavior of our estimator. In
order to perform inference, we also need an estimator of the asymptotic covariance
function. For all U1 , u2 E U, let
C(ui, U2) = SJ(ui, U2 )S'
where
S = (G-1Gx G,xwQGww,
G
J(ui, u2) = E((&g(ui) - X'#)(&g(U2) - X'3)wgw),
g=1
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QG,xw = X'W/G, and QG,ww = W'W/G.
We show that C(ui, U2 ) is consistent for C(ui, U2 ) uniformly over u1 , u 2 E U.
Theorem 3 (Estimating C(-,-)). Let assumptions 1-9 hold. Then jjC(ui, u2)-C(ui, u2)|| =
o,(1) uniformly over u1 , U2 EU.
Remark 3. Theorems 2 and 3 can be used for hypothesis testing concerning /3(u)
for a given quantile index u E U. In particular, we have that /Ud(u, u))- 1 /2(/(u) -
/3(u)) => N(O, 1). Importantly for applied researchers, Theorems 2 and 3 demonstrate
that heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for our estimator can be obtained by
traditional White (1980) standard errors.
Finally, we show how to obtain confidence bands for /3(u) that hold uniformly over
U. Let D c 1, ..., d. denote a subset of components of # a researcher is interested in.
Define
T = max sup Vs/U(d(u, U)jj)-1/ 2 ((u), - O(u)j)|, (3.5)
jED UEU
and let c1 _- denote (1 - a) quantile of T. Then uniform confidence bands of level a
for /3(u)j can be constructed as
1/2 1/2-
d(u, u)jj d (u, U)jj[(u)j - ci- ( G , (u), + ci C u . (3.6)
These confidence bands are infeasible because ci-a is unknown. We suggest estimat-
ing c1 _- by subsampling. Assume that subsample size b satisfies b -+ oo but b/G -+ 0.
For subsample of groups {gi, ... , gI}, run the second step of our estimator (2SLS regres-
sion) to obtain /(u, g1 , ... , gb) using the data {xgi, Wgi, &gi }E{g,...,g,,} Then calculate
T(gi, ..., gb) using equation (3.5) with (ug 1 , g ..., gb)j and /(u), replacing #(u)j and
#(u)j, respectively, and b replacing G over all subsamples of size b. Then c1 _0 can
be estimated as the (1 - a) empirical quantile of the sample {T(gi, .. , g)} where
{g, ... , gb} varies over all subsamples of groups of size b. Denote this estimator by
1 Then a feasible version of uniform confidence bands is given by equation (3.6)
with 1_, replacing ci-,. The validity of these confidence bands is established in the
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following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Validity of Uniform Confidence Bands). Let assumptions 1-9 hold. In
addition, suppose that all eigenvalues of E[e(u, r 9,) 2 w,,w' are bounded away from zero.
Then
( (u) E[(u) -- 1-(u)1 , 3(u) + (1(u- ) 1/2
P~~~~~  ~ O-1-a *j -- aG ,*)
for all u EU andj ED
3.6 Simulations
In order to investigate the properties of our estimator and compare to traditional
quantile regression, we generate data according to the following model:
yjg = zigy(Ztjg) + x9 /3(ui9 ) + E(uig, 71g~) (3.7)
The variable xg is correlated with ?g, where
Xg = rWg+ Yg +Vg (3.8)
and wg, vg, and zig are each distributed exp(0.25*N[0, 1]), while uj9 and 77g are both
distributed U[0, 1]. The quantile coefficient functions are -y(U) = #(u) = U1 / 2 , and
e(u, i) = u7. The parameter 7r = 1.
In addition to the case where xg is endogenous, we also examine two special cases.
First, we examine the case in which x. is exogenous, meaning qg does not enter (3.8).
Second, we examine the case where x, is exogenous and no group-level unobservables
are included, meaning qg = 0. The latter corresponds to the case in which standard
quantile regression will be unbiased.
We perform our estimator and standard quantile regression for decile (u = 0.1, ... , 0.9)
with the number of groups (G) and the number of observations per group (N) given
by (N, G) = (200,200), (200,25), (25,200), (25, 25). 10,000 Monte Carlo replications
were used. The results are displayed in Figures 3-1 and 3-2.
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Figure 3-1: Bias of Grouped Estimator vs. Quantile Regression; 200 Groups
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Notes: Figures show mean bias for 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations with 200 groups.
The number of observations per group is indicated above each column, and the
group shock type is indicated by each row's y-axis labels. Dashed lines plot mean
bias of standard quantile regression, and solid lines plot the mean bias of the
grouped estimator.
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Figure 3-2: Bias of Grouped Estimator vs. Quantile Regression; 25 Groups
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Notes: Figures show mean bias for 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations with 25 groups.
The number of observations per group is indicated above each column, and the
group shock type is indicated by each row's y-axis labels. Dashed lines plot mean
bias of standard quantile regression, and solid lines plot the mean bias of the
grouped estimator.
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Figure 3-1 displays the simulation results with a large number of groups (G = 200).
Panels on the left of Figure 3-1 use few individuals per group (N = 25) and panels on
the right use many individuals per group (N = 200). In each panel, the solid (blue)
line represents the bias of the grouped IV quantile regression estimator, the dashed
(red) line represents the bias of standard quantile regression, and the dotted (black)
line marks the horizontal axis.
Panels (a) and (b) demonstrate that, in the presence of endogeneity, the bias of
the grouped estimator is significantly lower than that of standard quantile regression.
Panels (c) and (d) display the results when xg is exogenous but r9, is still non-zero,
meaning that there is left-hand-side measurement error which standard quantile re-
gression would not account for. In this case, standard quantile regression is biased, as
suggested by Hausman (2001), while the grouped estimator performs well.5 The final
panels, (e) and (f), display the results when x, is exogenous and no group shocks
are included (ri, = 0). In this situation, standard quantile regression is unbiased,
and is somewhat less biased than the grouped estimator. However, the bias of the
grouped estimator is also very low, as can be seen from the scale of the vertical axis.
A comparison of the panels on the left to the panels on the right suggests that the
bias of both estimators decreases as the number of individuals in each group grows
large, although this bias improvement is small in most cases.
The simulation results for the few-groups case (G = 25) are displayed in Figure
3-2. A similar pattern emerges to that in Figure 3-1. Even with small N and small
G, the grouped estimator clearly outperforms standard quantile regression whether
x9 is endogenous or exogenous, as seen in panels (a) and (c). Panel (e) demonstrates
that, with no group-level shocks, quantile regression may still have bias when few
individuals (N = 25) are included in each group. This bias decreases as N increases
to 200, as seen in panel (f). Overall, the results are indicative that if group-level
unobservables are present whether they be exogenous or endogenous- the grouped
estimator can have significantly less bias.
5For the case where 0(u) is linear in u, standard quantile regression is biased toward the median
estimator, 3(0.5).
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an approach for estimating distributional effects of
a group-level treatment variable. The estimator is simple, consisting of the following
steps: 1) For each group, perform quantile regression of the outcome on individual-
level covariates and on a constant; 2) perform a linear regression of the group-level
constants on the group-level treatment; if the treatment is correlated with group-level
unobservables, this linear regression should be a 2SLS regression. While this approach
is straightforward and intuitive, we provide a rigorous derivation of the asymptotic
properties of the estimator and demonstrate that it is consistent and asymptotically
normal.
Simulations show that this estimator has much lower bias than standard quantile
regression in the presence of group-level shocks, which are present in many applied
microeconomic models. We find this improvement over standard quantile regression
both in the case where the group-level treatment is exogenous and in the case where it
is endogenous. We provide several applied microeconomics examples of this estimator
in practice. We believe the estimator has potential for application in a variety of other
settings as well.
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3.A Proofs
In this Appendix, we first prove some preliminary lemmas. Then we present the
proofs of the theorems stated in the main part of the text.
We will use the following additional notation. Denote Zig = (1, z4 g), =g(u)
(a,(u), -(u)')', and g(u) = (&g(u), j(u)')'. Let A (u) = (a1(U), ... ,aG (u))' and
3(u) = (X'Pw X) (X'Pw A(u)).
For r, 6 E Rd2+1, and u C U, consider the function f7,, : Rd- x R -* R defined by
fA,(z, y) (1, z')r(1{y (1, z')S} - u).
Let F = {f ,,,u : r/, 6 E Rd2+1; U C U}, i.e. F is the class of functions fn, ,u as 7, 6
vary over Rd2+1 and u varies over U. For 6 c Rd2+1 and u E U, let the function
h6,u : Rdz x R --* Rd2+1 be defined by
h6,u(z, y) = (1, z')'(1{y 5 (1, z') } - u).
Let hk,6,u denote kth component of h6 ,u. Let Nk = {hk,6,u : 6 E Rdz+1; u E U1. Note
that NHk C F for all k = 1,..., dz + 1.
We will also use the following notation from the empirical process literature,
Ng
G9 (f) = (f(zig, yi,) - Eg[f (zig, yig)]) / /Ng
for f E F or f E Hik.
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Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 1. Under assumption RC, for all u E U and for any 6 E Rdz+1 satisfying
16 - 69(u)| 1 1/C,
IEg[hb,u(zig, yig)] - J (u) (6 - 6g(u))|| < Cl16 - 6g (u)||2, (3.9)
E9 [(6 - 6g(u))'hb,u(zig,yg)] (1/C)|6 - 6g(u)||2. (3.10)
Proof. Second order Taylor expansion around 6g(u) gives
Eg[hs,u (zig, yig)] = Eg[Zig(1{ yig Z,6} - u)] = Eg[Zig(Fg (Zig6) - u)]
= Eg[Zig(Fg(Zig6g(u)) - u)] + J,(u)(6 - 6g(u)) + rn(u),
where rn(U) is the remainder. The first claim follows from the facts that Eg[Zig(Fg(Zg6g (u))-
u)] = 0, which holds because Zj,6g(u) is the conditional u-quantile of yig, and that
|1rn(u)I I C 16 - 6g(u)||2 by assumptions 2 and 3.
To prove the second claim, note that if |16 - 6g(u)|| is sufficiently small, then
1(6 - 6g(u))'rn(U)|| 5 (1/C) 6 - 6g(u) 112 for arbitrarily large constant C. On the
other hand,
(6 - 6g(u))'Jg(u)(6 - 6g(u)) (1/C) 116 - 6g(u) ||2
by assumption 4. Combining these inequalities gives the second claim. L
Lemma 2. Consider the function class F defined in the beginning of the Appendix.
We have that F is a VC subgraph class of functions. Moreover, for all k = 1, ..., dz +1,
'Hgk is a VC subgraph class of functions as well.
Proof. Similar proof can be found in Belloni et al. (2006). We present the proof here
for the sake of completeness. Consider the class of sets {x E Rdz+ 2 : a'x < 0} with a
varying over Rd 2 . It is well known that this is a VC subgraph class of sets, see, for
example, exercise 14 of chapter 2.6 in Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996). Further,
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note that
= ({y < (1, z')6} nf {(1, z')r > t/(1 - u)})
U ({y > (1, z')6} n {(1, z')r/ < -t/u}) .
Therefore, the first result follows from lemma 2.6.17 (ii and iii) in Van der Vaart and
Wellner (1996). The second result follows from the fact thatk C F.
Lemma 3. For all c E (0, C) and u(0) E U,
I|21E sup
uEU:|u-u(O)I<6
< Cc.
Proof. We have
E sup
q1EU:|u-u(O)|IE
E sup
k=1 UEU:|u-u(0)|66
|G(h 69,,1) - G9 (h6 g(u(0)),u(O)) 112
I G9 (h,,,u) - G9 (hk,69 (U(O)),U(O))
Consider the function F :Rd- x R --+ R given by
F(z, y) = C (1{Iy - (1, z')6o(u(0)), u(0)| 1 Cc + c)
for some sufficiently large C > 0. By assumptions 2, 5, and 6, ||6g(u) - og(u(0))|| <
Clu - u(0)I a.s., and so |Z gg(u) - 6g(u(0)))| Clu - u(0)| a.s. Therefore, for all
u c U satisfying In - u(0)| 1 <,
Jhk,6g(11),it(Zig1Yig) - hk,6g(7t(o)),ii(o)(Zig, Yig)| < F(zjg, yig)
a.s. Note that Eg[F 2 (zig, yg)] < Cc by assumption 3. By lemma 2, 'Hk is a VC
subgraph class of functions. So, applying theorem 6, part (ii), from Appendix B with
177
< C 2
{(Z, yI t) : f'j,3,a(z, y) > t} I
||I GI(hog (U),1) - Gg(h6 g(U(0)),s(0))
F as an envelope yields
sup
uEU:Iu-u(0)|I6 |G
9 (hk,6g,u) - G9 (hk,6g(u(O)),U(O)) 2 < CE
for all k = 1, ..., dz + 1. The claim of the lemma follows.
Lemma 4. For all e E (0, C),
E [sup sup
[UEU 5ERdz+l: II6-6g(U)Ij<E
|G9 (h6,7) - G9(h6g(u),u)|| C(c+1/ N) log (1/(c + 1/ N)).
Proof. We have
E sup sup |G 9(h&,u) - G9(hb,(u),u)[ EU 6ERdz+1:||6--6,(u)I|<c
dz+1
< CEE sup sup |G9(hk,6,u) - Gg(hkJ ,3(U),e)
k=1 .IIEU 66 Rdz+1:||6-6,(Ug jgE
Consider the function class
H~k = {hk,J,u - hk6()Uu E U; j16 - 6g(u)II - 'E.
We have that Nk c F - F. Therefore, it follows from lemma 2 that Sk has a poly-
nomial uniform entropy. In addition, all functions from Sk are bounded in absolute
value by some constant C. Applying theorem 6, part (i), from Appendix B yields
E sup |G9(f)| CE [/ 1 + log (1/x)dxl.[ f "1-tk [ ,JOy |
where =upE 7 ~k Z I f (zig, yig)I /Ng.
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0
Since x, < C a.s., integrating by parts gives
0< E [J0 1+ log(1/x)dxl < CE [jXfl log (1/x)dx]
< CE [Xn log (1/xn) - (1/2) 1/ log (1/x)dx] CE[xn Vlog (1/xn)]
< CE[xn1 log (1/E[xn]).
where in the last line we used the fact that the function 1(x) = x log (1/x) is concave.
Indeed, calculations show that
l'(x) = flog (1/x) - 1/(2/log (1/x))
l"(x) -1/(2x Vlog (1/x)) - 1/(4x log (1/x) 3/ 2 ) < 0.
So,
E sup
ULfik
IG-G(f) |I< CE[xn] log (1/E[x]). (3.11)
Now, to calculate E[xn], we apply theorem 6, part (ii), from Appendix B. We have
E sup
[f Ek
G(If) < C. (3.12)
This theorem applies because the function class { fI : f E 7 1 k } also has polynomial
uniform entropy because for any random variables X and Y, we have
E[(IXI--YI) 2] = E[X 2 ]+E[Y2]-2E[IXYI] E[X 2]+E[Y2]-2E[XY] E[(X-Y) 2].
In addition, for all f E lik, E[If(zg,ygI] < CE. Combining this inequality with
(3.12) gives E[xn] < C(c + 1/ N9 ). The result follows from this inequality and that
in (3.11). 0
Lemma 5. Let assumptions RC and I hold. Then
G
- J1(u)G9(hg(u),u)w'/ v/b = O,(1)
g=1
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uniformly over u E U.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we apply theorem 5 from Appendix B with the semi-
metric p(ui, u2 ) = CV/ui - u2 | for u1 , u2 E U and some sufficiently large constant
C > 0. Clearly, p is Gaussian-dominated. Define vg(u) = Jg-1(u)G9(hjg(.),u) and
Zk,m,g(U) = Vk,g(U)Wm,g/VG
where Vk,g(u) and wmg denote kth and mth components of vg(u) and wg correspond-
ingly. Then for any a > 0,
GS E[sup |Zk,m,g(u)|1{sup IZk,m,g (u) > a}]
g=1 uEU UEU
G
" E[sup Z2,m,g (u)1{sup IZk,m,g(u)I > a a
g=1 uCU UEU
" E[sUP(Vkg (u)wm,g) 2 1{sup lVk,g(u)wm,g| > V'_a o/a
UEU uEU
" CE[sup JIG 9(h69(U)U )112 1{SUP J1G9(hjg(u),u)jj > Cx/ba}]/a
UEU uU
dz+1
E CE[sup G-(hj,sg(s),u) 2 1{sup Gg(h,6 g(U),u) > CV/da/
j uU=1 U
(d2 + 1)}]/a = L
where we used assumptions 4 and 8-ii. Note that hj,6g(u),u E F and Ihp,6g(u),u(zig, yig) I
C a.s. for all j = 1, ... , dz + 1. Therefore, combining lemma 2 and theorem 6, part
(ii), from Appendix B yields E[supucu Gg(h 3,9 (),U) 2 ] C. So, by the Dominated
Convergence Theorem, L -+ 0, which gives the condition (i) of theorem 5.
Further, for any ui, u2 E U,
GS E [(Zk,m, 9 (Ul) - Zk,m,g(U2)) 2 ]
g=1
K E [(Vk,g(U1) - Vk,g(U2)) 2 M,91
KCE [IIJ- 1 (u1 ) - J-'(U2)||2| G(ti),7i)(X.][3)
+CE [||J7 (U2) |2||G9(h3,(u1),u1 - hog(U2),W)P
where we used assumption 8. Since IG9(hg(uli)1|2 < C, the expression in line (3.13)
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is bounded from above by Cjui - U21 by assumption 4-ii. In addition, |Jg- 1(u2)|| C
by assumption 4-i and
dz+1
E [||G9(h.(u1 ),u1 - h6,(U 2 ),u2 ) 12] E[(h,(u1),u1
k=1
- h69( 2 ),U2 )2 ] Clui - U21-
Therefore, the expression in line (3.14) is bounded by Clui - U2| as well, and so
G
E E [(Zk,m,g(Ui) - Zk,m,g(U2)) 2 ] Clui - U21 p(ui, u2 ),
g=1
which is the condition (ii) of theorem 5.
Finally, the condition (iii) of theorem 5 holds because
G
sup t2P
t>0g 1
sup |Zk,m,g(U) - Zk,m,g(U(0)(u:p(u,u(0)) E
G '
E E sup
g=1 ,uEU:p(uu(0
< C2 /2 + CE
UEU:
IZk,n,g(U) - Zk,m,g(u(0))2
))<E
sup ||G 9 (ho(u),u - h6o(u(o)),u(o))| 21
p(U,U(0)) E
where we used Markov inequality in the second line, and the same argument as in
the verification of the second condition and lemma 3 in the third line (recall also that
the constant in the definition of p is sufficiently large).
The claim of the lemma now follows by applying theorem 5.
Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Since pu(-) is convex, for x > 0, 69(u)-6 9()u)| x for all u G U
if and only if
Ng
(3.15)inf inf __ frg()+X?,,u(zig, yig)/Ng > 0.
uU nCERdz+1;IIl=1
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It follows from lemma 1, inequality (3.10) that inequality (3.15) holds if
Ng
inf gf (frj,69 (u)+xq,u(Zig, yig) - Eg[fn,6 ,(u)±xq,u(zig, yig)]) /Ng > -Cx,
UEUqE~z~; 1771=1i=1
which in turn follows if
inf inf Gg(fy,6,u) -CxVN 9 . (3.16)UEU 7,6ERdz+1;II1||=1
Note that for any / E Rdz+1 satisfying ||r| = 1, Jj,6,u| 2||Z 9 || < C a.s. by
assumption 2. In addition, it follows from lemma 2 and theorem 2.6.7 in Van der
Vaart and Wellner (1996) that the condition of theorem 7 holds for the function class
{f ,Au E F : I||r|| = 1}. Therefore, theorem 7 shows that inequality (3.16) holds with
probability not smaller than
1 - C(x VNg)C exp(-2(Cx Ng)2 ) > 1 - Cexp(-Cx2 N,).
The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that v"((u) -
(u)) = op(1) uniformly over u C U. Second, we show that VU(3(-) - #(-)) = G(-)
in f (U). Combining these steps gives the result.
Recall that OG,xx = X'W/G and OG,ww = W'W/G. Then we have
VG(3(u) - A(u)) = QG,xw1Qw ,xw ,xw G m (W'(A(u) 
- A(u))/v/b).
By assumptions 1 and 8-iii, X'W/C -G E[xgw'], W'W --+, E[ww' ], and
Y= Q , Q G,xwQ -i, (QxwQwwQI xwQ7, = S. (3.17)
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Therefore, to prove the first step, it suffices to show that
G
S(u) = E ( (u) - J.(u))w' / /N = op(1)
9=1
uniformly over u E U (recall that 6.(u)- % (u) is the first component of , -(u) g(u)).
Write S(u) = S1(u) + S2 (u) where
G
=- J 1(u)G-(h 6,(u),u)w'/ /GN,
9=1
= ~ (~9 1(u)G(hg(u),u) + vN( 6 g(u) - 9(n)))
g=1
W' / GNg.
Consider Si (u). Combining assumptions 2, 4, 8-ii, and 9 gives
E[S2Qu)] < C/ min N. -+ 0,g=1,...,G
so S1(u) = op(1). Lemma 5 shows that this convergence holds uniformly over u E U.
Consider S2 (u). Let
Kg = Ko log (Ng)/Ng (3.18)
for some sufficiently large constant KO > 0. Let DG be the event that
max sup ||6(u) - 6g(u)|| < Kg,g=1,--.,G qEU
and let D' be the event that DG does not hold. Using the result of theorem 1, choose
a constant KO sufficiently large so that
P{sup ||g(u) - g(u)|| > K 9 } < CN 3 .
uU
By the union bound, P{D&} CGN- 3 . By assumption 7, CGNg-3 -* 0. Therefore,
S2(u) = S2(u)1{DG} + S2(u)1{D'} = S2(u)1{DG} + op(1)
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S1(u)
S2(u)
uniformly over u E U. Further, |S 2 (u)1{DG}I C gi r1,9 + r2,g + r3,g)/AGN
where
r1,g = sup. sup Jg- (u)(G-(h6,) - G9 (hSg(u),u))|
uEM 6ERdz+1:||6-og(u)||$Kg
Ng
r2 ,, = sup |Jg-1(u) hg(UU (zig, yig)/ VN 9 ,UEU
r3,, = sUp sup IK E f N(Jg-1(u)h6,u(zig, yig) - (- 6g (U)]I
uGU 6CGRdz+:jc5.-Cg(u)j K,
By lemma 4, E[r1,g] C log (N.)/ N. By the optimality of og (u) and since yig has
a continuous conditional distribution, r 2,9  C/Ng a.s., and so E[r2,g] C/ N9 .
Finally, by lemma 1,
E [r3 ,g] C N9 K2 C log (Ng)/ N
Hence, by assumption 9,
E[sup S2 (u)1{DG}|] Cv/ G max (log (Ng)/Ng) = o(1)
uEU g=1,...,G
implying that V/5((u) - )(u)) = og(1) uniformly over u E U and completing the
first step.
To prove that v/'b(3(-) - (()) -> G(.  in f'(U) (the second step), note that by
assumptions 8 and 6,
||g(e(Ui, Tg) - E(U 2 , 99)) E(Ui, g) - E(u 2 , I Cu1 - U2 1,
and so combining theorems 2.7.11 and 2.5.6 of Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996)
implies that Eg_ wge(-, rg)//N - G (-) in PO(U) where 5(-) is a Gaussian process
with uniformly continuous sample paths and covariance function E[5(ui)G(U2 )'] =
E[e(ui, 77g)e(u 2 , rl9)wgw']. Combining this convergence result with that in (3.17) gives
the second step.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Equation 3.17 in the proof of theorem 2 gives S -*> S. There-
fore, it suffices to prove that || (ui, u 2 ) - J(Ui, u 2) = o(1) uniformly over U1 , U2 E U.
Note that ag(u) - xg/ = (u, r7,). Hence,
dq(u) - x', = (&g(u) - ag(u)) - x'( - 3) + (u, r) =I1,(u) - I2 + e(u, r7g)
where I1,g(u) = 6,(u) - ag(u) and 12 = x',(# - /). Further, we have
C9
G
EW~jni,/)E(U2, %l)w,w')/G -+p JAUi, U2)
g=1
uniformly over u1, U2 E U by the uniform law of large numbers with bracketing
(theorem 2.4.1 in Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996)). In addition,
G
(I,g (1)I1,g(U2)WgW')/GII < Il K wgW' I/G+o,(1) < C .aG
g=1
K9+op(1) = op(1)
uniformly over u1 , u2 E U as in the proof of theorem 2 (see equation 3.18 for the
definition of K,). Moreover,
G
jZ(I1,(u1)E(u2, 79g)ww')/G||
g=1
G
< ||[(KF(U 2,?7g)wgw')/G| + op(l)
g=1
G
CZ Kg|(U 2, r7gI/G + op(1) = o,(1)
9=1
uniformly over u1 , u2 c U where the last equality follows because
E[IE(u2, ii)1] C + E[Iri(u, rg)|} C
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| E
g=1
by assumption 6. Similarly,
G
((I2U;w')/G|I < Csup |3(u) - 0(u)|I = op(1),
g=1 LC
G G
1 Z(2e(u2, ,)wgw')/G|| CZ e(U2, 7g)| sup ||f(u) - 3(u)||/G = o,(1).
g=1 g=1 UEU
Finally,
G G
|| Y(11,(u1j)2ww')/G|I | C>Z Kg sup ||(u) - 0(u)||/ G + op(1) = o0(1).
g=1 g=1 UEU
Combining these inequalities gives the asserted claim. 1
Proof. 4 It follows from assumptions on singular values of Q,2 and eigenvalues of
Qw, and E[E(u, qg)2 WgW,] that all eigenvalues of C(u, u) are bounded away from zero
uniformly over u E U. Combining theorems 2 and 3 and using Continuous Mapping
Theorem then implies that the statistic T converges weakly to some continuous dis-
tribution. Further, the statistic T calculated over a subsample of size b converges to
same distribution since our theory applies to this statistic (in particular, assumption 9
clearly holds for the subsample). The rest of the proof consists of applying a standard
argument for subsampling consistency; see, for example, theorem 15.7.1 in Lehmann
and Romano (2005).
3.B Tools
In Appendix A, we used several results from the Theory of Empirical Processes that
are rarely used in Econometrics literature. For ease of reference, we describe those
results in this section.
A semimetric p: F x F -* R+ is called Gaussian if it can be defined as
p(f, g) = (E[(G(f) - G(g))2])1
186
where G is a tight, zero-mean, Gaussian random element in 1 (F). A semimetric
p is called Gaussian-dominated if it is bounded from above by Gaussian metric. In
particular, it is known any semimetric p satisfying
j log N(, F,p)de < 00
0o
is Gaussian-dominated; see discussion on page 212 in Van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996).
Theorem 5 (Bracketing by Gaussian Hypotheses). For each n, let Z1i, ..., Znmn be
independent stochastic processes indexed by an arbitrary index set F. Suppose that
there exists a Gaussian-dominated semimetric p on F such that
"in() E* [11|ZrtjIlly{||1Znilly > r/}] - 0, for every r/ > 0,
(ii) E[(Zni(f) - Zn, (g)) 2 ] p2 (f, g), for every f, g,
Mn
(iii) sup t2P* sup IZ", (f) Z, (g)| > t E2,
t>0 f,gEB(e-)
for every p-ball B(E) C F of radius less than E and for every n. Then the sequence
* (Zn,4- E[Zn]) is asymptotically tight in l(F). It converges in distribution
provided it converges marginally.
Proof. See Theorem 2.11.11 in Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996). E
Theorem 6. Let F be a P-measurable class of measurable functions with measurable
envelope function F. Then
(i) || sup lGn(f)|*||p ,< ||J(On,F)||F jn||p,,f E-F
(ii) || sup lGjj(f)|*|p,, ,< J(1, T) ||F||P,2vp, 1 _ p.f ET
Here n = supf IE|f | *||IF||7, where ||-||n is the L2(Pn)-seminorm and the inequalities
are valid up to constants depending only on p involved in the statement.
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Proof. See Theorem 2.14.1 in Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996).
Theorem 7. Let C be a class of sets that satisfies
sup N(e, C, L1 (Q)) 5 (-i , for every 0 < e < K
where supremum is taken over all probability measures Q. Then
D DKT2 v 2P*(supIG(1)|) K - (1e t
CEC t ( V
for every t > 0 and a constant D that depends on K only.
Proof. See Theorem 2.14.13 in Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996). El
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